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Export Control/CI Nexus

Export Control/CI Nexus. E. L. Kolsto Manager, Export Control, Foreign Visits & Assignments, And Foreign Travel Argonne National Laboratory Security & Counterintelligence Division. Export Control/CI Nexus. CI Impetus

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Export Control/CI Nexus

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  1. Export Control/CI Nexus E. L. Kolsto Manager, Export Control, Foreign Visits & Assignments, And Foreign Travel Argonne National Laboratory Security & Counterintelligence Division

  2. Export Control/CI Nexus CI Impetus • FBI given concurrent investigative responsibility with DOC to investigate Export Violations • The FBI-CI Division creating new Section focused on Proliferation and Export • FBI/DOC/DHS(ICE) creating “Domain Task Force” for Technology Transfer and Export Control Matters

  3. Export Impetus • Inspector General Audits of FN Access to Sensitive Technologies • DOC/BIS – Stricter Interpretation – Including Deemed Exports and “Not Knowing is No Excuse” • Recognized patterns of particular countries focusing on particular technologies

  4. Background • Deemed Export implies Technology release • Requirements to process a Deemed Export are non-trivial, but Violations can be expensive and generate bad publicity • ANL has multiple potential areas of vulnerability, i.e., Streak Cameras, Lasers, Detectors, Reactors, etc. • Nexus with CI in many areas exists, such as National Security, Nonproliferation, Chem/Bio, Military, Crime Control exists

  5. Background (Cont) • Identification of Deemed Export items in the FV&A process will raise a flag for CI • FV&A, Export Control, Counterintelligence are tightly coupled • Inadequate aspect of any function causes a vulnerability • FBI involvement could broaden laboratory impact implications – Publicity/Legal

  6. Actions Being Taken • Acquired person for the CI group to address EC issues from a CI perspective • Address emerging areas of concern that could put the Laboratory at risk, i.e., ITAR, National Security (DHS), nanotechnology applications, etc. • Expand Laboratory Export Control Awareness Program • Address potential impacts of IG Audits

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