440 likes | 610 Views
The Economics of Hawaii’s Invasive Species. Kimberly M. Burnett University of Hawaii at Manoa Department of Economics. What is an “Invasive Species”?. An “invasive species” is defined as a species that is non-native (or alien) to the ecosystem under consideration and
E N D
The Economics of Hawaii’s Invasive Species Kimberly M. Burnett University of Hawaii at Manoa Department of Economics
What is an “Invasive Species”? • An “invasive species” is defined as a species that is • non-native (or alien) to the ecosystem under consideration and • whose introduction causes or is likely to cause economic or environmental harm or harm to human health. Executive Order 13112, President Clinton, 1999 • Invasive species can be plants, animals, and other organisms (e.g., microbes). Human actions are the primary means of invasive species introductions.
Hawaii as a Laboratory • Most isolated place on earth • Lots at risk: biodiversity, tourism, “paradise” • Potential to keep things out • Why do we see increasing invasion? • Increased trade • Globalization, disappearance of borders • Ease of mobility • Intentional introductions: driven by individual benefits; without accounting for potential social costs
Invasive Species as Externalities • Intentional introductions • Agriculture/Aquaculture (Apple snails) • Horticulture (Miconia) • Pet trade (Salvinia) • Unintentional introductions • Floriculture trade (Coqui) • Transport (Brown treesnake)
Outline • Threat from invasives • Policy • Bioeconomics (interdisciplinary problem) • 3 case studies: • Existing invader • Potential invader • Explosive invader • Conclusions for economics/policy • Conclusions for biology
Economic: Direct damages to physical capital Direct damages to human health Direct damages to natural resource assets Ecological: Ecosystem change Water quality/ quantity Soil conditions Loss of biodiversity Loss of resilience Loss of productive resources Threat from Invasives
Threats to Hawaii Miconia landslide, Tahiti
Role of Policy for Invasive Species • Policy currently fragmented and inefficient • Black lists • Inspections • Control efforts • Biological and economic tools must be used together to target policies that minimize disturbances to economy and environment • Successful policy will integrate prevention and control decisions
Prevention Reduce entrance vectors Interdiction at source Interdiction at destination Control Eradication Population reduction Containment Adaptation Prevention and Control
Planning Optimal Policy • Prevention and control decisions should be integrated and incorporate expected damages • Need to include both ecological and economic factors: Biological capacity Entrance vectors Reproduction Rate of transport Relative isolation Adaptability Habitat Costs Competitors Risks Predators Damages
Biology + Economics = Bioeconomics • Biology (and ecology and hydrology): how fast does it grow, where is it now, where is it going, how will it affect other species… • Economics: cost of control, value of expected damages • Show why all are necessary through case studies
The Existing Invader: Miconia calvescens • Native to South America • Intentionally introduced to a Big Island nursery in 1960’s • Attractive purple and green leaves • Aggressive growth • Long-lived seed bank • Shallow roots • Forms monotypic stands, dense canopy • “Purple plague” • “Green cancer” • Present on 4 main islands
Biology: How Fast Does it Grow? Where K = 100 trees per acre above 1800 mm/yr rainfall line
Hydrology: Potential WatershedChange from Invasion • Reduction in groundwater speeds up depletion of aquifer, increases water prices and need for desalination • Increase in sedimentation decreases water quality and viability of forest and nearshore resources
Recap • Population reduction optimal for most islands. • May be preferable to let population increase on Kauai (search costs high relative to damage) • For Molokai, optimal to spend on prevention and keep at zero • Difficulty with nonmarket valuation (true value of endangered birds, etc.).
