IAEA Activities in Relation to CRAFT Project - 28 Sep - 9 Oct 2015

1. Technical Meeting on the Demonstration of Operational and Long Term Safety of Predisposal Management Facilities for Radioactive Waste – 28 Sep. - 9 Oct. 2015 Overview of IAEA Activities in Relation to the CRAFT project Ms Monika Kinker Radioactive Waste and Spent Fuel Management Unit Division of Radiation, Transport and Waste Safety - NSRW

2. Methods and Tools for Safety Case and Safety Assessment • Methods set out in Safety Standards • Safety Assessment Framework (SAFRAN) Tool for Safety Case and Safety Assessment • Reference SC, Example SC documents

3. Classification L/ILW Reactors DS 448 Management Systems IAEA Publications: Safety of RW Predisposal Management 2010 2013 2015 NEW!!! 2012 2006 2010 2008 Spent Fuel Storage Small Users RW Storage FCFs HLW DS 477 DS 447 DS 454 Step 5 Step 11 Step 14 Step 14 3

4. 1. Government responsibilities 2. National Policy & Strategy 3. Regulatory Responsibilities 4. Operator Responsibilities 5. Safety/Security 6. Interdependences 7. Management systems 8. Waste minimization 9. Characterization and classification 10. Waste treatment 11. Waste storage 12. Waste acceptance for processing, storage and/or disposal 13. Preparation of the SC and supporting SA 14. Scope of the SC and supporting SA 15. Documentation of the SC and supporting SA 16. Periodic safety review 17. Facilities location and design 18. Facility construction and commissioning 19. Facilities operation, maintenance, emergency preparedness 20. Decommissioning 21. Nuclear safeguards 22. Existing facilities GSR Part 5, Safety Requirements for Predisposal Management of RW • Introduction • Protection of Human Health & Environment • Responsibilities • Steps in the Predisposal Management of RW • Development and Operation of RWM Facilities & Activities 4

5. Government Responsibilities • Setting well defined responsibilities • (legal, technical, financial) • Ensuring national policy and legislation are established • Establishing an effective, independent RB • Ensuring continuity of responsibility for safety through regulatory control (licensing regime) • Covers all steps and stages (including transfer) • Legal requirements, decision making, involvement of interested parties

6. Regulatory Body Responsibilities • Establish, define and implement a process for licensing • Review and assess safety case (SC) and environmental impact statement (EIS) • Prior to authorization and periodically during operation • Provide for the issuing, amending, suspension or revoking of licences • subject to any necessary requirements and conditions • Perform verification and enforcement actions

7. Waste Generator Responsibilities • Take measures to identify and control RW (e.g., volume and radioactivity content) • Characterize and classify RW (e.g. radionuclide content and activity, physical, chemical, biological, mechanical) • Treat and condition the waste in accordance with acceptance criteria for safe processing, storage and disposal • Maintain records of the wastes (supports accountability and traceability)

8. Operator’s Responsibilities • Develops the SC • Demonstration of safety, including periodic reviews • Demonstrating compatibilities with next waste management steps (up to and including disposal) • in the event that a disposal option has not been identified, assumptions should be made and clearly set down about the likely options • Short, medium and long term aspects should be considered and the possible need for future handling and treatment of the waste • Derivation of operational limits & conditions (incl WAC) • The facility must be operated in accordance with the licence conditions and with the safety case

9. Regulatory Hold Points: Nuclear Installations

10. Why do I need a license? • The overall goal of the regulatory review is to verify the facility (or activity) will not cause an unacceptable adverse impact on human health or safety, or on the environment, both now and in the future. • Primary objectives include reviewing the SA & SC and assumptions used. • Secondary objectives (to ensure SC evaluation) include sufficiently complete, data clearly presented by competent personnel, uncertainties listed, and facility operations understood. 10 10

