Government Role in the Flow of Human Talent

1. “Bringing the Party Back in:The Organization Department in China’s Reverse Brain Drain”David ZweigChair Professor, Division of Social ScienceDirector, Center on Environment, Energy and Resource PolicyHong Kong University of Science and TechnologyWorkshop on “China‘s Global Search for TalentCo-Sponsored by the Center on Environment, Energy and Resource Policy HKUST, and Center on China’s Globalization,Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce,7 November 2011

2. Government Role in the Flow of Human Talent • deregulate controls on human movement, lower transaction costs of reverse migration. • raise salaries for returnees, improve housing, give dual passports or long-term residence cards for nationals with foreign citizenship, and access to updated equipment. • The Korean state began their process of return migration in 1975, • Taiwanese government established a special organization to encourage return migration. • Overseas entrepreneurs will go to government high tech zones, with tax breaks, discount floor space, and help entering the local market. • Improve the overall scientific climate by promoting science, education and economic growth and pour funds into these sectors.

3. Newland: to facilitate circular migration, governments must at a minimum create an "enabling environment in the country of origin.” • “The most fundamental (and most difficult) elements of this are establishment of the rule of law, property rights, open and transparent government, lack of corruption and other attributes of good governance, including dual citizenship or eliminating visa requirements for members of the diaspora who are citizens of another country.“ • state must also overcome bias” against returnees at national, institutional or individual level.

4. First 25 Years: Limits to Success • Role of the CCP sporadic, key work by Min of Education, Personnel, Science and CAS. • CAS' "100 Talents Program,” gave awardees 2 million RMB, helped buy equipment, fund a laboratory, supplement returnee’s salary (by 20%). • Recipients given authority over a research team to work in their laboratory. • As of 2004, 100 Talent’s Program brought back 899. • Key academics award is Cheung Kong Scholar, funded by Li Kai-hsing--by 2004, 537. • NSFC Distinguished Scholars Program, 1994-2004, 1176.

5. Municipality’s Policies • More than 100 cities established incubators for overseas entrepreneurs in new high tech zones and some invested in these companies. • Cities offered special incentives, such as tax free purchases of new equipment and cars, free floor space in the incubator, • in some cases, company managing returned entrepreneurs’ incubator invested funds in the new start up.

6. Jiang changes policy • He accepted notion that China’s talent is part of global talent pool • Chinese government needed to let its talent go abroad to increase the value of its human capital and then compete with other countries in the global marketplace for this now enhanced talent. • Zhu Rongji, September 2001, “henceforth China would change the emphasis of the open policy from attracting foreign capital to attracting human talent and technology.”

7. Success and Problems  Mixed Outcome • China's science recovered quickly in the early- and mid-1980s, as hundreds of Visiting Scholars returned to universities and research institutes after 2 years abroad. • However, return flow stopped after June 4th, 1989 which dealt China a terrible blow

8. The Emergence of a Mainland Diaspora June 4th creates instant diaspora of Chinese talent overseas.

9. Problems in CAS • "100 Talents Program" brought back mostly researchers who had only finished a PhD or a post-doctoral fellowship abroad. • Very limited experience devising a major research project and directing a research teams. • Director of CAS institute in Northeast, said in 2004 that he could not get top 20% of Mainland scientists living abroad to return to China. • work climate in units not conducive to success. • Returnees complain of burdensome paperwork, time wasted on cultivating personal relations, rather on research, to gain research funding, and petty jealousies complicate their work.

10. Bias Against Returnees, CAS, 2002“Ability of Returnees in Your Unit to Fulfill their Capabilities” (发挥作用) • No. of Returnees = 85, No. of Locals = 44. • Chi-squared p<.007, R=.258, p<.003

11. Returnees Achievements at Work, Relative to Locals, CAS, 2002

12. Bringing the State Back In: Round One, 2001-2003 • May 2002, General Offices of CC-CCP and State Council promulgate “2002-2005 Outline for Building the Ranks of Nationwide Talent,” with “strategy of strengthening the country through human talent” (人才强国战略). • End of 2002, meeting of Organizational Department, （曾庆红）Zeng Qinghong, member of Standing Committee responsible for personnel, promulgated principle that “The Party Manages Talent” (党管人才)

13. CCP-Politburo on June 9th, 2003 established a “Central Leadership Small Group to Coordinate the Work on Talent,” （人才协调小组） • in December 2003, Hu Jintao put forward idea of a shift from “CCP managing cadres” (党管干部) to “CCP managing talent” (党管人才). • December 26, 2003, CC and State Council put forward Central Document no. 16 (2003), stated that if China wanted to put into practice the policy of using talent to strengthen the country, it had to follow the policy of the "party managing talent.”

