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US History in the Region and Policy on Genocide. U.S Relations With Sudan Before the Darfur Genocide Broke Out in 2003. Sudan went from U.S. enemy to ally during Cold War When General Nimeiri seized power in 1969 during the First Civil War, he was pro-Soviet, and therefore a U.S. enemy.
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U.S Relations With Sudan Before the Darfur Genocide Broke Out in 2003 • Sudan went from U.S. enemy to ally during Cold War • When General Nimeiri seized power in 1969 during the First Civil War, he was pro-Soviet, and therefore a U.S. enemy. • However, after a failed communist coup in 1971, he opposed the Soviet Union and became a U.S. ally. • U.S. attempted to make Sudan into a strong ally in the region. • U.S. built up Sudan militarily after pro-Soviet coup in Ethiopia in 1977. • U.S. saw Somalia, Sudan, and Kenya as anti-Soviet allies in region, and made Sudan sixth largest recipient of American military aid. • However, this fueled the Second Civil War and gave the corrupt military government in the North an advantage over the Christian and oil-rich South.
After 1989 coup that overthrew Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi and his elected government and put Omar al-Bashir in power, Sudan was no longer close ally due to Islamic rule. • Islamic regime made U.S. equate Sudan with Iran, which had an Islamic coup a decade before. • With Hassan al-Turabi’s National Islamic Front in power, U.S. was also worried about spread of anti-Western ideals in the country. • During Persian Gulf War, U.S. labeled Sudan as being supporter of Saddam Hussein. • This is also consequence of National Islamic Front being in Power, which opposed what they saw as American “imperialism.”
Sudan had already been bad location for the media due to wars and terrain, but Islamic rule made media coverage even more difficult due to state censorship. • Sudan’s National Islamic Front and its accompanying ideologies made opposing views on TV and the press all reflect the views of the government. • Foreign journalists entering Sudan found it difficult to reach dissidents who could give them criticisms of the government and reveal human rights abuses. • According to al-Turabi, there is no religious discrimination in the country, but Christians in the south secretly complained of attacks on their faith when interviewed.
Due to al-Turabi’s influence Sudan hosted Osama bin Laden from 1991 to 1996. • Hassan al-Turabi used his power as the head of the National Islamic Front to provide a haven for Osama bin Laden, who had been exiled from Saudi Arabia and stripped of his Saudi citizenship in 1991 for criticizing the government and condemning them for accepting U.S. help during the Gulf War and not resenting their presence in the area. • Bin Laden was asked to leave Khartoum in 1996 by the Sudanese Government under pressure from the U.S. and Egypt. • Bin Laden had been using Khartoum and Sudan as base to stregnthen terrorist network of what became al-Qaeda and used the location to direct Islamic fundamentalist mujahideen fighters around the world. • While al-Turabi had used Khartoum to shelter bin Laden, Sudan was facing pressures from oncoming economic sanctions from the U.S. and wanted to shed its image as a supporter of terror.
During Clinton administration in 1997, U.S. began imposing economic sanctions on Sudan and closed American embassy in Khartoum due to suspicions of terrorist support. • These measures were passed because the Clinton administration listed Sudan of being a state sponsor of terrorism following its harboring of already known terrorist leader Osama bin Laden. • These sanctions cut off the oil trade with Sudan, which was very profitable for the Sudanese. The U.S. saw these sanctions as a gain for reducing terrorist activity, but a loss for an extra oil trading partner. • Sudan wants these sanctions removed, but so did the U.S., who eagerly anticipates a ceasefire in Darfur today as a reason for lifting the sanctions and increasing oil trade.
In 1998, President Clinton authorized a cruise missile attack against the al-Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum, which was an alleged terrorist chemical weapons factory, in retaliation for the 1998 U.S. Embassy Bombings in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. • This was climax of U.S. hostilities towards Sudan over allegations of terrorism. • However, this was a grave miscalculation in intelligence, since the plant was responsible for producing half of Sudan’s anti-malaria medications. • U.S. never apologized or compensated Sudan for this incident.
Sudan wanted these sanctions removed, and was willing to prove to U.S. that it was not a terrorist sponsor. • Sudan began offering U.S. more and more intelligence regarding supposed terrorist activities, especially on those concerning al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden. • However, the U.S. claims that these information offers are more easily offered that carried out. • Al-Turabi was imprisoned following a power struggle with Bashir in 1999, and the nation hoped this conviction of a supposed terrorist supporter would improve relations. • Wanted to remove image as fundamentalist and militaristic nation to better its reputation.
Sudan claims that while bin Laden stayed in Khartoum, he was mostly involved in a civil engineering business, and was being watched too closely to coordinate terrorist activities. • Government downplayed bin Laden’s terrorist activity and claims he did not begin coordinating al-Qaeda until after he left Sudan, and that his expulsion is the reason why he turned to terrorism. • However, western nations know that bin Laden was forming al-Qaeda while in Khartoum which is why the sanctions ensued. • Sudan also claims that it had offered bin Laden to the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, but U.S. officials claim that this was a false alarm and would not have been carried out so simply. • These tactics of the Sudanese government downplaying problems and trying to build its image in the eyes of the U.S. would later be used in Darfur when the government tried to deny its involvement in human rights violations and sponsoring of the Janjaweed.
