Introduction to Moral Reasoning and Ethics

1. Introduction to Moral Reasoning and Ethics Kristene Unsworth Thanks to Adam Moore for slides

2. Connections Between Ethics, Political Theory, Public Policy, and Logic • We want public policy to be justified – right? • How can we do this? • Typically, we appeal to political theory which itself rests on moral/ethical theory. • Logic – correct reasoning – is our method for justifying ethical claims, political claims, and ultimately public policy positions.

3. Disclaimer • Almost everything I am going to say is contentious. • One problem for Moral Theory, Political Theory, and Policy Analysis is that there are no “agreed upon” methods for settling disputes in these areas. • I will begin with weak – and widely shared views and then move to more contentious areas and claims.

4. I. Some Ways Not To Answer These Questions 1. Moral, Political, and PolicyJudgments and Personal Preferences: Some people like rock music while others do not. Some people prefer the sport of ice hockey to any other sport. Some people like to drink beer and eat pizza while others could think of nothing worse. In each of these cases a disagreement in preference exists. We may ask, are moral, political, and policy disagreements about the rightness or wrongness of some action or policy the same as disagreements in preference?

5. The answer is NO for the following reasons. a. When Fred says he likes rock-and-roll he is not denying some view or preference that Ginger holds (suppose she prefers classical music and detests rock music). For Fred to deny what Ginger affirms, he would have to say that Ginger likes rock music and prefers it to classical music – in spite of Ginger’s denials. When two people express conflicting personal preferences, the one does not (necessarily) deny what the other affirms.

6. b. Moral, political, and policy disagreements are importantly different. When Fred says that file sharing is always wrong while Ginger says that it is morally permitted, Fred is denying what Ginger affirms (and vice versa). Fred is not merely reporting a fact about himself, he is saying something much more general — file sharing is wrong independent of personal preferences. c. Also, when someone says that something is morally right or wrong (or that it should be codified in the law etc.) it is always appropriate to ask them to give reasons to support their view — for most personal preferences a request for reasons would be inappropriate. "I like chocolate cake better than strawberry cake" what reason could I give to support my preference?

7. This difference between "conflicting" preferences and conflicting moral judgments points to one way not to answer moral, political, and policy questions. • Given that moral, political, and policy judgments are not just expressions of personal preference, it follows that moral right and wrong (or policy positions) cannot be determined by finding out the personal preferences of some particular person — say Fred. • Our personal preferences are important, but we do not answer moral, political, and policy questions by saying what we like or dislike.

8. 2. Moral, Political, and Policy Judgments: A Matter of Feelings Closely connected with personal preferences are person's feelings. On this view, when Ginger says that file sharing morally permitted, what she conveys are her positive feelings toward allowing abortions, whereas Fred conveys his feelings of disapproval. This way of answering moral, political, and policy questions falls prey to the same problems mentioned for the personal preference model.

9. 3. Why Thinking It Is So Does Not Make It So The same is true about what someone thinks. Quite aside from his feelings, Fred, if he is sincere, does think that file sharing is always wrong. Nevertheless, if his judgment about file sharing is a moral judgment, then what he means cannot merely be "I think that file sharing is wrong." Stating what he thinks does not make an action right or wrong — the action, whatever it is, is right or wrong, independent of what Fred thinks. What Fred prefers, feels, or thinks, has nothing to do with the rightness or wrongness of file sharing or any other action.

10. 4. The Irrelevance of Statistics Some people claim that what one person prefers, thinks, or feels about moral questions does not settle anything, but what all or most people prefer, think, or feel, does. A single individual is only one voice — what most people think, feel, or prefer, is a great deal more. There is strength in numbers.

11. This approach to moral questions is also deficient. a. Why think that just because a bunch of individuals believe that X is wrong (or bad policy) that their believing is what makes X wrong? Suppose every individual in a certain culture thought that causing pain to others was the right thing to do. How/why would their beliefs, preferences, or feelings, make not causing harm immoral? This is the equivalent to "X is right because everyone is believes X is right." Well suppose X = surviving by consuming one's own body.

12. b. Moreover this type of reasoning does not work for other areas of study. Most people think that in a vacuum a feather will fall slower than a rock — but their thinking it is so does not make it true (or false). This is true for any field of study, why should moral theory, political theory, and policy analysis be different? e.g. the flat-earthers

13. 5. The Appeal to a Moral Authority Suppose it is conceded that we cannot answer moral, political, and policy questions by finding out what someone thinks, feels, or prefers; or by finding out what all or most people think, feel, or prefer. Imagine that there is a moral/political authority who is never mistaken when it comes to moral questions: if this being judges something morally right then it is morally right — if it is judged wrong then it is morally wrong. Most people think that God is a moral authority and all we have to do is listen to God to answer moral questions.