14. Still, Organization Department failed to transform the environment in units all around China whose liberalization was critical to attracting major talents from abroad. • web-based survey in 2004 of over 3,000 respondents found that the most important force holding people back from returning was “the complicated role of human relations in Chinese society.” • Investors felt that the “legal system needed improvement.” • my 2002 survey:, when calculating whether to return, mainland expatriates less interested in special privileges, preferring a systematic reform of China's policies on human talent” • Improving the climate for returnees would be the issue that the CCP would have to address in the next policy drive.

15. Li Yuanchao （李源潮）on Building China Through Talent • October 2007, First Plenum, new 17th Central Committee, Li Yuanchao, became head of the Central Committee’s Organizational Department (CC-OD) and the head of the LSGT. • He took control of nationwide effort to “build a strong country through human talent” (人才强国). • For him, human talent is a “strategic resource” (战略性资源) and bringing them in is a “strategic investment” (战略投资)

16. In December 2008, he called for creating a welcoming environment based on three kinds of “kuan” (宽) — 宽松，宽容宽厚--that is, “relaxed, tolerant and lenient.” • Li told Chinese executives to appeal to hearts (一心引心) of returnees, including love of country (爱国心), love of their careers (事业心) and need for self-esteem (自尊心).

17. The 1000 Talent's Program • December 2008, Small Group for Coordinating Work on Talent (SGOT), outlined new 1000 Talents’ Program-- China to bring back 2000 highly talented over 5-10 years. • plan called for the return of people who can make breakthroughs in key technologies (能过突剖关键技术) and could serve as scientific and technological leaders who can bring forward newly emerging fields (带动新型学科). • each locality set a plan combining socio-economic development and restructuring of local economy, and go out and bring in overseas talent that could bring about those changes.

18. Nationwide recruitment efforts • Fall 2009, at nationwide meetings localities proposed the talents locality needed. • cities set quotas on number of talented returnees they would recruit. • Beijing announced a target of 500 people, Guangzhou set goal at 300, Jinan promised to recruit 150, all within 3-5 years. • city and provincial governments and party officials set out across Canada and the US on recruitment drives.

19. Original Content of the Program • Must have foreign PhD, be under 55, willing to work in China for no less than 6 months each year. • The program seeking: • experts and scholars with titles on a par with professors in prestigious foreign universities and scientific research institutes; • senior technical and management professionals working in well-known international companies and financial institutions; • entrepreneurs owning proprietary intellectual property rights or who mastered "core technologies," who have overseas experience as an entrepreneur and are familiar with related industries and international practice; • entrepreneurs must own IPR rights and invention patents,

20. one-time subsidy of RMB1 million, be entitled to medical care, social insurance==pensions, medical insurance, and work-related injury insurance. • housing and food allowance, subsidy for home leave, children-education allowance, all tax free. • new salary reached thru consultation and be reasonable in light of their previous salary overseas. • resolve issues such as Permanent Residence, urban registration, medical treatment, school enrollment of children, etc.

21. Panel of Experts • Tough evaluation schema • Assessment involves two step process: • first, local and foreign experts from the same fields will make an anonymous assessment, followed by comprehensive appraisals by a committee of experts in the relevant field.

22. Changing Policy Atmosphere • Originally, Ministry of Human Resources and Social Services (MHRSS), directed Leadership Group on Coordinating Talent (人才协调小组). • In 2008, replaced by Leadership Small Group on Talent, under Organization Department（中央组织部）. • All key ministries responsible for reverse brain drain are members, but Organization Department uses its higher authority to coordinate competing interests and insure the policy's success. • In terms of local administrative authority over the policy, little formal change. • Only the Beijing Service Center for Scholarly Exchange, a service company under the MHRSS and the Ministry of Education, was transferred from State Council system and placed directly under Beijing Organization Department.