11. Overview: What is a Safety Case? • The collection of arguments and evidence, including the outcome of safety assessment, in support of the safety of a facility or activity (GSR-5, GSG-3) • The basis for the safety considerations in respect of siting and locating facilities, construction, operation and decommissioning of the facility, including the justification for changes • The basis for interaction and dialogue between the operating organization and the regulatory body 11 11

12. Overview: Purpose of safety case Demonstrate that all planned activities can be carried out in a safe manner Provide guidance for the design, engineering and planning of operations to ensure safety Input to regulatory process (e.g. licensing), including evidence of compliance and arguments for confidence building 12

13. Overview: Roles of SC (GSG-3) Demonstrating safety (incl. uncertainties) Integrating scientific and other information Demonstrating compatibilities with next waste management steps (e.g. disposal) Aiding decision making on the authorisation/ licensing of the facilities Providing other information and arguments that support continued development, use or eventual decommissioning of the facility 13

14. Role of the Safety Case in Ensuring Long Term Safety (up to 100 years) Pretreatment Treatment Conditioning Disposal • Interdependencies: • Transfer of Ownership, Responsibilities, Information • Long Term Strategies for management of RW/DSRS • Safety implications of delayed disposal • Informing decision making (e.g., management of legacy sites, considering new/expanded nuclear programmes) • Demonstration of Safety • Licensing and authorization • Interactions w Interested Parties • Engineering Barriers • Management Systems • Monitoring and Inspections Waste and materials Radioactive material (for reuse/recycle) Exempt waste and materials STORAGE TRANSPORT

15. GSG-3: Components of the SC and SA Safety Assessment Radiological Impact Scenarios Models Calculations Management System Non radiological environmentalimpact Operational Safety Site and Engineering Safety Case The required content of the SC for a facility or activity may vary among States; however, the documentation of the SC should cover, at a minimum, the SA and the operating limits and conditions. Safety Assessment 15

16. GSG-3: Safety Guide • Demonstrating the Safety of RWM • Safety Case • Role, Components, Documentation and Use • Safety Assessment • Approach, Scenarios, Models, Analysis of Results • Specific Issues • SC evolution, graded approach, DID, facility lifetime, LTS • Regulatory Review Process Annex I Examples of Hazards and Initiating Events Annex II Topical Issues for Review of SC Annex III Template of Regulatory Review Report Annex IV SADRWMS Project Proposal to June 2010 WASSC -> CRAFT

17. CRAFT (Complimentary Safety Reports: Development and Application to Waste Management Facilities) • 4 Year Project • 1st Plenary May 2011 • 2nd, 3rd Plenaries 2012, 2013 • Final Plenary October 2014 • Objectives: • APPLY GSG-3, SADRWMS methodology, SAFRAN Tool • PROVIDE a forum for application of the methodology and SAFRAN tool • DEVELOP, document Publication illustrating application of GSG-3 • Facility/process specific • Process/Regulatory Review

18. CRAFT Working Methods, Outcomes • Radon Type Facility Application Case • develop illustrative test case(s) for applying the IAEA methodology/tools to RADON type facilities • RW retrieval activity at Murmansk RADON • Storage and Processing Facility • Apply IAEA methodology/tools to facilities for the storage and processing of RW • Central Storage Facility in Slovenia • Regulatory Interactions • Apply IAEA methodology/tools in regulatory review of WG application cases, and provide recommendations

19. INT9176 “Mediterranean” Project Objectives • Reinforcing the safety of all componentsof the management of RS and national regulatory framework • Reinforcing capacities of national regulatory authorities to license and exercise regulatory control over facilitiesand activities Project counterparts from: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Cyprus, Egypt, Ghana, Greece, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Montenegro, Morocco, Nigeria, Serbia, Slovenia, South Africa, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Tunisia, Turkey, United Republic of Tanzania

20. Mediterranean Project: Outcomes • Implementation in SAFRAN Tool of a Generic SC & SA of Predisposal Management of DSRS (including at Borehole Disposal site) • Provision of assistance to the operators in the development of the SC & SA • South Africa March: CS to develop Model SC • Simple Storage Facility • Centralized Predisposal Management • In preparation for disposal (BDC)

