FY02 ASA Presentation Service Group 16 Provide Security and Protection Services

1. FY02 ASA Presentation Service Group 16Provide Security and Protection Services Presented by: Captain Billy R. Alford Office of Research Services National Institutes of Health 18 November 2002

2. Table of Contents Main Presentation ASA Template ……………………………….……………………………….4 Customer Perspective……………………….……………………………….5 Customer Segmentation …………………….……………………………………6 Customer Satisfaction……………………….…………………………………….7 Customer Unique Measures………………………………………………………8/9 Internal Business Process Perspective…………………………….……….10 Service Group Block Diagram………………………………………………...….11 Relationship of Discrete Services………………………………………………..12 Conclusions from Discrete Services Deployment Flowcharts……….………..13 Process Measures………………………………..……………………………14 -21 Learning and Growth Perspective………………………….………….…….22 Conclusions from Turnover, Sick Leave, Awards, EEO/ER/ADR Data….23 - 25 Unique Learning and Growth Measures……………………………………..26 - 29 Analysis of Readiness Conclusions……….………………………………....30 - 41 Financial Perspective……………………………………………………….…42 Unit Cost…………………………………………………………………………….---- Asset Utilization…………………………………………………………………….---- Unique Financial Measures..…………………………………………………..43/44 Conclusions and Recommendations………………………………………...45 Conclusions from FY02 ASA..…………………………………………………..…46 Recommendations…………………………………………………………………..47

3. Table of Contents Appendices……………………………………………………49 Page 2 of your ASA Template…………………………………50 Customer segments graphs……………………………………51 -Customer segmentation graphs…………………………..52 -Customer satisfaction graphs……………………………..--- Block diagram……………………………………………………53 Process maps……………………………………………………54 -DS1 (Police the campus)……………………………………………55 -DS2 (Monitor and control campus traffic, page 1)…….………….56 -DS2 (Monitor and control campus traffic, page 2)………………..57 -DS3 (Provide security guards) and DS4 (Clear vehicles entering campus)…………………………………………………………………58 -DS5 (Inspect vehicles entering underground parking garages…..59 -DS6 (Clear trucks/cargo headed to loading docks………………..60 -DS7 (Provide secure environment for classified information…….61 -DS8 (Issue and manage temporary visitor passes)……………….62 Process measures graphs…………………………………..63/64 Learning and Growth graphs…………………………………..65 Analysis of Readiness Information………………………..66 - 82 Unit cost graphs………………………………………….….83 - 85 Asset utilization graphs…………………………………………--- Any unique measures graphs………………………………….---

5. Customer Perspective

6. Who Are Our Customers? • Main NIH campus community: approximately 318 acres of land with meandering roadways throughout the complex • About 18,000 campus employees • About 3000 daily visitors to the NIH campus • Employees at about 19 off-campus sites

7. Customer Satisfaction Survey • In 2002, we developed our survey methodology, but did not conduct surveys. • Next year we intend to survey as follows: • DS 1 and 2 – Police the campus, control traffic: Sample of community • DS 3 and DS 8 - Provide security guards, issue temporary visitor passes: A/Os who use premium guard service; sample of visitors to guarded buildings • DS 4,5 and 6 - Vehicle inspection: sample of employees and visitors

8. Unique Measure: Customer Satisfaction Guard Service Complaints • With heightened security after 9/11, all employees and visitors to the campus began coming into daily contact with guards and Police. • From September 2001 to September 2002, there were a total of 11 complaints about guards recorded by the ORS Comment Line. • Other registered complaints were about “policy.” • The Chief of Police and Deputy Chief of Police received complaints of lesser degree, dispatching these to their Chief, Technical Operations for resolution. • The Chief, Technical Operations registered 32 complaints, to date.

9. Unique Measure: Customer Satisfaction Guard Service Complaints(continued) • Complaints peaked in October 2001. • This averages to 3 complaints per month. • 11 + 32 = 43 ÷ 14 (months) = 3.07 • Given at least 22,000 contacts with guards daily, we are pleased with the numbers! • *22,000 (contacts) x 425 days = 9,350,000 contacts over 14 month period. • 43 (complaints) ÷ 9,350,000 (contacts over 14 month period) = • .0000045% (Complaint to Contact Ratio) • *Note: Estimated 22,000 contacts based on employee population, visitors entering the campus perimeter and into facilities, and commercial vehicles/vendors.

