The Implications of the Atomic Bomb for International Relations

1. The Implications of the Atomic Bomb for International Relations Jacob Viner, 1951

2. Observations • Atomic weapons have obvious destructive capability • Keeping atomic weapons secret is already impossible, preventing their manufacture through secrecy is similarly futile • Atomic weapons the type that are not effective against their own kind

3. Observations (contd.) • Vulnerability is dependent on: • The proportion of its population which lives in large cities • The average size and density of these cities • The concentration of major industries of military significance • There is a “universal agreement” that it is advantageous to strike first, but Viner contends that countries will not concentrate their atomic capability • This is the rational assumption that states will maintain a survivable second strike capability, a minimum requirement for deterrence

4. Observations (contd) • Defense against atomic bombs seems to be impossible • Viner acknowledges that “decentralization of industry and deurbanization of population” can reduce the military effectiveness of atomic weapons • This is an unwieldy procedure and carries tremendous economic costs • Because the article was written in 1951, it does not account for the new countermissile technologies. The development of advanced radars, anti-missile missiles, and kill vehicles is obviously not taken into account • Nonetheless, many defense analysts assess the effectiveness of a missile defense system as extremely suspect, so Viner’s presumption that defense is impossible is still relevant

5. Observations • Hypotheses • Atomic bombs would be used early in war, each country would be laid to waste • Both sides would make an agreement not to use atomic weapons at the start of a conflict • Countries would try as hard as possible to prevent war for assurance that atomic weapons will not be used

6. Arguments • Atomic weapons reshape the international system by making small states more powerful • Small states will not be conquered without cost • According to Viner, “the small country will again be more than a cipher or a mere pawn in power-politics, provided it is big enough to produce atomic bombs.” • Viner seems to assume that atomic bombs will proliferate quickly • However, in the present day most atomic states are acknowledged powers that states would likely not go to war with anyway • The actions of rogue states illustrates what Viner is trying to argue

7. Arguments (contd) • Prospects of world government • Unlikely in the near future • The system (in 1951) is dominated by two states, neither of which will give up its vital interests for the sake of world government • For world government to arise power needs to be evenly distributed • What is left is a Concert of Powers and the United Nations • The United Nations is effective, giving weight to the five world powers (the Security Council veto) • Two other advantages: near universal membership and “an ambitious program of beneficent economic and social activities which may succeed in fostering a feeling of community…strong enough to withstand the strains of the clashes of interest.”

8. Arguments (contd) • Mutually conciliatory diplomacy • Atomic weapons make war too horrible to contemplate, which makes peace a mutually beneficial goal • Trust and cooperation through diplomacy reduce the threat that atomic weapons pose