NGOs and Other Groups • Most NGOs missions are to help educate individuals on the situation in the region and to then encourage these individuals to pressure their Congress representatives and the media to focus on Darfur. • Most NGO websites include links to media outlets that provide analyses, background information, and policy positions. • The success of NGOs for the cause of Darfur is minimal. They have been successful in influencing the government to label the crisis as genocide, but have not had any luck past this.
Darfur coalitions also play a role in the world on NGOs. • Two exmaples are Save Darfur (http://www.savedarfur.org/content) and the Coalition for Darfur (http://coalitionfordarfur.blogspot.com/) • These coalitions may include several different NGOs that have a similar goal, in this case to stop the genocide in Darfur. • By drawing several groups together into one large coalition, they have more power in pressuring the U.S. government and the UN to intervene in Darfur. • Most deal with a want action from the U.S government and the UN rather than a NATO response to the Darfur genocide.
Many NGOs and coalitions encourage the public to send financial donations to their organizations. • The donations were said to “help fund our crucial awareness and advocacy programs that play a critical role in building the political pressure needed to end the crisis in Darfur” and to provide humanitarian aid to help the families, especially the Children (Save Darfur).
Lobbying groups and NGOs are actively involved in lobbying Congress and the President to take action in Darfur. • The Peace in Darfur Act is one such piece of legislation that lobbying groups are trying to get Congress to pass. • It calls for Sudan to allow the deployment of United Nation troops to Darfur in order to end the genocide. • It also calls for added humanitarian aid to be given to the refugees in Darfur and would impose sanctions upon Sudan. • One of the groups that are pushing for Congress to pass the measure is the Jewish Council for Public Affairs. • The Genocide Intervention Network is another key lobbying force.
In the past they have sponsored public events for lobbying in D.C. where students were invited to come and meet with their Representatives and Congressmen to voice their concern about Darfur. • Other organizations that encourage lobbying Congress include Save Darfur. • Save Darfur calls on activists to meet with their new Congressmen to educate them on the issues behind the situation in Darfur. • On the other side of the spectrum is the lobbying that the actual Sudanese government has employed on Congress. • According to a Coalition for Darfur, a lobbyist has been hired by Sudan to express Sudan’s interests in relation to genocide in Darfur. • This is an outrage to many Americans including this particular organization and they equated it to lobbying for the Soviet Union’s interests during the Cold War.
US History of Policy on Genocide • The United States has a long history of passivity and reticence involving the issue of Genocide. • Armenian Genocide- nobody had ever seen or heard of intentional mass murders and thus, many didn’t believe the accounts of what was occurring in Turkey, and later Germany. • The US took part in the Genocide Convention of 1948, but failed to ratify until 1986, becoming the 98th nation to do so. • Although the US ratification required passage of a law making genocide punishable, the fulfillment of this requirement has only seemed to make the US more reluctant to acknowledge such crimes as genocides. • In following genocides of the 20th Century, the US hesitates from acknowledging them as “genocides” as outlined in the Genocide Convention till after the genocide has ended.
The U.S. has held a long track record of considering its own interests above everything else, which often resulted in the U.S. government supporting the genocidal regime, hesitating to assign the “g” word to the crimes to avoid responsibility to act, or ignoring the crimes, allowing perpetrators to get away with murder. • Talaat Pasha in Turkey when he saw that the U.S. did not act on reports of genocide, he realized he could continue committing genocide without repercussions. • Saddam Hussein in Iraq U.S. supported Iraq during the Iraq Iran war because they were trying to contain the Iranian Islamic Republic. • The U.S. was also after oil interests in Iraq, and therefore felt that strained relations would not be good for trade. • When reports began coming in of chemical warfare and torture against the Kurds, the U.S. still wanted to stay in Iraq’s good graces, and therefore did little more than a slap on the wrist, basically saying they did not approve. Hussein understood that the U.S. would not take action, and realized that he could also continue committing genocide without consequences. • Perpetrators of genocides also came to understand that several smaller mass murders would be less noticed in the media and international community than a few large ones, and this became a tactic among perpetrators to hide their crime and to continue committing it.
The U.S. has even gone so far as to stop intervention that might have prevented genocide. • The U.S. ambassador to the UN was against leaving even a small force in Rwanda, even when the General in charge of the mission believed that even the presence of UN forces would deter the genocidal perpetrators.
Congress • In 2004, both houses of the U.S. Congress declared that a genocide is indeed occurring in Darfur, marking the first time that the U.S. has used the “g” word before the genocide is over. • Congress has been urging the government to intervene and take action to prevent the atrocities from being committed.
Congress has passed several pieces of legislation regarding involvement in the Sudan. • Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act • Supported African Union forces in the region • Vowed not to “normalize relations” with the Sudan • Darfur Peace and Accountability Act • Lends aid and support to the African Union forces and advocates “NATO reinforcement of the African Union Mission in Sudan.” • Under this act, those found guilty of war crimes or genocide can be punished.
Laws that were introduced but failed to be passed include: • The Darfur Genocide Accountability Act • Darfur Accountability Act • This would have allowed the president to use unlimited means to stop the genocide • Supported assistance to the African Union’s actions in the Sudan • Despite the failure to pass every law that has come its way, which is nearly impossible to achieve, Congress is playing a much larger role in this genocide than any other genocide by acknowledging the severity of the situation, urging governmental intervention, and passing laws that can help achieve an end to the genocide.