21. SAFRAN Tool“Reinforcing Safety Assessment capabilities and support licensing” • SAFRAN Tool - for SA of operations for conditioning and storage of DSRS and operations for their final disposal • Generic Operational Safety Assessment (GOSA) for DSRS • SIMBOD Tool - for supporting Member States to manage information on DSRS that are intended for disposal using the IAEA BDC

22. What is SAFRAN? • Software package for assessing radiological safety of pre-disposal waste management activities • Purpose: describing predisposal RWM activities in a systematic way • Conducting the SA with clear documentation of the methodology, assumptions, input data and models, • Establishing a traceable and transparent record of the safety basis for decisions on proposed waste management solutions, • Demonstrating clear consideration of and compliance with national and international safety standards and recommendations.

23. GOSA • A SA undertaken on a site-generic rather than site-specific basis using a synthetic system • Can provide useful input to decisions concerning a variety of issues: • suitable designs, site characteristics & activity limits • Use of the GOSA • Starting point for the SA of a specific site • Worked example that can be used to guide/inform a site-specific assessment • Identify key waste and site attributes that need to be characterised

24. Provision of Assistance to the Operators in the Development of SC & SA (select N African MS) Background • Necsa was contracted by the IAEA to assist with development of SC, SA for management of DSRS • Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon Objective • Draft SC and SA, including a radiation protection plan to cover DSRS management • Action plan for selection and licensing of dedicated management options

25. Scope of the Safety Cases • Collection & transport to dedicated facility • Receipt, identification, characterization, handling • Temporary storage at the facility • Conditioning of DSRS • Long term storage

26. Observations • Work on Safety Cases & SAFRAN Tool in parallel • Necsa approach to SA based on expert judgement • Missing elements, justifications/rationale for selection of accidents for quantitative evaluation • SAFRAN Tool used “quantitative” approach to SA • Missing “qualitative” evaluations, e.g. analysis of engineering and DSRS-specific issues e.g. surface contamination, doses to extremities and lens of the eye • Proposed to develop generic/model SC and specific templates for SA (core requirements w flexibility for site specific circumstances)

27. Model Safety Case • Objective: • Develop a Model SC for end of life mgmt of DSRS with supporting documentation compliant w GSG-3 and using the SAFRAN tool • The final product was to be • Complete model SC document for a storage facility for DSRS covering development and operation, • Reference SC for a storage facility for DSRS under development (i.e. the Mauritian SC for licence application for construction) and • Reference SC for an operational facility for conditioning and storage of DSRS (i.e. the Moroccan SC for licence application for continued operation).

28. Approach • SCs had been prepared by Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ghana, Morocco, Mauritius, and Tunisia. • SA work had been undertaken using the SAFRAN software tool for these countries. • Generic/Model document based on GSG-3 had also been compiled with a proposed structure for the SC • Based on the SCs of Mauritius and Morocco • The SCs reflected unique and different national situations, incllegal and regulatory frameworks • Work during the week focussed on review and revision of the national SCs, review and feedback on the Generic/ Model SC, and development of Lessons Learnt

29. Conclusions of the Experts • Generic/Model/Reference document valuable in providing a reference and in guiding development of other SCs • 5 SC documents with SAFRAN files • Represent a number of different facilities in different stages of development and within different national legal and regulatory frameworks. • Illustrates the dynamic nature of SC documentation and ongoing need for updating to reflect current status of facilities and activities. • Lessons Learnt include feedback on application of GSG-3 and for consideration in its future revision

30. Looking Ahead • IAEA publication w the SC documents and the process undertaken, lessons learned • Require another 1-2 consultancies to polish drafts • Network on GNSSN to include associated SAFRAN files • Broad application of these tools in Member States • Training of experts from Member States on the application of the methodology & tools for safety demonstration (SC and SA) • “Toolbox” of the different tools relevant for Safety Case and Safety Assessment covering all phases in the management of DSRS • Continuous feedback and improvement of the tools

31. Thank you!