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GPS Vulnerability Assessment. International Loran Association October 28, 2002 s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s Michael Shaw U.S. Department of Transportation. Overview. Background Action Plan Radionavigation Systems Task Force The Way Ahead. Background.
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GPS Vulnerability Assessment International Loran Association October 28, 2002 s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s Michael Shaw U.S. Department of Transportation
Overview • Background • Action Plan • Radionavigation Systems Task Force • The Way Ahead
Background • PDD-63 tasked DOT to assess vulnerability of transportation infrastructure relying on GPS • Analyze civil aviation, maritime, and surface use to assess the ways each is impacted by GPS outage • Steps to minimize impacts of GPS outages • Safety, operational, environmental, and economic • Overall Finding • GPS key element of nation’s transportation infrastructure • GPS is vulnerable to interference/disruption • Independent backup systems/procedures needed in critical applications Study released the day before Sep 11th
Background (cont’d) • 16 specific recommendations to mitigate the impact on transportation systems • Continue GPS modernization to include GPS III • More civil signals/higher broadcast power • Implement appropriate mitigation strategies • For each individual mode, maintain appropriate backup systems or procedures • Reflect impact of interference in application designs • Monitor/report/locate sources of interference • Applicability of military anti-jam technology • DOT develop Navigation Infrastructure Roadmap for the future
Background (cont’d) • Dec 01 -DOT Pos/Nav Exec Committee • Operating Administrations concurred with report recommendations • Endorsed proposed mitigation action plan • March 02-Secretary approved plan • Department currentlyimplementing • DOT Positioning and Navigation Executive Committee overseeing implementation • Task Force conducting RadionavigationCapabilities Assessment
Overview • Background • Action Plan • Radionavigation Systems Task Force • The Way Ahead
Action Plan Goals • Ensure thatGPSfulfills its potential as akey elementof the nation’s transportation infrastructure • Ensure that the vulnerabilities identified in the reportdo not affect the safety and security of our transportation system • Contains 12 elements
Vulnerability Mitigation Ensure adequate backup systems/procedures Continue GPS modernization Continue spectrum protection Enhance interference location capabilities Risk Awareness Emphasize education programs Conduct periodic public outreach Send letters to industry, state/local DOTs Work with GPS Industry Council GPS Receiver Enhancement Facilitate transfer of DoD AJ technology Certify safety-critical GPS receivers Develop GPS receiver standards Future Direction Intermodal radionavigation capabilities assessment Make decision on the future of LORAN-C by end of CY02 Develop Roadmap for 2003 Federal Radionavigation Plan Action Plan Elements
Overview • Background • Action Plan • Radionavigation Systems Task Force • The Way Ahead
Radionavigation Systems Task Force • Chartered to conduct a multi-modal capability assessment of radionavigation systems • Complete assessment of the future mix of systems to meet all requirements of the U.S. Transportation infrastructure • From both a capability and cost perspective • Consider requirements of non-transportation users of Federal Radionavigation Systems • Forward recommendation to Secretary to support a decision by end of CY02
Technical Approach • Identify requirements of transportation modes • Define capabilities of different systems • Conduct technical assessment of systems • Capabilities vs. Requirements • Develop alternatives of system mixes • Reduce to 4-6 alternatives • Criteria for evaluation of remaining alternatives • Cost, performance, backup • Political, impact to others • Provide recommendation on best alternative • To satisfy national need for positioning and timing services for at least the next 10 years
Assumptions • 2001 Federal Radionavigation Plan (FRP) • Baseline for radionavigation systems • Include GPS capabilities only through GPS modernized Block IIF (i.e., 2 new civil signals) • GPS III will be evaluated once system is defined • Augmentations to GPS are not backup radionavigation systems for GPS • WAAS, LAAS, and NDGPS (includes MDGPS) • All depend on receiving basic GPS position • If GPS position lost, value of augmentation lost
Evaluation • Produced detailed matrices of requirements • 2001 Federal Radionavigation Plan • GPS Operational Requirements Document (Feb 2000) • Other validated requirements • Produced detailed matrices of systems capabilities • Evaluated Capabilities vs Requirements • Integrity, availability, coverage, accuracy, and continuity
Alternatives • Developed 12 alternatives from the baseline • Based on assumptions and capabilities vs requirements assessment • Guidance from the POS/NAV EC on several issues • FAA Navigation and Landing Transition Strategy • Forwarded to the DOT on Aug 21, 2002 • Results integrated into Task Force evaluation • Reduced to 4 for further evaluation • Pros & cons for each alternative
Issues Should radionavigation systems in R&D be considered in current alternative mixes? • LAAS Cat II/III (FAA); High Accuracy NDGPS (FHWA); enhanced Loran (FAA, Coast Guard); GPS III (DoD/AF); and Galileo (EU) Decision: Do not include R&D systems until completion of R&D • Performance and lifecycle costs for systems are unknown at this time • Modes continue investments in R&D systems • Each R&D effort should assess feasibility to meet other mode performance requirements
Issues Can a single augmentation system (i.e. WAAS or DGPS) meet cross-modal transportation requirements? • 1994 National Augmentation Study • Field both the NDGPS and WAAS systems to meet individual mode requirements • Coordinate all Federal augmented GPS systems • Ensure optimal use of resources by maximizing commonality of system components • Task Force validated 1994 Study Decision: Continue both WAAS and NDGPS • FAA/CG examine co-location of future WAAS and NDGPS monitor stations
Issues What is decision path for Loran-C in 2002? • Transportation requirements not met by Loran-C • The POS/NAV EC examined three options • Option 1: Terminate Loran-C • Option 2: Complete enhanced Loran evaluation • Option 3: Fully endorse enhanced Loran now • Evaluation of enhanced Loran required to: • Determine performance for non precision approach or aviation and harbor approach for maritime • Will take until March 2004 and ~$10M to complete • Based on current spending levels • Does not include recapitalization costs thru 2008 • Still working toward decision by end of 2002
Radionavigation Alternative Mixes • Baseline Mix • Satisfies user requirements for primary and backup systems • May be viewed as failure to reduce proliferation of systems • Mix 1 – Baseline w/Loran-C terminated • Cost savings to Government w/termination of Loran-C • Negative user and political impact • May be viewed as not satisfying Volpe Report
Radionavigation Alternative Mixes (cont’d) • Mix 2 – Baseline w/ optimizing future systems convergence, Loran-C terminated • Some cost savings with termination of Loran-C • Negative user and political impact • May be viewed as not satisfying Volpe Report • Mix 3 – Baseline w/ optimizing future systems convergence to include Loran • Meets requirements for primary and backup systems • Requires completion of enhanced Loran evaluation
Overview • Background • Action Plan • Radionavigation Systems Task Force • The Way Ahead
The Way Ahead • Developing Decision Memorandum for Secretary on Loran-C • Coordinating with Administrators • Evaluating remaining 4 mix options • Forward recommendation to DOT Secretary in late-Dec 2002 • Plan public outreach meeting concurrent with FRP User Conferences in Spring 2003
Summary • Department concurs with all recommendations of the Volpe Study • Critical infrastructure protection a continuing issue • Department is implementing Action Plan • Completing assessment of future radionavigation mix to maintain adequate backups in the future • Working toward Loran decision by end of CY02 • Safety-critical transportation applications that useGPS currently have adequate backups in case of GPS disruptions • Ensure maintained in future
GPS Vulnerability Assessment International Loran Association October 28, 2002 s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s Michael Shaw U.S. Department of Transportation