140 likes | 365 Views
Liberalizing capital accounts – lessons from emerging Europe. Daniela Gabor UWE Bristol. Background. Two waves of liberalization post 1990, fast (Czech Republic and Baltic States by 1996) and gradual liberalizers (Hu, Ro, Bg , Sk by 2006).
E N D
Liberalizing capital accounts – lessons from emerging Europe Daniela Gabor UWE Bristol
Background • Two waves of liberalization post 1990, fast (Czech Republic and Baltic States by 1996) and gradual liberalizers (Hu, Ro, Bg, Sk by 2006). • KA liberalization - condition for EU membership • Similar sequencing: first FDI, last ‘hot’ interest-sensitive flows (non-resident access to money markets instruments) • KA liberalization with FDI targeting bank privatizations
Background • IMF(2009): Eastern Europe abandoned socialism to embrace financial globalisation + benign tolerance of real ER appreciation larger CA imbalances funded by capital inflows (consumption-driven growth model)
Post-Lehman hard landing • Sharp economic contraction • Sharp currency depreciation • Vienna Initiative – foreign-owned banks threatening to leave
Three lessons • Lesson 1: actors intermediating global liquidity matter! • Lesson 2:financialization of currency/money markets + cb liquidity management as CFM tool (during sudden stops) • Lesson 3: the IMF’s new institutional view ineffective, structural changes + normalized KK
Lesson 1: Bank-driven global carry Cross-border loans from BIS banks • Cross-border funding of • Sterilization games with the central bank (Christensen 2004) • Aggressive fx HH lending • Intra-financial system activity
Lesson 1: banks also intermediate non-resident carry in local currency assets
Lesson 2: financialization of currency and interbank money markets • McCauley and Scatigna (2011): EMEs currency markets trading driven by financial motives, off-shore • Financialization of currency markets spills into money markets • Structural surplus of liquidity, asymetrically distributed • Sterilizations as asset class for banks/non-residents • Sudden stops = inflicting liquidity shortages on (state-owned) patient banks
Interbank costs of reacting to sudden stops ‘restrictions on nonresident access to funding in local currency can at times make currency speculation more difficult’ (IMF, 2013: 18). The challenge is to ensure that non-speculative domestic demand for liquidity is satisfied at normal market rates (IMF 1997).
Lesson 3: IMF does not have the right answer to global fin. cycles • Ambiguous effects of macro-first steps approach (Blanchard et al. 2012) • How to respond to global financial cycles? • Regulatory restrictions on internal capital markets of global banks: local banking model • Careful management of ‘porous’ capital controls
Liberalizing capital accounts – lessons from emerging Europe Daniela Gabor UWE Bristol