23. But informal authority has shifted. • Service Centers for Scholarly Exchange in large cities now report to local LSGT, directly under Municipal Party Committee. • Meetings now run by local CCP Committee and Org Bureau • Officials in service centers hoping unit not taken over by CCP Policy environment has changed. • In fall 2009, cities mobilized to evaluate community's technical and scientific needs, commit to find these specialists overseas. • "soft quotas" will not affect careers if not accomplished. • But as one local official commented, "the policy is now under the CCP, so of course the pressure is greater." • Heightened expectations especially heavy for the units that “use” returnees, 用人单位, including universities, high tech parks, research institutes and companies (SOEs), which are under pressure to improve their internal environment.

24. Increased secrecy: Why? • CCP not publicly announcing list of awardees, though list of 360 awardees was posted on website. • Recruit very talented mainlanders, many with jobs and commitments to organizations abroad. • Senior academics planning to relocate may not want their names displayed at host institutions. • Some CCP official expressed concerns that role of Org Department will scare potential returnees who prefer to keep their distance from the CCP. • Wang Xiaodong, prof at Ohio State University, negotiating a 1000 Talent's Award at Nankai University, was target of complaint by colleague at OSU about amount of time spent as "dean" of a new college of Pharmacy he set up at Nankai. • But, in truth, universities demand loyalty, only reward “disloyalty!” Common in West.

25. Measuring Success • The policy intended to change research climate, but “intolerance” does not become “tolerance” over night. • Shi Yigong （施一公）and Rao Yi（饶毅), gave up professorship at Princeton and Northwestern, and returned to Tsinghua and Peking universities respectively, • In Science they lament that allocation of grants and awards still depends too heavily on who you know, not what you know, • Early returnees, now in positions of authority in scientific establishment, resist reforms that would put more funds in the hands of the current crop of “star”, 1000 Talent returnees. • Too major concessions in Program indicate short-term flaws • many awards bestowed on people who already returned. • While initial award intended only for full time (minimum 6 months) returnees, in mid-2010 began “A” and “B” schedule latter only spending 2 months a year in China, unwilling to commit to returning full time.

26. Measures of Success of Government Programs

27. Critiques on Chinese websites • Prof at Huazhong University of Science and Technology(华中理工大学，武汉）says that while senior people may promote school's prestige, they are unlikely to make a major breakthrough during the rest of their career; their truly creative burst is past. • His suggestion? Bring back 10,000 recent PhDs, give them opportunity to be innovative and they will produce very significant breakthroughs. • Second critique: all contracts, not tenured: “For people abroad with tenure overseas as full professors, program not attractive enough." • That the policy caved in so quickly on the two month issue suggested that organizations working on talent policy are chaotic and lack systematic coordination;

28. Survey from the web of 650 awardees, but could not get full data on manyreturnees.Age wise, they may be just a bit beyond their most creative period.

29. *We only have date of return for some of the returnees.**50% returned before the program began

30. Entrepreneurs have a much higher full return rate.

31. Most are very good universities in the world, including top universities like Harvard and MIT.

33. Conclusion • Three factors support optimistic perspective. • Li Yuanchao targets key block to reverse flow of exceptionally talented – the difficult intellectual environment. • BUT can it be dramatically transformed, allowing for free thinking, debating and writing, without significant political liberalization. • vested interests means non-transparent decisions will not change overnight. • Second, business, scientific and academic returnees fear China’s bureaucracy and myriad regulations that complicate their return and stifle their initiative.

34. 人才领导小组 • Org. Department and Leadership Small Group on Talent can use superior positions above ministries and bureaus to overcome complications from overlapping authority. • Much domestic criticism centered on two month concessions which suggest that despite active intervention of the CCP, what could not be accomplished for 30 years – attracting large numbers of the very best and very brightest to return and live in China– is still not going to happen so soon.