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Principles of Preparedness for Agroterrorism and Food Systems’ Disasters. David Goldenberg Preparedness Training Program Coordinator Western Institute for Food Safety & Security. “Emergency response is a product of preparedness”. - 9/11 Commission.
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Principles of Preparedness for Agroterrorism and Food Systems’ Disasters David GoldenbergPreparedness Training Program Coordinator Western Institute for Food Safety & Security
“Emergency response is a product of preparedness” - 9/11 Commission
Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPD) • Lay out vulnerabilities and outline steps to enhance preparedness and defense
Understanding the Dangers “For the life of me, I cannot understand why the terrorists have not attacked our food supply, because it is so easy to do.” — Tommy Thompson, former Secretary U.S. DHHS (2004)
Note! Key Food and Agriculture Related Documents Seized in Afghanistan
Agroterrorism—Defined The deliberate introduction, use, or threatened use, of a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or explosive agent against one or more components of the food or agriculture sectors, with the goal of causing mortality and morbidity, generating fear, precipitating economic loss, or undermining sector stability and confidence in government
WIFSS Curriculum Goal • Help communities prepare teams of frontline emergency responders for an agroterrorism incident or a food system disaster TEAMWORK AND COMMUNICATION ARE ESSENTIAL!
AWARENESS PREPAREDNESS DETECTION / DIAGNOSES RESPONSE / INVESTIGATION RECOVERY losses Incident time lag time point of attack The Steps to Preparedness P R E V E N T I O N M I T I G A T I O N
WIFSS Curriculum Core Courses: • Understanding the Dangers of Agroterrorism • Principles of Preparedness for Agroterrorism and Food Systems’ Disasters • Principles of Detection and Diagnosis—Strategies and Technologies • Principles of National Incident Management System (NIMS), Team Building, and Risk Communication • Principles of Frontline Response to Agroterrorism and Food Systems’ Disasters • Principles of Planning and Implementing Recovery
Challenges for Frontline Emergency Response Teams • Identify the correct team members • Creating effective planning and implementation • Sustaining the team • Getting to know each other • Sharing a vision and purpose • Communicating effectively • Developing trust
designated communication authorities & agencies designated communication authorities & agencies local political leadership & designated agencies local political leadership & designated agencies local public health groups local emergency response teams local public health groups local emergency response teams agriculture & food sector A Model Frontline Emergency Response Team
State Animal Response Plans State Food Response Plans State Plant Response Plans To Protect Food and Agriculture—Need Plans for Animals, Crops, and Food Food & Agriculture—NRF Incident Annex To be developed by federal partners to guide specific federal response protocols
Weapons of Mass Destruction • Chemical ** • Biological ** • Radiological • Nuclear • Explosives **Greatest threat to agriculture
Prior Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons against Agriculture • WWI – Glanders to infect draft animals • WWII – Colorado potato beetles to destroy potato crops • Contamination of a salad bar in Oregon (1984) • Feed-product contamination in Wisconsin (1996) • Contamination of ground beef with nicotine (2003) • Threat to poison the water supply with ricin in South Carolina (2003)
Chemical Threats • Pesticides/Herbicides* • Dioxins and Furans • Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs) • Poisons and Venoms *Greatest threat to agriculture
Biological Threats Citrus Canker Soybean Rust
Foreign Diseases and Organisms Greatest problem to agriculture because: • Lack of immunity • Non-indigenous species overwhelm native species • Standard biological and chemical resources control not effective • Requires extraordinary control measures
A new food continuum Farm to Table Human Beings (health & well-being) Environment (air, water & soil) Farm Transportation Points of Potential Terrorism Processing Transportation Borders Warehousing Retail Markets Domestic Tables Transportation International Markets International Tables
Concentration of product and facilities increases the danger of a contamination incident reaching more consumers. Effect of Concentration of Processing on Consumer Vulnerability
To Enhance Preparedness Communities should: • Inventory food systems • Assess vulnerabilities and risks • Institute mitigation measures to harden targets • Determine needed capabilities for surveillance, detection, diagnosis, response, and recovery
DHS Guidelines for Agriculture & Food National Level Critical Infrastructure (2004) • Distribution facilities shipping to ≥ 5 states • Food processors shipping to > 10 states • Producers with herds of: • > 20,000 bovine • > 30,000 swine • > 500,000 poultry • Distribution to > 10 states • Production of 50,001 - 250,000 bushels of crops
