Metaphysics

1. Metaphysics U. 1.

2. Metaphysics The Nature of Reality Consider firstly, an ‘ontological’ exercise: Unreal (place the following along this continuum) Real

3. Metaphysics The Nature of Reality What qualities, if any, do the similarly grouped items share? Unreal Real Can something be real but not exist, and vice versa? Can something be real if the senses cannot perceive it? Which items exist in perpetuity, and which do not? Are there different ‘modes’ of existence?

4. Metaphysics Mind Body

5. Metaphysics Body Mind What constitutes ‘you’?

6. Metaphysics Body Mind

7. Metaphysics Body Mind Blue eyes Thoughts What constitutes ‘you’? Values Physical components Brown hair Bone & Sinew Incorporeal components Feelings

8. Metaphysics Body Mind Ostensibly, we are composed of two parts: The Corporeal Me The Intangible Me Are the two actually separate in a meaningful sense?

9. Metaphysics Body Mind 2 Approaches/Views Dualism Monism

10. Metaphysics Body Mind Dualism • Dualists argue there are two modes/levels of existence: • A physical level, in which the • corporeal body operates • And an incorporeal level, • where the mind resides.

11. Metaphysics Body Mind Monism • Monists hold that there is only a single reality: • An entirely physical reality • where mind and body are • corporeal. (Physicalism) • OR • An entirely mental/non- • physical reality where matter • does not exist. (Idealism)

12. The Case for Dualism – Texts for Analysis 2. 1.

13. An Intellectual Revolution Greek Humanism Greek Mythology 500 BCE

14. Rise of Dualism Against a Monist Mythology A Monist attitude prevailed in ancient Greece: Glaucon “Haven't you realized that our soul is immortal and never destroyed?” “No, by god, I haven't. Are you really in a position to assert that?” Cebe “Men find it very hard to believe. They think that after (the soul) has left the body it no longer exists anywhere, but that it is destroyed and dissolved on the day the man dies.”

15. The Phaedo - Platonic Dualism 1. Argument Concerning Indestructibility 2. Argument Concerning Recollection 3. Argument Concerning Opposites

16. The Phaedo - Platonic Dualism 1. Argument Concerning Indestructibility P1: There are two kinds of existence; seen and unseen; P2: The Seen is changeable and the Unseen is unchanging; P3: The soul is most alike and akin to the unseen; C: Therefore, the soul is most likely unchanging, and thus indissoluble

17. The Phaedo - Platonic Dualism 2. Argument Concerning Recollection P1: We cannot derive knowledge (of absolutes) from the material world; P2: We have knowledge (of absolutes); P3: This knowledge must be obtained prior to our physical life; C: Therefore, our soul must exist prior to our physical existence, and thus is separate from it. So true Socrates, gosh you’re so wise!

18. The Phaedo - Platonic Dualism 3. Argument Concerning Opposites P1: All things that have opposites are generated out of their opposites P2: Life is the opposite of Death, and vice versa P3: The dead are generated from the living, the living are generated from the dead C: Therefore, the souls of the dead must exist in some place out of which they come again

19. The Phaedo - Platonic Dualism 1. Argument Concerning Indestructibility 2. Argument Concerning Recollection 3. Argument Concerning Opposites

20. The Case for Dualism – Texts for Analysis 2. 1.

21. Metaphysics Body Mind C.17th revival of Dualism ‘Cartesian Dualism’

22. Metaphysics Body Mind C.17th Dualist Revival 1. Argument from Doubt 2. Argument from Indivisibility ‘Cartesian Dualism’

23. Cartesian Dualism 1. Argument from Doubt P1: I can doubt my body (physical self) exists P2: I cannot doubt that I exist C: Therefore, I must be distinct (a different substance) from my body

24. Some Responses to ‘The Cogito’ How, Monsieur Descartes, does the existence of ‘thinking’ extend to the existence of an ‘I’? Better had the conclusion been “it thinks”, as in “it is raining”. Descartes, you scoundrel, your cogito already pre-supposes the existence of "I“ (which is doubting), and therefore concluding with existence is logically trivial! Descartes, old boy, I agree with Nietzsche; your process allows you to claim simply that “thinking is occurring” – you cannot attribute that thinking to an entity.

