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Did NATO Win the Media War? & Does this matter for C2 research?. Pascale Combelles Siegel Independent Consultant CCRP symposium, Monterey, 27 June 2000. The Dilemma. “No matter how brilliantly you fight, what matters is the actual packaging” Why repeat the same mistakes?
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Did NATO Win the Media War?&Does this matter for C2 research? Pascale Combelles Siegel Independent Consultant CCRP symposium, Monterey, 27 June 2000
The Dilemma • “No matter how brilliantly you fight, what matters is the actual packaging” • Why repeat the same mistakes? • Why haven’t we fully integrated PA into C2 research?
For Democracies in wartime, the media are
An Essential Battlefield • Popular support is key • Democracy rules by popular consent • Erosion of support may end mission • Potential vulnerability • Asymmetrical warfare • Easy and cheap to manipulate
A Difficult Battlefield • Who are “the media”? • Neither partner nor opponent • Multiplying types — not unitary • Some fundamental media rules • The cycle of news • The cycle of punditry • The speed of media reporting
An Understudied Battlefield • Large literature on “military-media relations” (Hotel Warrior, etc…) • Little on the critical importance of media reporting for the conduct of operations • What is there on the role of Public Affairs in operational C2?
NATO Public AffairsandThe Kosovo Campaign A brief overview
NATO Public Affairs • Jamie Shae, the “anti Winston Churchill” • “Total engagement,” • Limited transparency • Isolated • Victim of erroneous assumptions • PA dissociated from ops and intel • Some improvement at mid-course
Yugoslav Approach ... • Undermine NATO’s will to fight • Thwart NATO’s rationale • Exploit “mistakes” and civilian damage • A multi-media campaign • Pictures • Speakers • Internet
The Bottom Line • NATO able to maintain support • Majority supported strikes until the end • Mass deportations strengthened resolve • Demonization of Milosevic worked • Collateral damage had limited impact on popular support • By end of May: use diplomacy, not bombs
However, some reasons for concern • Faulty planning process • Lack of operational information • Fueled debate and controversy • Credibility on the line • National coordination deficient • Different policies/viewpoints • Problems adapting to speed of media reporting — reactive
Some thoughts for the future • PA/Media issues frequently require command attention — resource eater (time) • Some PA C2 issues from Allied Force • Relationship between PA and Operations • Centralized v. decentralized PA operations • Interoperability • Planning process • Military v. media reporting speed
Fig 2. Responsibility for Refugees • Whose actions are more responsible for the large number of ethnic Albanian refugees now leaving Kosovo: The Serbian government 67% The NATO alliance 19% Both equally 4% Neither 1% Don’t know 9% “Special Report: Kosovo: The data,” The Gallup Poll Monthly, nº 402, March 1999, p17.
Fig 4. Evaluation of US policy after Chinese Embassy Incident
Fig 5. Diplomacy and Bombs • Which of the following approaches to reaching a peace agreement in Yugoslavia would you prefer to see the US take? • continue the current military action: 48% • stop the military action and focus on diplomacy: 48% • Neither (vol.) 3% • No opinion: 1%
Fig 5. Diplomacy and Bombs (2) • Please say whether you would approve or disapprove if NATO and the US were to temporarily suspend the strikes and attempt to resolve the matter through negotiations and other means? • Approve: 82% • Disapprove: 15% • No opinion: 3%