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Insights from the Astronaut Office on the necessity of a safe, versatile space system for future missions. Emphasizing on safety, adaptability, and long-term planning to overcome challenges and ensure mission success.
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Human Spaceflight ReviewAstronaut Office Perspective The next system should have capability beyond LEO • A LEO - only system is a dead end for our human spaceflight program. It likely ends when ISS does. • The next architecture should be able to accommodate several potential destinations. • We will likely fly using the building blocks of this new architecture for at least the next 30+ years. • ‘Heavy’ lift should be heavy enough (both mass and volume) to have a reasonable chance at more distant destinations with a few launches. • We cannot afford nor should we anticipate support to develop another heavy lift capability for many, many years if we elect to accept a stopgap measure today.
Human Spaceflight ReviewAstronaut Office Perspective The next system should be significantly safer than the previous system “. . . The Astronaut Office strongly recommends that NASA change this [OSP Level 1 program requirements] to instead mandate an order of magnitude improvement over the Shuttle in crew survivability” (CB-03-070, Oct 31, 2003) “Although flying in space will always involve some measure of risk, it is our consensus that an order-of-magnitude reduction in the risk of loss of human life during ascent, compared to the Space Shuttle, is both achievable with current technology and consistent with NASA’s focus on steadily improving rocket reliability, and should therefore represent a minimum safety benchmark for future systems” (CB-04-044, May 4, 2004) Acceptance of risk should be commensurate with our level of experience (We have nearly 50 years of experience with ascent and entry)
Human Spaceflight ReviewAstronaut Office Perspective A safer launch/entry system should include the following: • Abort/escape capability from hatch closure through orbital insertion • A full-envelope escape system which is free of ‘blackzones’ within the nominal ascent trajectory • Designed and built to meet NASA Human Rating Requirements • 1.4 structural FS, crew situational awareness, manual control, robustness, redundancy, etc. • not waived or rationalized away • Substantial Test and Verification • We view ascent/entry reliability derived from only modeling/analysis with skepticism until substantiated with test and verification • Paper rockets are always better, faster, safer, cheaper, etc.
Human Spaceflight ReviewAstronaut Office Perspective Closing Thoughts: • Commitment – Budget must match the Program • A program without adequate budget or constantly changing budget profiles cannot hope to be successful. We all know how we got here . . . • If we commit to a program, we need to have the will to follow through. How many canceled new human spaceflight programs can NASA survive? • There’s always a ‘better’ architecture/plan ready to replace the current one . . . • A change in architecture will • Delay IOC and increase costs. • Trade one set of technical challenges for another. • “Gaps” in access to space – There are 2 gaps to address: • Access to ISS after Shuttle program ends • End of ISS to our next destination • Any new architecture/plan must address both • We committed to both our nation and our international partners when we started the International Space Station Program; we need to honor that commitment and get our return on investment.