10. Internal Business Process Perspective

11. Block Diagram – Service Group 16

12. Internal Business Process: Relationship of Discrete Services Provide Security and Protection Services Service Group 16 Police Branch Police the Campus DS-1 ProvideSecurityGuards DS-3 Clear Vehicles Entering Campus DS-4 Monitor and Control Campus Traffic DS-2 Inspect Vehicles Entering Underground Parking Garages DS-5 Clear Trucks/Cargo Headed to NIH Loading Docks DS-6 Issue and Manage Temporary Visitor Passes DS-8

13. Conclusions from Discrete Services Deployment Flowcharts • Our Service Group completed 8 deployment flowcharts for 8 discrete services • Essentially, our processes are relatively “clean” and function adequately. Our performance deficits are due to lack of staffing and lack of training. • We have to “triage” calls for service because of lack of enough staff to respond timely • Guards are inadequately trained • Visitors, contractors and vendors aren’t provided enough information about security procedures and requirements – resulting in traffic bottlenecks and complaints

14. Process Measures • List process measures for each discrete service • DS1: Overall crime rates, 2001-2002 • DS2: Number of parking tickets issued. • DS2: Number of vehicle accidents • DS3 & 8: Guard performance against contractual requirements • DS1, DS2, DS3, DS4, DS5, DS6, & DS8: • a. Contraband seized from entering vehicles • b. Expired/Altered NIH identification cards, passes, and parking permits

15. Process Measure Findings • DS-1 – Police the Campus: Overall crime statistics • Closing down the campus for security reasons had a dramatic effect on crime • Larcenies cut 66% • Suspicious persons reports cut in half • Controlled substance arrests reduced from 11 to 1 • DS-2 – Monitor and Control Traffic • Police officer losses are crippling the department’s ability to conduct effective trafficenforcement • Approximately 1500 fewer parking tickets issued than last year • Those prone to violate traffic laws have noticed a decline in traffic enforcement and are consequently taking more risks • More in-coming requests from community to increase enforcement of traffic and parking laws.

16. Process Measure Findings(continued) • Closing down the campus for security reasons had a dramatic effect on accidents • Reduced traffic flow • Screening out of individuals DUI, criminals, those simply using the campus as a bypass road network RESULT: 63% fewer traffic accidents (all types) than last year………………CY2001 = 117 accidents CY2002* = *46 accidents (actual number of accidents reported through October 2002 is 36) (*For purpose of this chart, a “best guess calculation” for total number of accidents is submitted at a trend based on the previous 10-month period.)

17. Process Measures Data (continued) • Prior to 9/11, the NIH Police had one guard contract that provided guard services to both on and off campus facilities. • There were approximately 110 guards under this contract. • After 9/11, the NIH Police implemented an emergency requisition for an additional guard force to meet increased security needs. • Approximately 400 additional guards were needed. • One company could not provide that number of guards at that time due to the call out for guard services throughout the country.

18. Process Measures Data (continued) • The NIH Police found three local guard companies eager to provide their service. • Procured the services of Knight Security Service, Metropolitan Security Service, and Burns Security initially through credit card payments, then by purchase order. • Companies hired individuals “fresh off the street” with no prior security experience and many of them didn’t receive any security training before going to work. If they could walk and talk, the companies could use them.

19. Process Measures Data (continued) • The NIH Police conducted criminal background checks through the National Criminal Information Center on all guards prior to allowing them to work at NIH. • The NIH Police weeded out many brought to the campus seeking employment due to their having criminal records. • A couple were immediately arrested for Outstanding Warrants from other Police jurisdictions and re-entered into the Criminal Justice System. • One arrested for an Outstanding Warrant, was charged for carrying a concealed pistol in his backpack subsequent to a search conducted after his arrest.

20. Process Measures Data (continued) • The NIH Police has painstakingly worked at providing the necessary training to those selected to work under this temporary guard service arrangement. • In addition to working through this, the NIH Police feverishly worked at developing a new guard contract that would consolidate all guard services into one. • The NIH Police are currently in the selection process to identity that one company to meet its work requirement under a consolidated guard contract.

