1 / 47

The Case for Fielding a NATO Territorial MD Capability

2. Key Issues. Why should NATO be involved?Is territorial MD technically feasible?What would it cost, and would that be affordable?What about Russian concerns?Where does NATO stand on this now?What does NATO need to decide now?How might consensus be reached by or at NATO 2008 Summit on deployi

jaegar
Download Presentation

The Case for Fielding a NATO Territorial MD Capability

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

    1. The Case for Fielding a NATO Territorial MD Capability Robert G. Bell Senior Vice President SAIC The Atlantic Council April 19, 2007

    2. 2 Key Issues Why should NATO be involved? Is territorial MD technically feasible? What would it cost, and would that be affordable? What about Russian concerns? Where does NATO stand on this now? What does NATO need to decide now? How might consensus be reached by or at NATO 2008 Summit on deploying such a capability?

    3. 3 Why Should NATO be Involved in Territorial MD?

    4. 4 Article 5, Washington Treaty “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against all of them…” Could argue that even if the US BMDS European site offered no protection for NATO Europe, allies should be involved.Could argue that even if the US BMDS European site offered no protection for NATO Europe, allies should be involved.

    5. 5 2002 Prague Summit “Latvia lost its independence for a very long time, and it knows the meaning both of liberty and the loss of it. Latvia knows the meaning of security and the loss of it. And this is why being invited in an Alliance that will ensure our security is a momentous moment that will be writ large in the history of our nation.” - Statement accepting NATO membership invitation by Vaira Vike-Frieberga, President of the Republic of Latvia For many nations in Europe, Article 5 is not academic. Nations are not joining NATO so they can come to more committee meetings in Brussels. They are joining NATO because it is the most successful Alliance in history, and that success is underpinned by the collective security commitment.For many nations in Europe, Article 5 is not academic. Nations are not joining NATO so they can come to more committee meetings in Brussels. They are joining NATO because it is the most successful Alliance in history, and that success is underpinned by the collective security commitment.

    6. 6 September 12, 2001 “The Council agreed that if it is determined that this attack was directed from abroad against the United States, it shall be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.” Art. 5 is not academic for NATO, either.Art. 5 is not academic for NATO, either.

    7. 7 NATO AWACS Deployments to U.S. Pursuant to Article 5 Operation “Eagle Assist”: NATO’s first-ever deployment of assets in direct support of operations in the CONUS Deployment sustained from October 9, 2001 – May 16, 2002 830 crew members from 13 NATO nations 360 operational sorties totalling 4300 flight hours When the United States asked for NATO’s help pursuant to Art. 5 after 9/11 in protecting American cities against more airlines being used as missiles, NATO did not say: “well, we’ll protect our cities in Europe, and you can worry about your cities over there.” Rather, NATO said that Art 5 means the indivisibility of security, and dispatched its AWACS fllet.When the United States asked for NATO’s help pursuant to Art. 5 after 9/11 in protecting American cities against more airlines being used as missiles, NATO did not say: “well, we’ll protect our cities in Europe, and you can worry about your cities over there.” Rather, NATO said that Art 5 means the indivisibility of security, and dispatched its AWACS fllet.

    8. 8 Problem: US BMDS European Site Will not Protect All of NATO-Europe “There should not be two levels or multiple levels of security within the transatlantic community and the NATO Alliance. There should be one level of security, and it is not right that some countries be vulnerable while other countries are covered. … There should not be class A and class B allies. And it does the United States, frankly, little good if we are secured from ballistic missile attack but our European allies are completely vulnerable. That is also a strategic problem for us.” Asst Sec Fried March 28 State Department briefing

    9. 9 NATO is Already Pursuing TMD and Air Defense Collectively (“at 26”) ALTBMD contract signed at 2006 Riga Summit To provide, by 2010, protection against theater ballistic missiles strikes against NATO’s forces and critical military assets ALTBMD “imbedded” in NATO’s Extended Integrated Air Defense System For NATO, air defense of population and territory is neither “academic” nor “outdated”: e.g., “Air Policing” missions in Baltics, ACCS modernization program Missile threats to populations is, in one sense, simply another rung on this conflict spectrum.

