Perspectives on Airbase Operations

1. 1 Perspectives on Airbase Operations Col Josuelito Worrell HQ AFCESA/CEX 3 May 2002 Greetings�.. This briefing provides a focus on some of the WMD and NBCC defense aspects of Airbase Operations since September 11th from the perspectives of the AF Civil Engineer Contingency Support Division. My division manages the Air Force Explosive Ordnance Disposal, Fire Protection, and Disaster Preparedness programs. The Disaster Preparedness Program will change to the Full Spectrum Threat Response Program within the next few months. Greetings�.. This briefing provides a focus on some of the WMD and NBCC defense aspects of Airbase Operations since September 11th from the perspectives of the AF Civil Engineer Contingency Support Division. My division manages the Air Force Explosive Ordnance Disposal, Fire Protection, and Disaster Preparedness programs. The Disaster Preparedness Program will change to the Full Spectrum Threat Response Program within the next few months.

2. 2 Focus Based upon AFCESA experiences after 9-11� What lessons did we learn (or re-learn)? What issues should be an Air Force or DoD priority to better respond to future WMD events? Discussion areas Doctrine and Policy Organization Training Equipage I�ve developed the next few slides to show some of the key lessons we learned from both CONUS emergency response operations and support to the wartime forces. I�ll also highlight some issues that should be considered at the Air Force and DoD level to prepare our forces to better respond to terrorist and wartime WMD incidents in the future. These are the four discussion areas.I�ve developed the next few slides to show some of the key lessons we learned from both CONUS emergency response operations and support to the wartime forces. I�ll also highlight some issues that should be considered at the Air Force and DoD level to prepare our forces to better respond to terrorist and wartime WMD incidents in the future. These are the four discussion areas.

3. 3 Doctrine and Policy Noteworthy Emergency Services Mutual Aid/Mutual Support Agreements are force multipliers (MSCA) Needs Attention CONUS mission sustainment tasks unclear for critical command and control functions AT/FP focus is primarily on explosives mitigation MSCA tasks and responsibilities have changed AF Task List � update to reflect NBC/WMD defense, homeland security, and disaster control task Noteworthy in the doctrine and policy area was the use of our existing emergency services mutual aid agreements with local communities. These agreements fall under the Military Support to Civil Authorities umbrella. Within our area, these are commonly used by the base fire protection flights to enhance response capability or to leverage local capabilities when military fire fighters deploy. Shortly after 9-11 we recognized that several key command and control elements-one was the 1st Air Force right at Tyndall-had little or no previous direction for mission continuation in a WMD attack. Essentially, they would evacuate just the same as the rest of the base population. The problem was that some elements of the organization required a short period of time to switch their activities over to their alternate control element. The issue of mission sustainment and a reasonable level of individual and collective protection for these key functions needs to be addressed. AT/FP measures need to expand to address all potential threats�particularly for CONUS locations. This include adjustments to new construction and retrofits to existing structures to meet the new DoD minimum standards (in final draft, POC is HQ AFCESA/CES, Mr Jim Caulder). Doctrine and policy require adjustment to reflect the new or revised MSCA supporting tasks and responsibilities. Several draft document have been circulated at the Air Force and DoD level. The key will be a clear understanding of the homeland defense mission and decision to assign forces to support this mission under a deliberate plan. Air Force Doctrine Document 1-1, Air Force Task List, requires an immediate update to incorporate changes in the Universal Joint Task List, include homeland security tasks, and address full spectrum threat response operations (disaster control is the joint service term for emergency response). Inclusion of these tasks will support development of MAJCOM requirements and speed implementation of the new tasks. Noteworthy in the doctrine and policy area was the use of our existing emergency services mutual aid agreements with local communities. These agreements fall under the Military Support to Civil Authorities umbrella. Within our area, these are commonly used by the base fire protection flights to enhance response capability or to leverage local capabilities when military fire fighters deploy. Shortly after 9-11 we recognized that several key command and control elements-one was the 1st Air Force right at Tyndall-had little or no previous direction for mission continuation in a WMD attack. Essentially, they would evacuate just the same as the rest of the base population. The problem was that some elements of the organization required a short period of time to switch their activities over to their alternate control element. The issue of mission sustainment and a reasonable level of individual and collective protection for these key functions needs to be addressed. AT/FP measures need to expand to address all potential threats�particularly for CONUS locations. This include adjustments to new construction and retrofits to existing structures to meet the new DoD minimum standards (in final draft, POC is HQ AFCESA/CES, Mr Jim Caulder). Doctrine and policy require adjustment to reflect the new or revised MSCA supporting tasks and responsibilities. Several draft document have been circulated at the Air Force and DoD level. The key will be a clear understanding of the homeland defense mission and decision to assign forces to support this mission under a deliberate plan. Air Force Doctrine Document 1-1, Air Force Task List, requires an immediate update to incorporate changes in the Universal Joint Task List, include homeland security tasks, and address full spectrum threat response operations (disaster control is the joint service term for emergency response). Inclusion of these tasks will support development of MAJCOM requirements and speed implementation of the new tasks.

