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Government E-1275: Nov. 27, 2007 China Rising?

Government E-1275: Nov. 27, 2007 China Rising?. 1. How should we think about China’s military power? 2. How should we think about China’s “soft power”? 3. Does nationalism make Chinese foreign policy more aggressive?. Military Power of the PRC. “Balancing act”:

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Government E-1275: Nov. 27, 2007 China Rising?

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  1. Government E-1275: Nov. 27, 2007China Rising? 1. How should we think about China’s military power? 2. How should we think about China’s “soft power”? 3. Does nationalism make Chinese foreign policy more aggressive?

  2. Military Power of the PRC • “Balancing act”: • Growth of China’s military power. • U.S. strategy & military power; avoid discussion of relative power. 2. China’s military modernization: continuing, gradual. • Ballistic missiles. • Naval power: submarines & destroyers. • Air power: technological improvements. • Nuclear weapons capabilities. • Land power (ground forces): Taiwan & land borders.

  3. Military Power of the PRC (cont.) 3. Information warfare: • “War under conditions of informatization.” • Defensive & offensive aspects of electromagnetic warfare. 4. China’s military strategy: • Deng Xiaoping’s “24 character strategy.” • Preemptive doctrine: Korea, India, S. Union, Vietnam. • Military capabilities beyond Taiwan: South China Sea. 5. Lack of transparency: • Defense spending.

  4. Military Power of the PRC (cont.) 6. Cautious strategic behavior & problems: • Taiwan: responsible reaction toward Pres. Chen (p. 5). • Peaceful settlements of territorial disputes (p. 8). • Lack of recent combat experience (p. 11). • “…greater potential for miscalculation in crises (p. 11). • Inter-service conflict (p. 15). 7. U.S. strategy: engagement with the PLA. • Defense Sec. Gates’s visit to Beijing. • Rebuff of USS Kitty Hawk at Hong Kong.

  5. Defense Sec. Gates and Chinese Central Military Commission Executive Vice Chairman General Guo Bixiong (Nov. 5, 2007)

  6. China’s Engagement of Asia • Multilateral institutions (Shambaugh): • Skepticism; learning & iteration; confidence-building. • Security: ARF; CSCAP (track 2); SCO. • Asian financial crisis; no yuan devaluation. • Bilateral engagement: • ROK, Vietnam, India. • Trade, investment, foreign aid; military exchanges, security dialogues. • Perception of China as a status quo power. • “An increase in China’s regional power and influence need not result in a reciprocal decrease in U.S. power and influence.” (Shambaugh, p. 90).

  7. China’s Soft Power (Kurlantzick) • Definition of soft power: • Contrast with Nye: includes economic incentives & diplomatic initiatives. 2. Instruments of China’s soft power: • Foreign aid; loans from China Export-Import Bank. • China Association Youth Volunteers (“peace corp”). • Diplomats: specialization & linguistic competence. • Confucius Institute. • English/overseas media: Xinhua, People’s Daily, CCTV.

  8. China’s Soft Power (Kurlantzick, cont.) 3. Close links to energy security: • State-led energy development, no reliance on markets. • Iran; Venezuela; Nigeria; Kazakhstan; Myanmar. 4. Alternative to the “Washington Consensus”: • China as a developing economy. • Authoritarian, state-led economic development. • No emphasis on trade liberalization, privatization, deregulation; democracy, human rights, rule of law.

  9. China’s Soft Power (Kurlantzick, cont.) 5. Links to the Chinese diaspora and migration: • Southeast Asia: business community; Robert Kuok (of Shangri-La Hotels); former Thai PM Thaksin Shinawatra. • Migration to Africa. • Chinese tourists. • Visa policies to increase foreign students in China. 6. Soft power is relative: anti-Americanism. • Lack of focus on public diplomacy; unilateralism; War against Iraq; visa restrictions; Hurricane Katrina. 7. Limits of China’s soft power? • Tsunami relief: U.S. vs. China; novelty of China’s emergence. • Lack of ideals: hostility of civil society groups and IO’s.

  10. Evolution of Chinese nationalism • Maoist foreign policy: “victory narrative” (Gries): • Mao’s decision not to politicize Japan’s history problem. 2. Deng Xiaoping & Jiang Zemin: “victim narrative.” • CCP’s legitimacy: nationalism & economic development. • Patriotic educational campaigns; “history activists.” • “Apology diplomacy”: Jiang-Obuchi summit; Belgrade embassy bombing; EP-3 incident. 3. Consequences of nationalist mobilization: • Popular nationalism may limit pragmatic diplomacy. • Anti-Japanese demonstrations (April ’05). 4. Beijing public opinion polls (Iain Johnston): • Income, education, travel experiences moderate anti-Americanism; less effects on anti-Japanese sentiment.

  11. Conclusions • Relative military & soft power: • China is rising; U.S. advantages (no focus on soft power). • China’s differentiated military & diplomatic strategies: • Taiwan, U.S., and Japan: wholly separate category. • Willingness to engage all other countries in Asia, L. America, Africa, and the Middle East; energy security. • May force countries to choose b/w China & U.S. 3. Nationalist mobilization: • Limited against Taiwan, U.S., and Japan. • Continued modernization may moderate anti-Americanism.

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