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Investment Treaty Practice of China, Japan and Korea

Investment Treaty Practice of China, Japan and Korea . Arbitration Academy 2012: Class 2 Professor Hi- Taek Shin Seoul National University School of Law [work in progress: Not to be quoted without permission]. Notes.

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Investment Treaty Practice of China, Japan and Korea

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  1. Investment Treaty Practice of China, Japan and Korea Arbitration Academy 2012: Class 2 Professor Hi-Taek Shin Seoul National University School of Law [work in progress: Not to be quoted without permission]

  2. Notes • The powerpoint files are provided to students of Arbitration Academy 2012. • As these files are work under progress, no quotation is permitted without the author’s written permission. • In preparing the lecture, the author draws upon the expertise and previous studies by G. Wang, W. Shan and N. Gallagher (on Chinese practice), and S. Hamamoto and L. Nottage (on Japanese practice). However, all mistakes, if any, are the author’s own.

  3. National Treatment • Promise not to discriminate foreign “investor” or “investment” as compared to domestic counterpart on the basis of “foreignness” • To whom NT is given? • Investor, Investment, or both? • With respect to what? • Establishment, acquisition and expansion? • Other post-establishment business activities? • Exceptions to NT?

  4. National Treatment: China (1) • Model BIT (III) Article 3：Treatment of Investment • 2. Without prejudice to its laws and regulations, each Contracting Party shall accord to investments and activities associated with such investments by the investors of the other Contracting Party treatment not less favorable than that accorded to the investments and associated activities by its own investors. • China has not agreed to date to apply NT to “establishment and acquisition”. • The maximum extent China would be willing to extend NT: “expansion” as provided for in China-Korea BIT of 2007. • Chinese Model BIT: separate provision dealing with “admission of investment” which reserves the State’s right to admit investment in accordance with its laws and regulations. • Model BIT Art. 2.1 • Each Contracting Party shall encourage investors of the other Contracting Party to make investments in its territory and admit such investments in accordance with its laws and regulations.

  5. National Treatment: China (2) • Due to the long history of planned economy, NT has not been widely used in Chinese BIT practice. • First Model BIT: no mention of NT at all; • Second Model BIT: only a ‘best endeavours’ clause. • Third Model: NT standard, subject to local laws and regulations. • In some recent BITs (e.g., Korea-China BIT of 2007), China has moved a bit further: • These BITs removed the ‘domestic laws and regulations’ qualification from the treaty text, • but retain a ‘grandfather provision’ or ‘freezing clause’ applicable to China, allowing it to maintain and modify existing non-conforming measures inconsistent with the NT standard, as long as this will not increase the general level of inconsistency. • China also agrees in these BITs to gradually phase out such inconsistent measures.

  6. National Treatment: China (3) • Korea-China BIT, Art. 3 (Treatment of Investment) 1.  Each Contracting Party shall in its territory accord to investors of the otherContracting Party and to their investments treatment no less favourable than the treatment it accords in like circumstances to its own investors and their investments (hereinafter referred to as "national treatment") with respect to the expansion, operation, management, maintenance, use, enjoyment, and sale or other disposal of investments (hereinafter referred to as "investment and business activities"). 2.  ……. paragraph 1 of the Article 3 do not apply to any existing non-conforming measure maintained within its territory of the People’s Republic of China or any future amendment thereto provided that the amendment does not increase the non-conforming effect of such a measure from what it was immediately before the amendment took effect. Treatment granted to investments once admitted shall in no case be made restrictive than the treatment granted at the time when the original investment was made. The People’s Republic of China will take all appropriate measures to progressively remove all non-conforming measures.

  7. National Treatment: Japan (1) Japan – Korea BIT (2002), Art 2 1. Each Contracting Party shall in its territory accord to investors of the other Contracting Party and to their investments treatment no less favorable than the treatment it accords in like circumstances to its own investors and their investments (hereinafter referred to as “national treatment”) with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, operation, management, maintenance, use, enjoyment, and sale or other disposal of investments (hereinafter referred to as “investment and business activities”). • NT clauses of the post 2002 new-generation BITs/FTAs applies to investors and their investments with respect to the establishment and/or acquisition of investments as well as post-establishment business activities (such as operation, management, maintenance, use, enjoyment etc.) • Exceptions to NT with respect to the establishment and acquisition are specified in the so-called 'negative list'. • Negative list identifies: • all sectors or activities to which the pre-establishment NT obligation is not applicable • All existing (and future) non-conforming measures

  8. National Treatment: Japan (2) • If the other State party would not accept legally binding NT commitment with respect to establishment and acquisition (e.g., China): • Japan attempts to secure MFN treatment with respect to establishment and acquisition • Exceptional cases: Japan was unable to obtain either NT or MFN with respect to establishment and acquisition (Japan - Papua New Guinea BIT (2011)

  9. National Treatment: Korea (1) Model BIT 2001 Article 3：Treatment of Investment 1. Each Contracting Party shall in its territory accord to investments and returns of investors of the other Contracting Party treatment no less favourable than that which it accords to investments and returns of its own investors or to investments and returns of investors of any third State, whichever is more favourable to investors. 2. Each Contracting Party shall in its territory accord to investors of the other Contracting Party as regards management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal of their investments, treatment no less favourable than that which it accords to its own investors or to investors of any third State, whichever is more favourable to investors.