21. Process Measures Data (continued) • DS-3 Provide Security Guards: Contract Compliance Rate • Contract performance data to date are available for only one of the four guard companies, representing 33% of the guard force • Going forward, the single guard contract will contain performance standards covering all guards • From October 2001 through September 2002, Paragon Guards met contract specifications over 99% of the time. Under inspections conducted by the Crime Prevention Branch, deductions for failure to meet specifications amounted to less than 1% of the contract amount.

22. Process Measures Data (continued) • DS-4-5-6 Vehicle clearance: Contraband seized in vehicle search process • Closing down the campus for security reasons had a dramatic effect on identifying and confiscating concealed weapons and other dangerous instruments being brought onto the campus • NIH Police have confiscated the following weapons and other dangerous instruments during vehicle and facility inspections since 9/11: • Over 40 knives • 10 pistols • 6 rifles • 2 shotguns • 1 machete • 1 police night stick • Multiple rounds of ammunition for the various weapons seized

23. Weapons and other dangerous instruments seized

24. Weapons and other dangerous instruments seized (continued)

25. Weapons and other dangerous instruments seized (continued)

26. Expired/Altered NIH Credentials Seized

27. Learning and Growth Perspective

28. Conclusions from Turnover, Sick Leave, Awards, EEO/ER/ADR Data • Data provided is too inaccurate to yield reliable information • 42 of the 116 personnel listed under Service Group 16 are no longer employed with DPS. One (1) listed under the service group is a “student hire.” • Because of issues with the supplied data, we analyzed our own data for turnover and sick leave

29. Turnover • Since 9/11, the NIH Police Branch has successfully hired 30 new officers, however, 28 officers left seeking better pay and benefits. • Turnover rate = 55% since 9/11 • On 9/11, NIH Police strength was 51 Police officers. • At the writing of this chart on 11-08-02, NIH Police strength was 53 Police officers. • Conclusions: • Our turnover rate is highest of any ORS Service Group • With current salary and benefits, NIH Police are finding it difficult to maintain current strength, let alone to augment strength to authorized levels

30. Sick Leave Usage (01-02 through Present): NIH Police: 2668.75 hrs. NIH Guards: 2497.00 hrs. Total………………...5165.75 hrs. • NIH Police: About 6 eight-hour days of sick leave per employee. • NIH Guards: About 8 eight-hour days of sick leave per employee. • Conclusions: • Our sick leave usage places us among the top 5 ORS components. • Many months of working 12-hour shifts are taking their toll.

31. Learning and Growth Unique Measures • LGU-1: Police authorized strength vs. police current strength • LGU-2: NIH Police officer age vs. age of officers lost to competing departments • LGU –3: Pay Comparison (NIH Police vs. Other Federal and Local State Jurisdictions)

32. L&G Unique Measure Findings and Conclusions • LGU-1: Police authorized strength vs. police current strength • We are currently at 49% of our authorized strength • Even with the hiring of 30 new Police officers since 9/11, we have experienced a gain of only 2 Police officers. • We had invested over $250,000 in training these officers. • Additional losses: Uniform Costs • Consistency in Operations • Conclusion: We must continue efforts to provide competitive salary and benefits package

33. L&G Unique Measure Findings and Conclusions • LGU-2: NIH Police officer age vs. age of officers lost to competing departments • Current average age, NIH Police Officers: 46 • Average age of officers lost: 34 • Conclusions: • We are losing some of our “best and brightest” • We are subsidizing the training of officers for other Federal police departments

34. L&G Unique Measure Findings and Conclusions • LGU-3: Pay Comparison (NIH Police vs. Other Federal and Local State Jurisdictions) • (See Chart, next slide) • Conclusions: • NIH Police pay not competitive with other federal and other local state jurisdictions. • NIH Police cannot keep, nor attract, a sufficient pool of officers.

