NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ADVANCED STUDIES BANGALORE SEMINAR ON “RISING CHINA” DECEMBER 20-21, 2011 INTRODUCTORY REMARKS A

1. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ADVANCED STUDIES BANGALORE SEMINAR ON “RISING CHINA” DECEMBER 20-21, 2011 INTRODUCTORY REMARKS AT SESSION ON ‘CHINESE MEDIA PERCEPTIONS OF INDIA’

2. Overall Chinese Media Scene Today* As in other fields, the media scene in China today is the outcome of the reforms introduced after the landmark December 1978, 3rd Plenum of the 11th CPC Central Committee under the influence of Deng Xiaoping. * largely based on collection of articles by Western and Chinese scholars in “Changing Media, Changing China” ed. Susan L. Shirk (OUP, 2011), besides recent official documents reported in the Chinese media and available on the I-net.

3. Structure of the Introductory Remarks I. Scenario at the ground level: a) Press b) TV c) I-net II. Censorship Scene III. Impact of New Policies IV. Official Approach in the Changing Scenario V. Overall Assessment of the State of Play

4. I. Key changes at the ground level a) Press • Growth – from 69 in 1979, the no. of newspapers today is about 2000; magazines 9000 • Qualitative -- emergence of commercial media as a result of change in policies and processes (without any significant change in structures), as e.g. relaxation of controls to permit: - freer expression (hence more lively style of present day newspapers and journals), - raising of revenues through advertising, alongside withdrawal of budgetary support from Govt. (resulting in their catering to audience tastes in news content and style), - retention of profits, if any (resulting in a rise in circulation, despite removal of mandatory subscriptions by Govt. Departments since 2003). • PLA daily is an exception to the above-mentioned trends: It (the PLA Daily) has been protected from this transformation affecting the civilian media and remains fundamentally unchanged, operating on the old “propaganda first, profitability second” maxim and presenting the same old sterilized image of the PLA to its audience in the soldiery. It has its captive readership of 2.5 million, having successfully resisted efforts to end mandatory subscriptions by all its units. [Together with the steady increases in the PLA’s budget over the last 15 years, this has to be understood to be a part of the CPC’s compulsion to keep this ultimate guarantor of authority to rule satisfied and loyal.]

5. I. Key changes at the ground level (contd.) b) TV • By far more influential than the press, being the sole source of news etc. for the 60% population in the rural areas, TV is, not surprisingly, more tightly controlled. There is no competition, as in case of the press, with only the staid State owned channels operational. • Yet TV producers too have to pay attention to ratings and audience preferences if they are to earn advertising revenue. [TV in China has been described by one Chinese journalist (Miao Di) as a double gendered rooster – “Propaganda Departments like it to crow, while Finance Departments want it to lay eggs.”] • A balance of sorts is sought to be struck by producing politically harmless and leisure entertainment programmes, not hard news or commentaries.

6. I. Key changes at the ground level (contd.) c) I-net • Dramatic expansion since its embrace by the CPC and Govt. in 1992/93, with over 450 million users (250 million of them intensive ones, i.e. bloggers and/or tweeters) today. • Public opinion communicated through on-line forums and Weblogs, reinforcing the more liberal elements in the press, are increasingly setting the agenda for public debate.

7. I. Key changes at the ground level (contd.) Overall, the most notable feature of the Chinese media scene today is the new information environment marked by the emergence of a hugely expanded, and commercially independent, press and an alert, and growing, on-line public opinion that cannot be wished away by officialdom, try as it may. This change has come about despite virtually no change in the ownership structure of the press (and TV), and can therefore obviously not be said to be an unqualified one, but one subject to several caveats and conditions.