    10. 10 ALTBMD Scenarios Not Different Than Territorial MD Scenarios Assume: Stringent UNSC sanctions on Iran agreed following Iranian announcement of deliverable nuclear weapons capability Iran closes Straits of Hormuz Closure condemned by UNSC, which approves mandate for NATO to reopen NATO forces begin build-up, including deployment of ALTBMD assets to accompany allied sea, air and land expeditionary units Iran warns that if NATO forces attack, it will employ its robust ballistic missile force to deliver nuclear weapons “against any and all NATO forces and territories” SACEUR declares NATO expeditionary forces can be protected, but that NATO populations not covered by the US BMDS European site are completely vulnerable. Does NATO want to have to rely in such a scenario on the threat of a nuclear retaliatory strike? Or would it hope to have additional options? “Bolt out of the blue” strike is not the real threat – rather, crisis escalation“Bolt out of the blue” strike is not the real threat – rather, crisis escalation

    11. 11 Iran’s “Strategic Deterrent Defence” Doctrine (IISS) “Iran’s strategy is to absorb a first strike, and then to initiate immediate retaliation with all means available” “Iranian leaders believe an effective defensive deterrence can force their enemies to relinquish their threats of pre-emption, believing that such a move would be too costly”

    12. 12 Value of MD “No one can contend that missile defense is sufficient to counter the threat of ballistic missiles. No defensive system, however sophisticated, can be 100% effective. … Such a tool cannot therefore be considered a substitute for deterrence. But it can supplement it by reducing our vulnerabilities.” -- President Chirac, Speech on French Nuclear Doctrine, January 19, 2006, L’lle Longue

    13. 13 Value to UNSC-led Diplomacy on Iran of NATO Territorial MD Program By directly focusing on Iran’s doctrine of “Strategic Deterrent Defense” and countering Iran’s confidence that it might be able to deter NATO and/or U.S. military action in a crisis by threatening retaliatory nuclear-armed missile strikes, a NATO decision to begin a missile defense system capable of protecting Alliance territory and population against Iranian TBM and IRBM threats could demonstrate to Iran that the advantages it seeks through its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile modernization activities cannot be achieved, and hence reinforce the emerging UNSC package of positive incentives and negative sanctions.

    14. 14 Value of MD (cont.) Should the diplomatic track fail and Iran in fact acquire deliverable nuclear weapons capability, NATO would be able to assure its citizens that they were not defenseless or dependent solely on the West’s threat of nuclear retaliation to deter Iranian nuclear strikes.

    15. 15 Is it technically feasible?

    16. 16 NATO, “at 26”, Agrees That It Is Prague Summit (November 22, 2002): CNAD to initiate a Missile Defence Feasibility Study (MD-FS) to examine options for protecting Alliance territory, forces and population centers against the full range of missile threats. MD-FS Final Report approved by MDPG on March 3, 2006; endorsed, with comments and amplifications, by CNAD on April 27, 2006, including basic conclusion that territorial MD of NATO Europe is technically feasible. NAC noted the MD-FS Final Report and endorsed the CNAD’s accompanying cover note on August 18. Riga Summit (November 29, 2006): HoS/G noted MDFS’s basic conclusion regarding technical feasibility..

    17. 17 Flight Test Intercept Record “We have now had 24 successful hit-to-kill intercepts in about 32 attempts since 2001, and that includes … successes in the last 14 to 15 flight tests over the past two, two and a half years. So this program works. It is a capability that does work and that we will rely upon as we move into this 21st Century.” LtGen Trey Obering State Dept briefing March 29th Since General Obering made this statement, there has been another fully successful THAAD TMD intercept (April 6).Since General Obering made this statement, there has been another fully successful THAAD TMD intercept (April 6).

    18. 18 What Would it Cost?

    19. 19 SAIC Cost Methodology ALTBMD: per MD-FS assumed architecture through FoC U.S. BMDS European site: costs shared bilaterally by U.S. and host nations Issue: Cost delta for NATO for architecture integration and NATO share of BMC3I?