25. Cartesian Dualism P1: The body is divisible into parts. P2: The mind is not divisible into parts C: Therefore, the mind is of a different nature to the body. 2. Argument from Indivisibility

26. Metaphysics Body Mind Even if we ‘suppose’ Dualism – problems arise: How does the incorporeal mind ‘control’ the physical body?

27. Dualist Theories Consider the following theories regarding dualist mind-body interaction: Set this one to the side for now Epiphenomenalism Interactionism Occasionalism Parallelism How sufficiently do these theories account for the co-existence of a mental and physical realm/reality?

28. Property Dualism The ONLY ‘substance’ The subjective experience of ‘me’ The objective experience of ‘me’

29. Property Dualism ‘Supervenience’ (pp.76-77 of Phelan)

30. Challenging Substance Dualism

31. Challenging Substance Dualism Genuine Article Is it justified to speak of the mind as an ‘entity’, a ‘thing’ which exists? Consider: Person Y did this for person X’s sake The ‘sake’ is not an entity in itself – just a term of reference To view the mind as a thing which exists in addition to the body is a mistake in classification. - My football team won the game - The team is made up of 15 members - The team exists in addition to its members Category Error Scientific Evidence Meaningful Meaningless The numerous cases of physical damage to the brain resulting in an alteration to personality and the function of the mind is a common refutation of dualism

32. P s Physicalism Behaviourism Functionalism Unverifiable statements about interior mental life are senseless. For the behaviourist, ‘mental states’ are just descriptions of behaviour or dispositions to behave in certain ways Problems? - Pretence? - Paralysis? - Qualia? Pain Wincing, shrieking, hopping around, clutching the wound Thirsty Would be inclined to drink water if it were available

33. P s Physicalism Behaviourism Functionalism Problems? - The Chinese Room - Zombies & Mutants - The Two Marys - Qualia (Phelan pp. 87-88) The role of the brain is purely functional: The brain responds to some stimuli (input) and processes a responses (output) Mary Mary http://people.brandeis.edu/~teuber/philsyllabus2.html

34. P s Physicalism Using the Phelan textbook (pp.77 – 83) and internet resources… (internet encyclopaedia of philosophy & Stanford university philosophy website are good starting places) Write a brief explanation of the following Materialist theories: 1. Reductive Materialism In addition to your ‘summary’ of the theories, make some notes about any problems with these theories. 2. Eliminative Materialism 3. Biological Naturalism

35. 1. Reductive Materialism Love Enjoyment of ice-cream Experience of ‘redness’ Thoughts about life BUT: Correlations are not explanations

36. 2. Eliminative Materialism Notions of thoughts and minds are old fashioned ‘hornswaggle’ Love C-fibres firing Increase of dopamine Enjoyment of ice-cream Experience of ‘redness’ Stimulation of frontal lobe Neural transmitters firing Thoughts about life BUT: ‘I am only what I can be proved to be through science’ = fallacy

37. 3. Biological Naturalism M ‘Dualism in sheep’s clothing’? M M M

38. P s Physicalism

39. M s Idealism ‘It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing amongst men, that houses, mountains, rivers, and in a word all sensible objects have an existence natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the understanding. But with how great an assurance and acquiescence soever this principle may be entertained in the world; yet whoever shall find in his heart to call it in question, may, if I mistake not, perceive it to involve a manifest contradiction. ‘ P1: We perceive ordinary objects (houses, mountains, etc.); P2: We (are able to) perceive only ideas; C: Therefore, ordinary objects are ideas.

40. M s Idealism Berkeley does not deny the existence of ordinary objects such as stones, trees, books, and apples - he holds that only an immaterialist account of such objects can avoid scepticism about their existence and nature. What such objects turn out to be, on his account, are bundles or collections of ideas. Where is the ‘sweetness’ of an apple? Where is the texture of an apple? Where is the colour of the apple? Where does the sound of eating an apple exist?

41. Hierarchy of Ideas Substance Dualism M s P s Interactionism & Parallelism/ Occasionalism P s Property Dualism Epiphenomenalism M p P p Monism P s M s No exp. of interaction necessary. OR