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Institut Français , Budapest, 2014. szeptember 25.

The New Strategic Landscape in the Middle East Cold War (s) in the Gulf : Saudi Arabia and Iran. Institut Français , Budapest, 2014. szeptember 25. Erzsébet N. Rózsa Institute for Foreign Affairs and Trade. Cold War (s) in the Gulf.

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Institut Français , Budapest, 2014. szeptember 25.

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  1. The New StrategicLandscapeintheMiddleEastColdWar(s) intheGulf:SaudiArabia and Iran InstitutFrançais, Budapest, 2014. szeptember 25. Erzsébet N. Rózsa Institute forForeignAffairs and Trade

  2. ColdWar(s) intheGulf • The MiddleEastbalance of power has significantlychanged: • from 3 to 5+1 regionalstates – notbecauseany has becomestronger, butallhavebecomerelativelyweaker • decline of US interest and influence • non-stateactorsontherise – Hamas, Hezbollahthreatening Israel, ISIS/ISIL/IS • REGIONAL DYNAMIC MUCH MORE IMPORTANT • „The best framework for understanding the regional politics of the Middle East is as a cold war in which Iran and Saudi Arabia play theleading roles.”(Gregory G Gause III) • behaveasempiresbutclosedinnation-stateformat - universalist claims to expand their religious ideology across nation-state borders • no direct military confrontation • contestfor influence realizedin the domestic political systems of the region’s weak states - morea struggle over the direction of the Middle East’s domestic politics more than a purely military contest • Resemblesthe „Arab coldwar” of the 1950-1960s - measured in the ability to affect domestic political struggles in neighboring states where weak regimes had trouble controlling their own societies and local players sought regional allies against their own domestic opponents– therole of non-state actors • ColdWars (plural) – besidetheSaudi-Iraniancompetition: • crackwithinthe GCC: Qatarvstheothers (mostlySaudi+UAE) • theMuslimBrotherhood (supportedbyQatar) vsSaudiArabia • ISIS/ISISL/IS vsthe rest • Arab-Israeli – stillrelevant? Erzsébet N. Rózsa

  3. Saudi-Iraniancompetition- notstatic, influencedbyoutsidefactors (e.g. ISIS)- confrontation and appeasement • SaudiArabia • Identity: • Sunni (Wahhabi) Muslim • „theCustodian of thetwoHolyMosques” – intheabsence of a caliphamissionarycommitment • Arab vscajam • Alliancewith US, GCC and „behindcloseddoors” Israel • Iran • Identity: • ShiiteMuslim (since 1501!) missionarycommitment (export of theIslamicRevolution) • Revolutionarytradition (Hosseinvsquietism/Hassan) • Ancientstatehood, culturalsuperiority, etc • The „Shiiteaxis” orthejabhatal-muqawama(fillingthevacuum) Erzsébet N. Rózsa

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  6. The Iranianthreatperception, orwhyaretheIraniansnervous? PresidentHassanRouhani: „Iran is an influentialpowerintheregion and the West must understandthisreality.” „the most importantmessage of the (nuclear) talks is thatimportantglobalissuescan be resolvedthroughnegotiations” Erzsébet N. Rózsa

  7. Fields of Saudi-Iranianclashof interest • Primaryfield: theGulf. • in spite of the continuous efforts, a kind of status quo -with Saudi Arabia dominating the Arab side of the Gulf, Iran seekingalliances farther away – BUT … • Iraq - specific ethnic and religious composition +in-betweenposition • Sameinterests: a relativelystable, butmilitarilynottoostrongIraq • Sharedpast: threatbySaddamHussein • AlthoughShiitemajorityinpower, but no Iraniandictate – Iranianinfluenceineconomicterms • SaudisupporttoSunnicommunities, BUT • Sharedconcern and enemy: ISIS/ISIL/IS Erzsébet N. Rózsa

  8. Fields of Saudi-Iranianclashof interest (cont) • Syria • theAssadregime (Iran) vsopposition (SaudiArabia) • FirststatmentsfromIranianofficialsacknowledgingIranianinvolvement • ForIran • Syriatheonlystateactorally • symbol of its regional power status • the route of supply to the Hezbollah • aretheAlawitestrueMuslims > trueShiites? • ForSaudiArabia • thedutytosupportSunniMuslims, BUT … MB Erzsébet N. Rózsa

  9. Fields of Saudi-Iranianclashofinterest (cont) • Yemen • IraniansupportfortheHouthi – questionable • Saudiinvolvementinthe Arab Spring and after • Bahrein • IraniansupporttoShiites – questionable • GCC PeninsulaShield, BUT … • FINALLY itseemsthat • SaudiArabiadoesnotallowanyinterferenceinitsdirectneighbourhoodonthePeninsula (the „near-abroad”) • inIraq an Iranianleadinginfluence is quietlyaccepted • THE ULTIMATE QUESTION: howthefightagainstcommonthreat ISIS/ISIL/IS willinfluencetheSaudi-Iranianrivalry Erzsébet N. Rózsa

  10. Fields of Saudi-Iranianclashof interest (cont) • The Iraniannuclearissue • US, Israeli + Saudicoordination • Plan of Saudi (civilian) nuclear program (2006/7 Arab League call) • BUT RATHER defencepactwiththe US • IF THERE IS a reconciliation … • thethreat of a newaxisbetweenthe US and Iran • Iran is a big market, relativelyisolatedfromthe US (directly) • Iranianeconomyeagerlywaitingfor US interest and investment • impossibleto stop orcontainIraninanyregionalissue • THEN WHAT? - a protractedColdWar, withsiftingperiods of bothconfrontation and appeasement, witheventualcommoninterestsandevenjointactions Erzsébet N. Rózsa

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