    20. 20 SAIC Cost Conclusions

    21. 21 Bottom-Line on Costs NATO territorial defense system with US “3rd site” contributed is “one heck of a bargain”: US (and perhaps Poland, Czech Republic, Denmark and UK) pay all remaining costs of US BMDS European site” (€5.5B) US also pays 21% of NATO Common Funded ALTBMD BMC3I enhancement costs required to extend European site’s coverage (€215M) NATO, minus US, pays just under €800M (over 20 years) for its share – i.e., €40M a year, average One example: Dutch cost share (exclusive of national TMD program costs) would be less than €2M a year.

    22. 22 Cost Considerations (cont.) NATO collectively is already pursuing TMD for protection of its forces and critical military assets, and several NATO allies are already spending billions on national TMD systems. Inter-connecting the US BMDS European site’s powerful sensors with NATO ALTBMD would substantially enhance the capabilities of those assets if generated for protection of NATO maneuver forces and therefore provide “value added” at modest additional cost. NATO already spending substantial sums in Common Funded budget resources on fielding the ALTBMD Integrated Test Bed (ITB). The ITB could be used to demonstrate/validate interoperability solutions for tying NATO ALTBMD to the US BMDS European site. As with ALTBMD, NATO territorial MD interceptors and sensors need not be a “standing force”, but rather could reside with the nations and could be generated as needed in a crisis situation (assuming architectures had been demonstrated and validated and NATO BMC3 “backbone” in place).

    23. 23 What About Russian Concerns?

    24. 24 Context for Engagement with Russia Moscow ABM Record of prior consultations Russia assistance to Iran on missile technology Russia opposition to stiffer sanctions Russia interest in assistance to Iran with civil nuclear reactors Disagreement over scope of cooperation on NRC TMD

    25. 25 Result of March 28th Bush-Putin Telephone Call on Missile Defense “The United States looks forward to further discussions with the Russian Federation on bilateral cooperation and joint activity in this important field, including the potential sharing of technology and the development of compatible systems. Possible areas of partnership with Russia could include research and development of missile defense systems, sharing of early warning data, and exercises between our forces.” - Press Release by Amb. Nuland

    26. 26 Possible Cooperation Areas Identified by MDA Director on March 28th Data sharing Information exchange Radar data sharing Using US BMDS European site to cover Russian territory Incorporation of Russian MD capabilities into “a larger capability” Interaction of NATO and Russian systems Technology exchange

    27. 27 Foreign Minister Lavrov on NRC MD Cooperation (“Before”) “Sergei Lavrov, Russia’s foreign minister, said Moscow’s complaints arose from concerns on how such defenses were being handled between Russia and the west. He said western countries in the NATO Russia Council, which deals with military ties between Moscow and the alliance, had insisted on ‘calling a break’ in talks on missile defense cooperation. The pause in consultations appeared to have been tailor-made to coincide with’ the US move to impose parts of its national missile system in eastern Europe, he complained.” FT, February 23, 2007

    28. 28 Foreign Minister Lavrov on NRC MD Cooperation (“After”) “Lavrov expressed the hope that ‘political will expressed by President Bush in the telephone talk with President Putin will be implemented in practice during these [April 19th NRC] consultations and in those actions the U.S. will take in the future.” - ITAR-TASS, March 29

    29. 29 So, Will NATO Agree? NATO ? Leadership at Headquarters NATO ? Coalition of U.S. and willing European allies NATO = Consensus “at 26” NATO decision-making requires unanimity “at 26”NATO decision-making requires unanimity “at 26”

    30. 30 NATO SecGen on Territorial MD “When it comes to missile defense, there shouldn’t be an A-league and a B-league within NATO. For me it is the indivisibility of security that is the guiding principle.” FT, March 12, 2007 That said, leadership also matters. And the fact is the Secretary General is urging this.That said, leadership also matters. And the fact is the Secretary General is urging this.

    31. 31 “Czechs Want to Integrate US Anti-Missile System into NATO Projects” “The Czech Republic will push for a proposed US missile defense system, including a radar station on its own territory, to be ultimately linked to NATO defense projects during a two-day informal meeting of NATO defense ministers now underway in Seville, Spain, Czech Ambassador to NATO Stefan Fule told Interfax.” Czech Republic Business Newswire, February 8, 2007 As you heard this morning, so are our friends from Prague.As you heard this morning, so are our friends from Prague.

