AA&E Retrograde Assessment

1. AA&E Retrograde Assessment Jared Andrews LMI jandrews@lmi.org AA&E ICG Meeting June 2, 2009

2. AA&E Retrograde Assessment • OSD (Transportation Policy) Sponsored Assessment • Objectives: • Evaluate policies and procedures for ensuring in-transit safety and security • Safety Issues - Packaging, Blocking Bracing, Unnecessary Exposure • Security Issues - Protective Services, Accountability/Oversight, Visibility, etc. • Assess worldwide distribution of AA&E retrograde • Identify needed changes to policy, business processes, and systems • Assessment will be finalized and published by 30 June 2009

3. Who we met with • Conducted meetings and interviews with: • Services • USTRANSCOM • JMC • Defense Ammunition Center • DoD DEMIL Program Manager for Ammunition (PEO Ammo) • DLA DEMIL Program Office (Operates the DRMOs) • USCENTCOM • CDDOC • 401st and 402nd Army Field Support Brigades • Combat Support Associates (CSA) • SDDC • 595th Transportation Terminal Group (Kuwait) • 596th Transportation Terminal Group (Sunny Point/MOTSU) • Munitions Depots (McAlester, Tooele, and Blue Grass) • MSC

4. How big is the retrograde program? Number of JMC-managed munitions containers retrograded to CONUS between September 2007 and August 2008

5. Theater Overview – USEUCOM and USPACOM • Mature, established processes with experienced civilian workforce to ensure safety and security • USEUCOM • Drawdown of forces has resulted in the reduction and redistribution of AA&E inventories, retrograde requirement has stabilized • USPACOM • Large War Reserve stockpile in Korea from Cold War build up • Approx. 225,000 short tons of munitions require DEMIL • US/Korea building new DEMIL facility, but due to capacity constraints, USPACOM estimates 3 ships per year through 2016 are required to clear the backlog

6. Theater Overview - USCENTCOM • Austere, resource-constrained, dynamic, high-risk theater • Political and military conditions focusing on the eventual drawdown in Iraq, with subsequent needs for retrograde and reset • Large amount of AA&E being redistributed from Iraq to Afghanistan • No significant amount of retrograde occurring or planned for Afghanistan • All AA&E shipments to and from Afghanistan move by military air

7. Iraq Weapons Retrograde • Units redeploying from Iraq leave equipment sets behind for arriving units to “fall in on” • Has significantly decreased amount of weapons being retrograded • TACOM instituted the Small Arms Readiness Evaluation Team with Repair (SARET-R) program • Aimed at returning unit-owned weapons as a consolidated package to the unit home station following redeployment • All SARET shipments are currently airlifted from Iraq • Theater-provided weapons are handled differently • Managed through the Retrograde Property Assistance Team (RPAT) program • Move via secure convoy to the Theater Storage Area (TSA) in Kuwait where they are consolidated and shipped to Afghanistan via air, or to the US via MILAIR or ocean liner service

8. Iraq Munitions Retrograde • In 2007 Army sent a munitions assessment team to Iraq to identify retrograde requirements and need for packaging materials • Results of assessment better than expected • smaller amount of munitions at FOBs than expected • majority of excess munitions throughout Iraq still in their original packaging • EOD and Quality Assurance Specialist Ammunition Surveillance (QASAS) personnel are doing excellent job working with forward units to collect and dispose of unserviceable munitions • Highly motivated soldiers, but more ammunition training required at forward locations • JMC has deployed experts to assist with identifying remaining packaging requirements • Significant packaging materials sent to theater

9. Iraq Munitions Retrograde • DAC has a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with ARCENT to send a mobile training team twice a year to SWA • Provide HAZMAT certification training to military, civilian, and contractor personnel • Two instructors in theater for about 90 days • Teach about 10 classes

10. Iraq Munitions Retrograde Process Retrograde shipments moved via military convoy from Iraq to the TSA/ASP in Kuwait • Containers not marked/placarded so as not to attract undue attention At TSA/ASP, Combat Support Associates (CSA) processes and containerizes the ammo. CSA: • Provides 100% re-inspection of all inbound containers, repackages (as required), stuffs containers, blocks & braces, documents contents (including Dangerous Goods Declaration) Containers then move to port via military convoy and loaded on vessel for voyage to United States

11. Iraq Munitions Retrograde Observations • Up until mid- 2008, a significant number of munitions shipments were arriving at the TSA with deficient packaging, blocking, and bracing • Incident in 2006 where a container was improperly blocked and braced at a forward location in Iraq for shipment to the TSA • Third Country National (TCN) was injured when opening the container • Since mid-2008, condition of shipments arriving at TSA has improved significantly, seeing very few safety issues • Improvement attributed to greater availability of packaging material and CSA’s efforts to report packaging deficiencies back to the shipping units and bases

12. Iraq Munitions Retrograde Observations Cont. • MOTSU and MOTCO Observations • Act as pass through point—rarely open containers • Did not identify any issues with blocking and bracing • Recent cases where the contents and Net Explosive Weight (NEW) listed on the Dangerous Goods Declaration (DD Form 2890) do not match the contents and NEW listed on the vessel manifest • Depot Observations (Tooele, McAlester, and Blue Grass) • Occasional issues with documentation • Occasional issues with blocking and bracing but nothing very serious from a safety perspective

13. Over Ocean Security • Somali pirates have captured majority of attention but pirate incidents have also occurred in waters off of South America, India, Vietnam, and in the South China Sea • Armed security teams are used on vessels transporting munitions in SWA and other high-risk areas • Crews are vetted through El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) • Two issues identified: Sovereign Immunity for retrograde to Germany and Automatic Identification System (AIS) technology

14. Conclusions / Recommendations • Overall, retrograde AA&E is moving safely and securely • USCENTCOM has quickly developed robust processes and procedures • CONUS ports and depots are seeing very few issues • DoD should increase its efforts to ensure that forward units in Iraq receive necessary training and have adequate packaging materials on-hand • USCENTCOM, JMC, SDDC, and CSA should work to correct the documentation issues (i.e. DD Form 2890 not matching vessel manifest) • DoD should continue to pursue and utilize organic and commercial DEMIL capabilities in OCONUS to reduce in-transit exposure time • MSC should continue to: • Ensure status reporting is turned off for vessels carrying sensitive cargo • Work with Germany to resolve SI issue