Sobering after a „grim wedding” – a realistic evaluation of Hungary’s accession to the EU

1. Sobering after a „grim wedding” – a realistic evaluation of Hungary’s accession to the EU Krisztina Arató Ph.D ELTE, Budapest „Euroscepticism and European Integration” Zagreb, 12 April 2007

2. Introduction • Why grim wedding? • Timothy Garton Ash in The Guardian (June 27, 2002) • Something went wrong – neither the old, nor the new member states are happy with the realisation of the EU’s Eastern enlargement • Problem not important in itself – interesting for the future, the innovation capacity of the new EU

3. Basis • There was no other possible way for modernising Central-Eastern Europe • The overall result of EU accession in positive for both old and new member states • However, after accession euphoria there is a need for a realistic evaluation of EU eastern enlargement process

4. Major parts of the presentation • Analysis of the European Union – approach, motivation, institutional background, conditionality in Eastern enlargement • Analysis of new member states (esp. Hungary) – accession strategies, roles of regional institutions in accession process • Conclusions

5. EU and eastern enlargement I. • Why enlargement? • Several analyses (e.g. H.Grabbe) argued that the EU had no clearcut strategy for Eastern enlargement • It seemed just a natural consequence of the collapse of the bipolar world • EU: special responsibility for the region (Hallstein, Mitterand, Dooge Committee, etc.) • 1990s: symbolic and concrete promises after the Copenhagen criteria

6. EU and eastern enlargement II. • Just how important is Eastern enlargement for the EU? • Not a priority throughout the process (Ágh) – see Constitution and Lisbon strategy • Internal engagements and debates (EMU, clashes of interest in EU15) • No external pressure

7. EU and eastern enlargement III. • Role of the Commission • No formal responsibility in enlargement in general • Huge role in Eastern enlargement – no political decision on Council level • Uncertain, even contradictory information from different DGs in different periods of the negotiation process

8. EU and eastern enlargement IV. • Moving target • The EU did not present a clear schedule for enlargement • Not accession date, only indirect schedule (2000-2006 financial perspective) • Principle of differentiation changed late 2001 to Big Bang – too late to change accession strategies for most applicants

9. EU and eastern enlargement V. • Conditionality • Formal and informal conditionality • Exceptional in scale • Expectations to apply parts of the acquis prior to accession • Informal expectations in excess – e.g. concerning regional policy and subnational government structures

10. EU and eastern enlargement VI. • Money • EU transfers have been one of the biggest attractions of membership • How much money is available? – set in 2000-2006 financial perspecive for 4-6 new member states • Good deal for the EU - cheap enlargement

11. Poland 67€ Hungary 49 € Slovenia 41 € Czech Republic 29 € Per capita available EU funding for 2005 Data from Michaela Schreyer in Int. Herald Tribune Greece 437 € Ireland 418 € Spain 216 € Portugal 211 € Per capita available EU funding for 2000 EU and eastern enlargement VII.

12. CEECs and EU accession I. • Why accession? • Symbolic reasons – „returning to Europe” • Economic reasons – economic stability, stabilisation of strong trade links, FDI, etc. • Modernisation – EU membership might be a key element in modernising key sectors like pension reforms, budgetary stability, etc. • Political reasons – stabilising democratic political systems • UNEQUIVOCAL COMMITMENT FOR MEMBERSHIP

13. CEECs and EU accession II. • Accession strategies • 2 main models – Hungarian and Polish • Hungarian: to become a member state at the first possible date with the best possible conditions • Few derogations • Strong adaptive attitude – „best pupil in class” • Belief in the principle of differentiation • Polish: there is no Eastern enlargement without Poland • Hard negotiations, better concessions

14. CEECs and EU accession III. • Regional co-operation • Failure of Visegrad and other regional organisations • Rational expectations: co-operation might strengthen negotiating positions of CEECs • Reality: • Historic conflicts and neuralgic points • Principle of differentiation – Divide et impera from the Commission?

15. Conclusions • I have listed the major mistakes made by both negotiating sides • Why they happened? • NO STRATEGY ON ANY SIDES • EU15 did not have a vision about how an enlaged Union would target and operate • New members did not have an idea how to change attitude after accession (from applicant to club member) • Now EU 27 are in a visionless status – in order to make the EU work, we all have to contribute to create the future