4. 4 Organization Noteworthy CE and LG UTCs well postured to provide deployed base infrastructure AF Contract Augmentation Program invaluable force multiplier for diverse mission and agency support Installation Disaster Response Force CONOPS works Needs Attention CE UTCs not postured for peacetime WMD response Additional duty augmentees unavailable for critical support team and CCA duties (CONUS and OCONUS) Within the organizational area, we found our CE and HQ ACC/LG UTCs well postured to support contingency operations. Although not used in the peacetime roles, these forces were ready, able and equipped to provide base support infrastructure where needed. If future incidents occur in areas without the infrastructure found around New York City, the AF base support UTCs can provide rapid beddown support to recovery and medical forces. Our AF Contract Augmentation Program once again provided support that was and remains a key sustainment element. Need to add specifics here�. Another bright spot was our base Disaster Response Force. At bases throughout the world, the DRF concept of operations proved up to the task during hundreds of responses following the September attack and subsequent anthrax incidents. We found that our CE UTCs are not postured to support peacetime WMD operations. These UTCs were built to support wartime chemical, biological and radiological material detection. Consequently, they do not have the full range of capabilities required for a WMD incident that includes, for example, toxic industrial chemical. We once again confirmed that base have problems filling augmentation positions that are critical for operating such functions as the Disaster Preparedness Support Team or conducting wartime contamination control area and shelter management operations. Under the AEF concept, there are insufficient numbers of �non-critical� personnel to meet the need. We�re looking into the use of an in-place and deployable UTC to support operations both at home and during expeditionary deployments. Within the organizational area, we found our CE and HQ ACC/LG UTCs well postured to support contingency operations. Although not used in the peacetime roles, these forces were ready, able and equipped to provide base support infrastructure where needed. If future incidents occur in areas without the infrastructure found around New York City, the AF base support UTCs can provide rapid beddown support to recovery and medical forces. Our AF Contract Augmentation Program once again provided support that was and remains a key sustainment element. Need to add specifics here�. Another bright spot was our base Disaster Response Force. At bases throughout the world, the DRF concept of operations proved up to the task during hundreds of responses following the September attack and subsequent anthrax incidents. We found that our CE UTCs are not postured to support peacetime WMD operations. These UTCs were built to support wartime chemical, biological and radiological material detection. Consequently, they do not have the full range of capabilities required for a WMD incident that includes, for example, toxic industrial chemical. We once again confirmed that base have problems filling augmentation positions that are critical for operating such functions as the Disaster Preparedness Support Team or conducting wartime contamination control area and shelter management operations. Under the AEF concept, there are insufficient numbers of �non-critical� personnel to meet the need. We�re looking into the use of an in-place and deployable UTC to support operations both at home and during expeditionary deployments.

5. 5 Training Noteworthy First Responder WMD Training Courses began in 1998 Standardized training enabled EOD and Fire Fighters to support local community WMD incidents Needs Attention Security Forces First Responder Awareness training course completion rate is low Additional training will be needed to support new homeland security and MSCA tasks CE UTC personnel need more WMD response training Under the training area, our investment in first responder training courses paid off. These courses began in 1998 to enhance the existing HAZMAT First Responder Training and fill a critical information void for our first responder community. In addition, the AF HAZMAT Emergency Response Training Program standardized training throughout the Air Force and enabled our first responders to support local community responses and meet federal HAZMAT guidelines. We recognize the need to work with the Security Forces to increase the HAZMAT First Responder Awareness training for their forces. Completion rates are historically low due to the high demands upon their time. Depending upon the specific requirements, we�ll need additional training�particularly in the EOD area� to support new missions in homeland security and support to civil authorities. Finally, we need to better train our people on wartime UTCs to respond to WMD incidents. This training, of course, must coincide with the addition of WMD equipment to the UTC.Under the training area, our investment in first responder training courses paid off. These courses began in 1998 to enhance the existing HAZMAT First Responder Training and fill a critical information void for our first responder community. In addition, the AF HAZMAT Emergency Response Training Program standardized training throughout the Air Force and enabled our first responders to support local community responses and meet federal HAZMAT guidelines. We recognize the need to work with the Security Forces to increase the HAZMAT First Responder Awareness training for their forces. Completion rates are historically low due to the high demands upon their time. Depending upon the specific requirements, we�ll need additional training�particularly in the EOD area� to support new missions in homeland security and support to civil authorities. Finally, we need to better train our people on wartime UTCs to respond to WMD incidents. This training, of course, must coincide with the addition of WMD equipment to the UTC.