The Potential Invader: Brown Treesnake • Native to New Guinea/Australia • Accidentally introduced to Guam during WW2 • Heavy transport btw Guam and Hawaii (esp. military) • 8 intercepted at HI ports since 1980 • Survived trip from Guam to Texas for months in a washing machine • Hitchhikes in wheels of airplanes, hidden in cargo • Mildly venomous • “Just a matter of time” (and money)
Economics: Damage • Based on Guam, • Power outage costs: $121.11 /snake • Snakebite costs: $0.07 /snake • Biodiversity: $0.32 – $1.93 /snake • Loomis and White (1996) • Total expected damages: $122.31 per snake
Economics: Control Cost • Catching 1 out of 1: $100 million (?) • Catching 1 out of 100: $100,000 • Catching 1 out of 39m: $0.64
Optimal Prevention and Control Expenditures control C(x*)=$10 m $6 m Optimal population n = 543 y*=$ 84,000 prevention
Recap • If zero snakes, spend heavily on prevention • If more than zero snakes, spend on control • May be large returns to early detection of small populations • Uncertainty about current population warrants diversification between strategies
The Explosive Invader: Coqui Frog • Native to Puerto Rico • Introduced to Hawaii late 1980s through nursery trade • Spread to 4 islands by movement of plant material and intentional introductions • No external tadpole stage; does not require standing water; 2 week breeding cycle • Have attained some of the highest densities ever observed for terrestrial amphibian populations (up to 133,000 per ha on Hawaii) • New populations being reported weekly Coqui photos: USDA/APHIS/NWRC Hilo Field Station “ko-KEE” Full chorus
Falling Property Prices?Hedonic Pricing Theory • Wish to explain determinants of total property price • Some things add to price, others subtract • Structural • Number of rooms, number of bathrooms, square footage (+) • Acreage (+) • Neighborhood/Accessibility • Proximity to public transportation, school districts, other amenities (+/–) • Zoning (+/–) • Environmental • Presence of coqui (–???) • Elevation (+) • Financial • Mortgage rates (–) • Buyer in HI (–) • Derive implicit value of each characteristic from explicit price of property using multiple regression analysis
Study Site and Data • 50,033 real estate transactions on Big Island, 1995-2005 • 9 main districts (see map) divided into 10 sub-districts each to control for neighborhood characteristics • SFLA to represent structure • Frog complaints registered to NWRC Hilo, 1997-2001 • Use GIS to identify property transactions occurring after complaint, within 500m and 800m of frog complaints • Financial variables • Prices deflated using West Urban CPI • 30 year mortgage rates from Federal Reserve • Buyer residing in HI used to control for information effects
Percentage of Transactions with Frog Complaints Prior to Sale
Puna Close-up Frogs within 500 m Frogs within 800 m Transactions
Impact on Property Price ***,** indicate statistical significance at 99% and 95% confidence respectively Huber-White Robust Standard errors in parentheses.
Recap • Presence of frogs have a negative impact on property value • Tells us nothing about optimal policy (don’t know the response of population to spending) • Need to build model of frog population response to spending if want to evaluate policy options
Limitations • General • Nonmarket values controversial/hard to measure • Miconia • How to deal with seed bank (is zero really zero?) • Lack of spatial considerations • Brown treesnake • “Not here”, so… • Uncertain about population • Uncertain about annual arrivals • Unknown control costs • Lack of spatial considerations • Coqui • Ecological threats not accounted for
Directions of Future Research • Miconia • Better data on: current number of trees on each island, growth, costs, locations • Brown treesnake • Early detection/rapid response • Probabilistic model • Coqui • Real estate analysis: increase years of BI data, add Maui data • Calculate lost profits to horticultural industry from • Reduced revenues from lost sales if infested • Increased costs from removing frogs for certification • Model the increase in potential viability of brown treesnake and accompanying increase in potential damages (biodiversity loss, power supply and medical expenses) due to coqui prey base
Conclusions • Invasive species can cause real economic damage • Eradication not necessarily preferred over population maintenance or adaptation • An ounce of prevention not necessarily “worth a pound of cure” • Optimal policy will depend on economic as well as ecological characteristics of an invasion • Essential to consider benefits versus costs over some time horizon
Acknowledgements James Roumasset, Brooks Kaiser, William Pitt, Sean D’Evelyn, and Porntawee Nantamanasikarn