Considerations for Evaluating Facilities • Criticality of target • Level of visibility • Accessibility • Proximity of WMD to target • Capacity • Product distribution area • Impact of loss
continues on next slide CARVER plus Shock • Target prioritization tool • Assesses vulnerabilities • Helps identify the most attractive targets to attackers • Identifies the most vulnerable points in your agricultural infrastructure
CARVER plus Shock, cont. • Criticality • Accessibility • Recuperability • Vulnerability • Effect • Recognizability • Shock
FSIS Food Security Guidance using ORM • FSIS Safety and Security Guidelines for the Transportation and Distribution of Meat, Poultry, and Egg Products • FSIS Security Guidelines for Food Processors
Local Intelligence Networks • It all starts and ends locally • 85% of our nation’s critical assets are privately owned • Two-way communication is the key
The Importance of Instituting Biosecurity Measures • Harmful agents or substances could damage a food company/process if it harms consumers • Protect against terrorism
continues on next slide Security and Protection • Procedures that prevent entry of harmful agents • Detailed operations protocols for buffer areas are essential
CONTAMINANTS: • Animals • Supplies • Feed • Water • Packaging • Ingredients • Chemicals • Medicaments • CONTAMINANTS: • Environmental • Biological • Chemical • Nuclear Biosecure Production Room or Facility (Protected Space) PRODUCT ENDOGENOUS CONTAMINATION • CONTAMINANTS: • People • Employees • Deliverymen • Salespersons • Relatives • Visitors Model of Contamination Entry into a Biosecure Food System ENTRANCE Buffer Zone EXIT Buffer Zone (Transitional Area)
Security and Protection, cont. • Plan ahead: • Emergency response plans • Security breakdowns • Contamination protocols • New employee training procedures • Business plan changes
Surveillance Data • Variety of services and networks • Data available to assist in disease outbreak investigation efforts • Changes in patterns can alert officials • Differences may help pinpoint an agroterrorism attack
PulseNet • Identifies and labels each "fingerprint" pattern • Permits rapid comparison of patterns to identify related strains • “Fingerprinting" can distinguish strains of an organism at the DNA level
FAD Surveillance • Passive system • Depends on producer and private veterinarian detection and notification • Number of investigations in the U.S. has steadily increased over the past few years • Increased awareness and willingness to report
National Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN) • National network of diagnostic labs • Detect and report animal diseases • Certified to analyze samples for FAD • Provides needed surge response to handle samples
National Animal Health Laboratory Network Cornell University Animal-Satellite Regional Plant Diagnostics Ctr. National Veterinary Services Lab (NVSL) Colorado State University Animal-Core University of Wisconsin Animal-Core Iowa State University Animal-Satellite Washington State University Animal-Satellite North Central Region Northwestern Region Western Region Rollins Laboratory North Carolina Animal-Satellite Southern Region University of Arizona Animal-Satellite University of Georgia Animal-Core Texas A&M University Animal-Core Louisiana State University Animal-Satellite Oklahoma State University Animal Diagnostic Florida Diagnostic Laboratory Animal-Satellite UC Davis Regional Plant CAHFS
Exotic Pest Surveillance • Critical component • PPQ oversees Cooperative Agricultural Pest Survey • Provides early detection of exotic pests • Supported by a national stakeholder network
USDA/APHIS/Plant, Protection, and Quarantine (PPQ) • Federal response agency for plant health emergencies • Prevents entry and dissemination of a plant pest and pathogen • Implement control or eradication programs
National Plant Diagnostic Laboratory Network Kansas State University Regional Plant Diagnostic Ctr. Cornell University Animal-Satellite Regional Plant Diagnostics Ctr. Michigan State University Regional Plant Diagnostic Ctr. Great Plains Region Northwestern Region North Central Region Purdue University NAPHIS Western Region UC Davis Regional Plant Diagnostics Ctr. Animal-Core Southern Region Texas Tech University Plant Diagnostic Support University of Florida Regional Plant Diagnostic Ctr.
Other Laboratory Networks • Laboratory Response Network (LRN) • Food Emergency Response Network (FERN) • CDC’s Health Alert Network (HAN) • Integrated Consortium of Laboratory Networks (ICLN)—LRN, NAHLN, and NPDN • National Bioforensics Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBFAC)
Globalization and the Food Continuum • Food is now distributed and shipped globally • Globalization has led to increases in: • Connectivity and exchange between countries • Trade of food products between nations • Vulnerabilities of the food systems
continues on next slide Identification of an Agroterrorism Incident • Attacks on agriculture and the food systems may be: • Slow to reveal themselves • Difficult to detect • Hard to classify as accidental or intentional • Difficult to distinguish from a natural occurrence