8. II. Censorship Scene • Commercialization of the media has “opened a gap in the Chinese Govt.’s control of the news media”, according to journalist He Qinglian, author of “Media Control in China” (published in 2004 by the international NGO, Human Rights in China). [Competition for audiences provide a strong motivation for the press (and news sites) to publish/post a news story before the authorities impose a ban on it. Thus there has been an exponential expansion in the amount of information available to the public and, consequently, an unprecedented expansion of space for protest concomitantly, as witnessed in the early phase of the pro-Google Net commentaries last year. ] b) Change of form, and style, but not in essence. On umpteen occasions, the Chinese authorities have shown that they will do whatever it takes to make sure that information reaching the public by any means (including through the modern commercial media and I-net) does not rouse them to challenge Party rule. c) One (He Qinglian’s) assessment is that Chinese journalists may be ‘dancing in shackles’ but they are dancing all the same ! Caught between the commercialization and control, they (and the Netizens) have become adept at playing a cat and mouse game with the censors. d) An interesting (and perhaps important) part of the (unchanging) story of censorship and control of the Chinese media that should perhaps not be missed therefore is how the political game is changing, all attempts by the authorities to retain control over the new media as before notwithstanding.

9. III. Impact of New Policies The impact of the new information environment can be discerned in several dimensions: • Greater independence for the media (along with re-examination of their self-perception of their professional role) -- gradually, as a result of Chinese journalists’ increasing interaction with their counterparts abroad. Xinhua, e.g., is now believed to have the green light from the CPC Propaganda Departments to report on “mass incidents”. • Vigilante watchdog role • Sensationalism (albeit of a softer variety than say in India) • Political – domestic • Political – foreign policy/affairs related

10. IV. Official Approach in the Changing Scenario Officialdom is “deeply ambivalent” towards the commercial media and I-net, in the words of some relatively more broad minded Chinese journalists cited by Western scholars: • It recognizes its potential benefits (and inevitability may be) – greater efficiency (in the process of economic development) through better informed markets, improved governance and strengthened popular support through checks on wayward local/provincial governments, etc. • But it is also acutely conscious of the severe risks it is subjected to – new demands being made on the establishment that the latter may not be able to meet, opening of political space for crystallization of opposition through revelation of divisions within the top leadership etc. By choosing to give up some degree of control, they make a trade-off -- hoping to reap the former, while feverishly seeking to avert the latter.

11. IV. Official Approach in the Changing Scenario (contd.) The nightmare scenario for Chinese rulers would, it may be surmised, be a combination of an opposition movement at the ground level and an elite split at the top, as that would seal the fate of the rulers in the absence of direct and visible military support – something that may not be forthcoming in such a charged socio-political situation. [Tien An Men June 4, 1989 is the defining moment in this regard as it almost brought down CPC rule. But for Deng Xiao Ping’s enormous political weight, which enabled the (divided) Politburo to take a decision to invoke the military against the protesters (and evoke compliance from the PLA for the same), all might have been lost. And that was before the age of the instantaneous mass media; before the color revolutions in Eastern Europe, Iran 2009, the Arab Spring revolutions of last year and, above all, the Anna Hazare movement in India -- each of which would have given the CPC jitters, we can be sure.]

12. IV. Official Approach in the Changing Scenario (contd.) The destabilizing potential of new technologies, and the freer environment within which mass media functions today, would undoubtedly be a question to which the CPC must be paying extremely close attention. Their watchwords might easily be guessed to be something on the following lines: a) prevent large scale social unrest from crystallizing at any one point (or a credibility gap on any one issue, be it a localized one, from becoming a rallying point); b) avoid public splits in the top leadership ranks; c) ensure loyalty of the PLA at all costs. Commercialization of the media and spread of the I-net have consequences for all three dimensions, albeit most of all in respect of the first. [Hence the frightful, almost apocalyptic, 2010 reaction to Google, which appears to have been seen to have the makings of a ‘digital’ Tien An Men 1989. The ‘50 cent Army’ was invoked in no time in order to overwhelm the initially spontaneous outburst of comments favorable to Google on the Net with contrary ones. Hence also the continuing attempts in recent times to impose various restrictions on I-net users, including the latest requirement to use their real names.]

13. V. Overall Assessment of the State of Play The jury is out on the future of the Chinese polity under the impact of a changing media. Commercialization of the media and explosive growth of on-line public opinion are altering the strategic interaction between the leadership and the public, as the former struggles to head off unrest and maintain public acceptance of the legitimacy of its authority. Will it run along the lines scripted by CPC apparatchiks, hoping to put the new features of the modern (digital) media to good use but contain the risks they pose for authoritarian regimes ? No one can say.

14. Thank you