    32. 32 Chancellor Merkel “We from the German side prefer a solution inside NATO and also a open talk with Russia on this subject. It has already been agreed at the Prague NATO Council in 2002, that NATO will acquire such a defensive system. And I believe, we should stick to that, to regard it as an overall NATO task, and I will promote it this way. I view the chance for this (system) ‘not negative’.” ZDF interview, March 13, 2007 So are other key alliesSo are other key allies

    33. 33 U.S. Asst Sec of State John Rood “It is important that NATO move from merely studying [MDFS] options to implementing the options.” “If NATO approves a Military Requirement for territorial missile defense, the 3rd site could make an important contribution to the defense of Alliance territory.” - RUSI MD Conference, February 28 And since US leadership is also a sina qua non within NATO, it is extremely significant that President Bush’s administration has in recent weeks come out strongly in favor of this approach. And since US leadership is also a sina qua non within NATO, it is extremely significant that President Bush’s administration has in recent weeks come out strongly in favor of this approach.

    34. 34 U.S. Asst. Sec. of State Dan Fried “The more NATO is involved in this, the better. And the bilateral systems which the United States is preparing to discuss with the Poles and the Czechs could be – and in fact we would all be better off if they were – integrated with national systems and linked up with some sort of NATO-integrated systems.” - March 28 State Dept briefing

    35. 35 NATO ASG/DI Peter Flory “There is not a consensus on territorial missile defense.” - RUSI MD Conference, February 27th I do not know the outcome of today’s pivotal R-NAC in Brussels, but at least ion terms of going-in positions among the allies, there was no consensus. I do not know the outcome of today’s pivotal R-NAC in Brussels, but at least ion terms of going-in positions among the allies, there was no consensus.

    36. 36 April 27, 2006 CNAD D/S Noted that it was clear that before proceeding further, a clear definition of the political dimension of MD was required ... In large part, this is because while NATO had done good work on the technical issues associated with territorial missile defense, it had not really begun to engage on the political context for such a deployment decision. Iran was a key issue in capitals, of course, but until last Fall there was hope that the EU-3/UNSC diplomacy might pull a rabbit out of the hat. In large part, this is because while NATO had done good work on the technical issues associated with territorial missile defense, it had not really begun to engage on the political context for such a deployment decision. Iran was a key issue in capitals, of course, but until last Fall there was hope that the EU-3/UNSC diplomacy might pull a rabbit out of the hat.

    37. 37 So, what to do?

    38. 38 MD as One Element of Broader Approach “It is important and politically necessary to underline that when the HOS/G commissioned the new MDFS to examine options ‘for active defense’ to protect Alliance territory, forces and population centers against the full range of missile threats, these options were clearly seen in the context of an efficient and appropriate mix of political and defense efforts, along with deterrence as laid out in the Prague Summit Declaration.” ASG/DI Marshall Billingslea Multinational BMD Conference London, September 18, 2006

    39. 39 NSC Advisor Stephen Hadley During a stopover in Brussels on Wednesday en route to Moscow, Hadley said the missile defense system was “an element of a strategy to try and convince Iran that developing this capability is not in its interest.” IHT, February 22, 2007

    40. 40 Ideal Taskings from Today’s R-NAC: By July, update MDFS: SGP to update threat assessment Member States to update ALTBMD data packages US to provide data package re European site CNAD MDPG to review/update MDFS scenarios Building consensus within NATO takes time. But there are still 12 or 13 months until the next NATO Summit (President Bush’s last). However, while efforts to define an acceptable political dimension for NATO taking a deployment decision on enhancing its ALTBMD program to allow it to complement the US BMDS European site in providing effective MD for all of NATO-Europe, putting crucial technical building blocks in place must proceed in parallel. Building consensus within NATO takes time. But there are still 12 or 13 months until the next NATO Summit (President Bush’s last). However, while efforts to define an acceptable political dimension for NATO taking a deployment decision on enhancing its ALTBMD program to allow it to complement the US BMDS European site in providing effective MD for all of NATO-Europe, putting crucial technical building blocks in place must proceed in parallel.