  10. National Treatment: Korea (2) • Korean policy is hybrid: • In Korean Model BIT: NT and MFN treatment, which is more favorable to investors • In BITs, Korea applies NT only to the post-establishment phases of investment with respect to management, maintenance, use, enjoyment, or disposal of investments. • Exception: Korea-Japan BIT (2003) • In the investment chapters of FTA, • Korea seeks to extend the scope of NT to cover the establishment, acquisition and expansion

  11. National Treatment: Korea (3) • The Korea-China BIT accommodates China’s position on NT and provides a unique variation of the NT (and MFN treatment) standards, carving out very broad exceptions only for China. • NT shall apply to 'the expansion, operation, management, maintenance, use, enjoyment, and sale or other disposal of investments.' • However, the NT does not apply to 'any existing non-conforming measure maintained within its territory of People's Republic of China or any future amendment thereto provided that the amendment does not increase the non-conforming effect of such a measure from what it was immediately before the amendment took effect.' • The Korea-China BIT grants full NT (and MFN) to investors of the other contracting party 'with respect to access to the courts of justice and administrative tribunals and authorities both in pursuit and in defense of their rights.'

  12. National Treatment: Korea (4) • Article 11.12 of the investment chapter of the Korea-US FTA (modeled after 2004 US Model BIT): • NT is granted with respect to establishment and acquisition • Non-conforming measures need to be identified in the appendix • NT (and MFN treatment) do not apply to 'government procurement' or 'subsidies or grants provided by a Party, including government-supported loans, guarantees, and insurance.

  13. NT Clause in BITs BIT

  14. NT Clause in FTAs FTA Investment Chapter

  15. Most Favored Nation(MFN) Treatment • Promise not to discriminate between foreign investors and investments on the basis of “nationality” • With respect to what? • Establishment and acquisition [and expansion]? • Other post-establishment business activities? • MFN clause applicable to dispute resolution related provisions?

  16. Most Favored Nation: China (1) Model BIT (III) Article 3：Treatment of Investment 3. Neither Contracting Party shall subject investments and activities associated with such investments by the investors of the other Contracting Party to treatment less favorable than that accorded to the investments and associated activities by the investors of any third State. • MFN treatment : common in all Chinese BITs. • All three Versions of the Chinese Model BIT have a MFN clause covering both ‘investments’ and ‘activities associated with such investments’

  17. Most Favored Nation: China (2) • None of the Chinese Model BITS have included the ‘in like circumstances’ wording in the MFN provision,; in the more recent treaties signed by China, this phrase is adopted. (China-Mexico BIT (2008)) • In some recent BITs, MFN clauses apply to “admission of investments” (China-Korea BIT, China-Japan BIT). • While Korea and Japan grant NT with respect to establishment and acquisition in Japan-Korea BIT, Chinese investors could benefit the NT with respect to establishment and acquisition both in Korea and Japan on the basis of the MFN treatment clause, while Japanese and Korean investors could only get the MFN in China as China has not yet granted NT on establishment and acquisition to any third State.

  18. Most Favored Nation: China (3) • Exceptions to MFN: benefits, preference or privileges by virtue of • any membership of customs unions, free trade zones, economic unions or common markets or • any double taxation agreements • The MFN clause does not expressly refer to dispute resolution. It is not certain whether the MFN provision in China’s current Model BIT could therefore be extended to apply to the procedural rights of the treaty, i.e., investor State arbitration clauses. • In light of the recent changes in Chinese BITs which now permit resort to ICSID arbitration for investor-State disputes, the exact scope and application of the MFN clause has significance for foreign investors in China. • In its more recent treaties, China has included an express provision excluding the application of the MFN clause to dispute resolution provisions. (Art. 5(4) of The ASEAN/China Investment Agreement (2009))

