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Updates to the Updates to Asserted Identity in SIP

Updates to SIP standards for PAI/PPI in responses, importance of identity info, proposal for authentication methods, and considerations for WG acceptance or individual draft submission.

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Updates to the Updates to Asserted Identity in SIP

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  1. Updates to the Updates to Asserted Identity in SIP draft-kaplan-sipping-pai-responses-00 Hadriel Kaplan

  2. The Setup • RFC 3325 only specified 6 specific methods for PAI/PPI inclusion • draft-ietf-sipping-update-pai-09 updates RFC 3325, to include PAI/PPI in any SIP request method type • But it does not include it in SIP responses to those requests, for the new methods

  3. Who Cares? • Why do we need/want PAI in responses? • You make a call to the PSTN, and you’d like to know the called party identity • You send a MESSAGE note, and you’d like to know who received it • You send a PUBLISH package, and you’d like to know to whom/what it got delivered

  4. Background • RFC 3325 explicitly allowed PAI in responses; for example, section 5: If the proxy receives a message (request or response) from a node that it trusts, it can use the information in the P-Asserted-Identity header field, if any, as if it had authenticated the user itself. • But it was pulled out of draft-update-pai because of concern over not being able to authenticate responses, ACK or CANCEL

  5. Rationale for allowing it • Read the draft • Essentially, it’s mostly only useful within a Trust Domain, or for pre-authenticated UAC’s • Which is basically the case for PAI to begin with • There are also other potential means of authenticating it in a response • E.g., draft-kaplan-sip-asserter-identity-01

  6. Proposal • Is there interest in this? • If WG accepts this, can we modify draft-sipping-update-pai before publication? • If not, is there some procedural means of working on this without creating a WG? • Plan-B: just an individual draft to RFC-Editor

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