    41. 41 Ideal Taskings from Today’s R-NAC (cont.): By January, ALTBMD PO to complete 3 new territorial MD studies*: Determine coverage of US BMDS European site Identify options (inc. costs) for using ALTBMD assets (inc. necessary enhancements) for filling “gaps” Identify debris management/mitigation approaches (* NC3A to secure necessary NSIP funding for studies from IC IAW SRB guidelines)

    42. 42 Ideal Taskings from Today’s R-NAC (cont.): By April 2008, CNAD to review option recommended by ALTBMD PO and agree a recommended architecture and Program Plan for consideration by NAC before NATO 2008 Summit.

    43. 43 Conclusions Tying NATO into US BMDS European site underscores cardinal principle of the “indivisibility” of Alliance security. NATO cost “delta” for providing territorial MD for Europe against Iranian TBM/IRBM threats, assuming 3rd U.S. site, affordable (average of €50M/year). Excellent foundation laid by NATO with its decisions on ALTBMD SE&I and MDFS. Initiating such a NATO territorial MD program can reinforce UNCR-led diplomatic efforts and, should such diplomacy fail, reinforce Western nuclear deterrence against Iran by augmenting that deterrence with active defenses. Russia should be made “part of the solution”, not be “part of the problem.” The answer lies in revitalizing NRC engagement on Missile Defense. Given long-lead times for MD programs (2011-2017) and current projections of the timelines associated with possible Iranian nuclear weapons capability (2010), time is of the essence for NATO decision-making Goal should be to prepare program option for NATO 2008 Summit. .

    44. 44 Back-Up Slides

    45. 45 Towards A “Clear Political Definition”: A New NATO “Double Track” Political/Diplomatic Track: Senior-level consultations on how best to reinforce UNSC-led political/economic pressure on Iran to facilitate a negotiated settlement of the dispute. Intensified engagement with Russia on MD cooperation within NRC, and enlistment of stronger Russian assistance vis-à-vis Iran (i.e., a “double track” not aimed at Russia, but this time in partnership with Russia) Modernization/Defense Track: Contingency planning by NMAs for any Iranian attempt to close Strait of Hormuz Preparation of Iranian-specific limited territorial MD options against TBM/IRBM threats.

    46. 46 Elements of Political Track Senior-level consultations within appropriate NATO venues on how to coordinate (in cooperation with EU) energy resources in the event of an Iranian oil disruption or export embargo Strengthening of counter-proliferation measures, including more direct role for NATO in UNSCR 1696. Energizing of EWG-R and MC discussions on MD-FS, together with R-NAC, For Min and Def Min meetings, to reach agreement in 2007 on extending ALTBMD to provide territorial MD capabilities against Iranian TBMs/IRBMs. Defer discussion of need or lack thereof for NATO defenses against longer-range, longer-term ICBM threats (whether North Korean or Iranian) Parallel public diplomacy/education efforts re costs and value of this limited territorial MD program.

    47. 47 Military/Deployment Track Per 1999 NATO Strategic Concept (Para. 24) initiate NATO contingency planning for any Iranian attempt to close the Straits of Hormuz, to include sea and air NRF deployment options Task appropriate NATO committees and agencies to update MD-FS database, address technical issues and prepare for senior-level review a specific low-cost/near-term plan for enhancing ALTBMD assets to provide TBM/IRBM territorial MD option, upon force generation.

    48. 48 Specific Elements of MD Track Keep ALTBMD SE&I program on course, on schedule. Ensure the “L” stays in ALTBMD Consider necessary enhancements of these upper-level TMD systems to provide more capable “end game” defense options against TBM and/or IRBM threats. Agree on evolutionary enhancements and upgrades to ACCS, Bi-SC AIS and NGCS. Identify and develop necessary interfaces, communications, CONOPS, and C3 arrangements required to facilitate real-time data sharing, radar cueing, target assignment, firing decisions, political consultations, and consequence management (including debris control). Agree on respective roles and responsibilities of US STRATCOM and NATO ACO in real-time missile engagements over Europe.

More Related