14. This view is deficient for a number of reasons. a. First, while many will find this troublesome, it is very difficult to justify a belief in God. Appeal to God as a moral authority would first require an argument that justified a belief in God — but this is no easy task (some say it will never be done).

15. b. Even if God exists we must determine what he commands, wills, or forbids, before we can know how to proceed. Can we trust religious texts? Which ones? What about "false" prophets? Are the rules commanded by God absolute (exceptionless)? Suppose that you could save twenty people from a painful death by stealing the property of another (Suppose God commanded "Thou shall not steal"). What if you enjoy pain? Should you do unto others as you would have them do unto you?

16. C. The Euthyphro problem: Is X right because God commands X or does God command X because it is right. Suppose we say that X is right because God commands X. Question: Does God have any reasons for what he commands? If yes, then it is these reasons that make X right not God’s mere commandments. If no, then morality is arbitrary – God, alas, could command anything and it would be moral.

17. II. Ideal Moral, Political, and Policy Judgments . . . . or a description of an approach to answering moral, political, and policy questions that is not open to the objections already raised. What requirements would someone have to meet to make an ideal judgments in these areas?

18. Conceptual Clarity: We must be conceptually clear about important issues and terms. E.g. “person,” or “property right,” bootlegging, piracy, etc. • Empirical Information: We cannot answer moral, political, and policy questions without marshaling knowledge about the real world. E.g. does file sharing cause more harm than good. • Rationality: We must use valid/strong argument forms and proceed from reliable premises. E.g. the rules of logic….

19. Impartiality: In striving to reach the correct answer to moral, political, and policy questions we must guard against extreme partiality — our moral, political, and policy judgments should be free from bigotry, prejudice, and favoritism. • Reflective Endorsement: Our moral, political, and policy judgments should stand the test of cool and calm reflective endorsement. • Correct Moral Principles: It is also essential that the judgment be based on the correct or most reasonable moral principles.

20. Given the complexity of moral arguments what tools do we have to proceed?

21. I. Arguments: The Tools of the Trade A. Argument - a set of declarative statements with one statement being argued for (the conclusion), and other statements (premises) given as support or proof. 1. Premise - what is given as support or evidence for a conclusion. 2. Conclusion - what follows from the premises, what is being claimed. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=teMlv3ripSM

22. B. Deductive Argument - an argument where the conclusion is conclusively supported by the premises C. Inductive Argument - an argument where the conclusion is only strongly supported by the premises

23. D. Qualities Of Deductive Arguments: Validity And Soundness. In deductive logic there are two main terms of argument evaluation: valid and sound. To begin with validity. There are several different ways to define this, but the definitions are all equivalent, i.e., they all mean the same thing. Think of it whatever way suits you.

24. Def. 1. An argument is valid if, and only if, supposing the premises are all true, then the conclusion is necessarily true (it must be true). Def. 2. An argument is valid if, and only if, supposing the premises are all true, then the conclusion cannot be false. Def. 3. An argument is valid if, and only if, supposing the conclusion is false, then at least one premise is necessarily false (it must be that one is false). Def. 4. An argument is valid if, and only if, there is no possible situation where all the premises be true, and the conclusion is false.

25. Example of a valid argument: (1) All adlers are bobkins; (2) all bobkins are crockers; (3) (conclusion) therefore, all adlers are crockers. Suppose you don’t know anything about adlers, bobkins, or crockers (but these words really did mean something); well then, you would still be able to say that the argument just given is valid, because if (1) and (2) are true, then (3) would have to be true.

26. To say that an argument is valid is to say that a certain kind of relationship holds between the premises and the conclusion. The premises deductively support the conclusion. So to say an argument is valid is not to say simply that the premises are true, or false, or the conclusion is true, or false. It is to say that the conclusion has to be true, supposing the premises to be true.

27. Here is a definition of "sound": Def. An argument is sound if, and only if, it is valid and all of its premises are true. So Soundness = Validity + True Premises. Some valid arguments are not sound: they have false premises. Notice: if you know that an argument is sound, then you do know that the conclusion is true. Why? (Hint: look at the definitions of "valid" and "sound.")