  19. Tza Yap Shum v. Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6, Decision on Jurisdiction and Competence of the Arbitral Tribunal 19 June 2009 • The first ICSID tribunal decision interpreting an investment treaty entered into China • Facts: • Tza Yap Shum is a Chinese national, resident in Hong Kong • Tza owns 90% of TSG Peru SAC (TSG), a Peruvian company engaged in the business of producing fish-based food products and export them to Asian market, indirectly through an offshore entity • In December 2004, SUNAT, Peru’s national tax authority, charged TSG for an alleged tax underreporting and imposed a back tax in the amount of approximately US4 million • TSG filed a challenge to SUNAT’s finding and tax imposition • SUNAT imposed a tax lien on TSG’s bank accounts shortly after TSG was notified of the tax imposition and while TSG’s legal challenge was pending • Tza argued that the tax lien effectively paralysed TSG’s business

  20. Tza Yap Shum v. Peru (2) • Tza’s Arguments: SUNAT’s freezing of TSG’s bank accounts amounted to • A denial of "fair and equitable treatment“, • A denial of "full protection and security“, • A restriction on the transfer of capital and earnings, and • Expropriation without compensation, • all of which are prohibited under China-Peru BIT. • Peru raised a number of objections to ICSID tribunal’s jurisdiction. In particular, • The claims were beyond the scope of the BIT’s dispute settlement clause

  21. Relevant Provisions in China-Peru BIT • Art. 3.2. stipulates an MFN treatment (without any limiting language) • Art. 8.3. If a dispute involving the amount of compensation for expropriation cannot be settled within six months after resort to negotiations as specified in Paragraph 1…, it may be submitted at the request of either party to the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)…… Any disputes concerning other matters …… may be submitted to the Center if the parties to the disputes so agree. ……

  22. Tribunal’s decision on application of MFN clause • Question: tribunal’s jurisdiction over Tza’s claims other than those concerning expropriation (FET and full protection and security) • Tzaargued that the apparent limitation could be overcome by the operation of MFN treatment clause which entitles him to import the benefit of Peru-Colombia BIT allowing any dispute of a legal nature to be referred to ICSID arbitration • Tribunal rejected Tza’s argument on MFN: • The language in 8.3: specific in that it permits arbitration of claims other than the amount of expropriation only in accordance with a separate agreement by the parties • This specific language overrode any more general application of the MFN clause • Tza’s claims other than expropriation dismissed for lack of jurisdiction

  23. Most Favored Nation: Japan (1) Japan – Korea BIT, Art 2 2. Each Contracting Party shall in its territory accord to investors of the other Contracting Party and to their investments treatment no less favourable than the treatment it accords in like circumstances to investors of any third country and to their investments (hereinafter referred to as “most-favoured-nation treatment”) with respect to investment and business activities. • Almost all of the Japan's BIT contain MFN clause. • Exception: Japan - Papua New Guinea BIT • Japan's post-2002 BITs(and FTAs) in general grant MFN treatment with respect to establishment and acquisition as well as post-establishment investment activities.

  24. Most Favored Nation: Japan (2) • Common exception to MFN treatment: benefit of any treatment granted by virtue of • a customs union, a free trade area or a monetary union. • Double tax treaty • Except for two recent BIT/FTA (Japan-Peru BIT and Japan-Switzerland FTA), Japanese BITs/FTAs do not have an explicit provision whether the MFN clause extends to the dispute settlement provisions or not.

  25. Most Favored Nation: Korea (1) Model BIT 2001 Article 3：Treatment of Investment 1. Each Contracting Party shall in its territory accord to investments and returns of investors of the other Contracting Party treatment no less favourable than that which it accords to investments and returns of its own investors or to investments and returns of investors of any third State, whichever is more favourable to investors. 2. Each Contracting Party shall in its territory accord to investors of the other Contracting Party as regards management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal of their investments, treatment no less favourable than that which it accords to its own investors or to investors of any third State, whichever is more favourable to investors. • The 2001 Korean Model BIT: MFN treatment standard apply • to the investment after it is established in its territory, and • to investors with respect to management, maintenance, use, enjoyment, or disposal of their investments. • Exception: Korea-China BIT and Korea-Japan BIT

  26. Most Favored Nation: Korea (2) • Korea-Japan BIT and the investment chapters of Korea-US FTA: • MFN treatment to cover the establishment, acquisition and expansion stages of an investment • detailed lists of non-conforming measures in the annexes to the main body of the agreements. • The 2001 Korean Model BIT does not include the concept of 'in like circumstances' in connection with national treatment and the MFN treatment.

  27. Most Favored Nation: Korea (3) • Korean BITs, in general, do not explicitly address whether the MFN treatment would extend to the investor State dispute settlement provisions. • Common exception to MFN treatment: benefit of any treatment granted by virtue of • a customs union, a free trade area or a monetary union. • Double tax treaty • 'government procurement' or 'subsidies or grants provided by a Party, including government-supported loans, guarantees, and insurance.' (Korea-US FTA)

  28. Most Favoured Nation (MFN) Treatment (1) BIT

  29. Most Favoured Nation (MFN) Treatment (2) FTA Investment Chapter

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