6. 6 Equipage Noteworthy Key CE NBCC Defense UTC equipment purchased Funding increased dramatically for key installation WMD response training and equipment purchases Joint Service Installation Pilot Program equips three bases with chemical and bio detectors in FY03 Needs Attention CE UTCs not equipped for WMD response CE NBCC Defense UTCs not fully equipped WMD response equipment not fully funded NBC shelf-life surveillance poorly managed Our CE UTCs are equipped for war but not for WMD response in a homeland security role. Unless an adversary uses a wartime material, our forces�with the exception of EOD�can provide little WMD assistance to rescue and recovery forces. During the recent operations, we were fortunate to receive funds to purchase some key items and ship them direction into the theater. Funds for training and equipment are available for a limited number of bases in FY03-09 for the USAF WMD Pilot Installation Program (11 bases) and Joint Service Installation Pilot Program (3 bases). We have funding shortages for our NBCD UTCs as well as installation equipment. The NBCC UTC shortages are funded through the FYDP and WMD response equipment funding seems to grow daily. We�re still short but getting better. Shelf-life surveillance of NBC equipment needs improvement. We see the need conduct surveillance test on key items in the AF inventory to identify shelf-life extensions for current equipment. For example, we have $4.7M worth of C-2 filter canister that reach the end of their life this month. After testing, a high number of C-2 canisters receive a shelf life extension. If we spend about $485K to test their serviceability, there is a high potential to save the Air Force several million dollars on this one item lot number alone. . Our CE UTCs are equipped for war but not for WMD response in a homeland security role. Unless an adversary uses a wartime material, our forces�with the exception of EOD�can provide little WMD assistance to rescue and recovery forces. During the recent operations, we were fortunate to receive funds to purchase some key items and ship them direction into the theater. Funds for training and equipment are available for a limited number of bases in FY03-09 for the USAF WMD Pilot Installation Program (11 bases) and Joint Service Installation Pilot Program (3 bases). We have funding shortages for our NBCD UTCs as well as installation equipment. The NBCC UTC shortages are funded through the FYDP and WMD response equipment funding seems to grow daily. We�re still short but getting better. Shelf-life surveillance of NBC equipment needs improvement. We see the need conduct surveillance test on key items in the AF inventory to identify shelf-life extensions for current equipment. For example, we have $4.7M worth of C-2 filter canister that reach the end of their life this month. After testing, a high number of C-2 canisters receive a shelf life extension. If we spend about $485K to test their serviceability, there is a high potential to save the Air Force several million dollars on this one item lot number alone. .

7. 7 Installation WMD Initiatives The key to this puzzle is the installation commander and program. The Air Force cannot provide the resources or manpower to have a separate organization to prepare for and respond to each separate type of incident. The installation uses the same people to respond to a WMD incident, a major accident, HAZMAT release, or natural disaster. We need to incorporate all of the good work, training, and equipment on the non-medial side into the existing HAZMAT Emergency Response Training Program and installation Full Spectrum Threat Response Program. These program are the core infrastructure of our response capability and the key to sustaining the improved capability provided by these multiple efforts. The key to this puzzle is the installation commander and program. The Air Force cannot provide the resources or manpower to have a separate organization to prepare for and respond to each separate type of incident. The installation uses the same people to respond to a WMD incident, a major accident, HAZMAT release, or natural disaster. We need to incorporate all of the good work, training, and equipment on the non-medial side into the existing HAZMAT Emergency Response Training Program and installation Full Spectrum Threat Response Program. These program are the core infrastructure of our response capability and the key to sustaining the improved capability provided by these multiple efforts.

8. 8 Questions or Discussion