28. E. Qualities Of Inductive Arguments: Strength And Cogency. What validity and soundness, respectively, are for deductive arguments, strength and cogency, respectively, are for inductive arguments. Def. An (inductive) argument is strong if, and only if, supposing the premises are true, then it is probable (but not absolutely necessary) that the conclusion is true.

29. Example of a strong argument: (1) 80% of observed blippos were oflt; (2) Harry is an blippo (as yet unobserved);(3) (conclusion) therefore, probably, Harry is also oflt. Notice that it is possible,even if (1) and (2) are true, that Harry is not oflt. It is just probable that he is oflt (since most other blippos were oflt). Notice also that, again, you don’t have to know what "blippo" and “oflt" mean, to know this is a strong argument.

30. Here is a definition of "cogent": Def. An (inductive) argument is cogent if, and only if, it is strong and all of its premises are true. Similar remarks apply here as for soundness. Cogency = Strength + True Premises. Some strong arguments are not cogent: they have false premises. Notice: if you know that an argument is cogent, then you do know that the conclusion is probably true. Why? (Hint: look at the definitions of "strong" and "cogent.")

31. II. Examples: A. Inductive Arguments 1. I have seen one swan and it was white 2. I have seen a second swan and it was white 3. I have seen n swans and they were all white 4. So, all swans are white B. Deductive Argument 1. If it is raining out then the grass is wet 2. It is raining out 3. So, the grass is wet

32. C. Valid argument with true premises and true conclusion - this means that this argument is also _____________? 1. All men are mortal 2. Socrates is a man 3. So, Socrates is mortal D. Valid argument with a false premise 1. All men are mortal 2. Spot (the dog) is a man 3. So, Spot is mortal

33. E. Valid argument with false premises and a false conclusion 1. No fish are swimmers 2. Orca’s are fish 3. Therefore, Orca’s cannot swim

34. We know what an argument is and how not to answer moral questions but what other tools are there?

35. Moral and ethical theory • Descriptive Ethics claims – statements that describe a state of affairs in the world • Normative Ethics Claims - exploration of what human beings ought to do • Responsibility, Accountability and Liability • Ethical Relativism

36. A Partial Typology of Normative Ethical Theories

37. Parts of Utilitarianism • Theory of Right (Obligation) • Theory of Good (Value)

38. Utilitarian Theory of Obligation • One ought to act so as to maximize the sum of individual (net) value where everyone’s good counts equally. • This is the defining characteristic of utilitarianism. • But, any complete utilitarian theory must provide a theory of value. • Different utilitarians hold different theories of value.

39. Three Theories of Value Commonly Adopted by Utilitarians • Hedonism • Eudaimonism • Desire Satisfaction Theory

40. Intrinsic v. Extrinsic Value • Intrinsic Value: A thing is intrinsically valuable if it is valuable independently of of its consequences. • Extrinsic Value: A thing has extrinsic valuable if it is valuable in virtue of its consequences.

41. Hedonism • Pleasure and only pleasure is intrinsically good. Pain and only pain in intrinsically bad.

42. Eudaimonism • Happiness (or well-being) and only happiness (or well-being) is intrinsically good. Unhappiness and only unhappiness is intrinsically bad.

43. Desire Satisfaction Theory • All and only those things that satisfy intrinsic desires are intrinsically good. All and only those things that thwart intrinsic desires are intrinsically bad.

44. Jeremy Bentham • 1748 - 1832 • Major Work • The Principles of Morals and Legislation

45. Bentham’s Hedonism • Qualitative Similarity: All pleasures are qualitatively identical. Considered in themselves, they differ only in: • Intensity • Duration

46. An Analogy to Understand Bentham’s Hedonism • Pleasure as a bell in the head • The bell could ring louder for a short period or softer for a longer period….

47. An Analogy to Understand Bentham’s Hedonism • Remember, it is only an analogy • It is intended to illustrate that there is only one kind of experience, though it can differ in intensity and duration. • Bentham didn’t really think there were bells in people’s heads.

48. Criticisms of Bentham’s Hedonism • Not all pleasures are qualitatively the same. • Pleasure is not the only thing that is intrinsically good. • Not all pleasures are intrinsically good.

49. Against Qualitative Similarity of Pleasures • Even considered in themselves, as mere sensations, many pleasurable sensations feel different from one another. • Pleasure of hearing your child tell you she loves you. • Pleasure of eating a hot fudge sundae.

50. Pleasure is Not the Only Intrinsic Good • There are other things that we value intrinsically • Nozick’s Pleasure Machine