35. LGU-3: NIH Police Pay Comparison with Other Federal and State Jurisdictions Police Department Rank Top Pay Cap U.S. Capitol Police Private $57, 734 NIH Police Private $35, 623

36. Analysis of Readiness Conclusions • Skills and Abilities • Don’t have full complement of needed skills and abilities now because of staff shortages: • A significant number of young, seasoned Police Officers and their inherent and learned skills and abilities have left for employment with other federal or state jurisdictions offering better Police compensation packages. • Experiencing difficulty in attracting qualified replacement officers due to an inferior Police compensation package. • Takes 6 to 8 months for a new Police recruit to meet minimum duty qualification standards

37. Analysis of Readiness Conclusions(continued) • Skills and Abilities – (continued) • Takes another 4(+/-) months for this officer to complete Field Training Officer (FTO) requirements, orientation of the NIH campus, and understand NIH specific Police operations.

38. Analysis of Readiness Conclusions(continued) • Training • Within our hiring authority and capability, officers needing training will be provided all required duty position and qualification training • Mandatory training that has been placed on hold since 9/11. • Police Manager • Police Supervisor • Other Specialized • Train Police officers/guards on new automated technologies.

39. Analysis of Readiness Conclusions(continued) • Tools and Materials • In addition to that already requested and approved under current budget authority, requests have already been submitted through the FY04 budget cycle. • New tools and equipment, yet to be determined, will be needed as each aspect of increasing security initiatives is discussed and approved. • This area cannot be fully developed due to current decisions being made on future security enhancements for the NIH.

40. Analysis of Readiness Conclusions(continued) • Ability to carry out mission for next 3 years • To effectively and efficiently meet mission requirements, the NIH Police needs to replace those officers and qualifications lost through attrition and fill open vacancies to authorized strength of 108. • The NIH Police are aggressively pursuing every opportunity and approach towards securing a competitive pay and benefits package to stop attrition of our trained, qualified, and experienced officers

41. Analysis of Readiness Conclusions(continued) • Ability to carry out mission for next 3 years (continued) • The department is facing new challenges with consolidation of the guard contract, erection of a perimeter fence around NIH, and placement of a commercial vehicle inspection station and Visitor’s Center on the East end of the campus. • These actions place additional requirements on the department, such as providing Quality Assurance for the new guard contract, patrolling and monitoring the fence line for security breaches, additional staffing needs for the commercial vehicle inspection station and Visitor’s Center, and training needed to learn and employ new automated technologies associated with them: for example, the vehicle x-ray units and additional explosive detectors needed for the increasing security initiatives.

42. Analysis of Readiness Conclusions(continued) • Ability to carry out mission for next 3 years – (continued) • To support increasing mission requirements, need to add planners to track the progress of new or on-going initiatives and develop plans and instructions for implementation, add trainers to train new operations, multi-level investigators (i.e., off-site responsibilities, background checks), K-9, and other supporting staff, such as background checks), K-9, and other supporting staff, such as logistics, etc. • Due to mission changes requiring additional spending over the next 2 years, the Chief of Police held special meetings with department heads to either cut requests, prioritize purchases, and/or delay purchases for other budget years when their funding might become available.

43. Analysis of Readiness Conclusions(continued) • Ability to carry out mission for next 3 years – (continued) • All identified personnel resources, physical resources, training, and support needed for them are absolutely essential for the department to effectively carry out its mission. • The NIH Police are reverting to a Consolidated Guard Contract mandating Operations Officers to assist quality performance of work requirements and quality assurance.

44. Analysis of Readiness Conclusions(continued) • Ability to carry out mission for next 3 years – (continued) • Though highly appreciative of additional space allocated for Police operations, some space provided is separated from the nucleus of current Police operations. • Crime Prevention Section • Guard Administration • Complicates the availability of resources, adds transportation time, slowing all processes. • Needed space was initially addressed in the FY2001 Annual Self Assessment.

45. Analysis of Readiness Conclusions(continued) • Ability to carry out mission for next 3 years – (continued) • In identifying needed space during that assessment, the NIH Police explained the inadequacies, lack of efficiency, and general “risk” to the NIH research community, general public, and visiting dignitaries who, may inadvertently come into “harms way” during Police action solely due to the physical location of Police operations. • We’d again like to keep this concern on the ASA agenda in hopes of securing NIH understanding of the problem and support in building a self-contained Police facility that will fully accommodate all Police operations.

46. Analysis of Readiness Conclusions(continued) • Ability to carry out mission for next 3 years – (continued) • It’s quite obvious that Police attrition has a broad and continuing negative effect on the department’s ability to effectively carry out its mission: decreased patrol coverage, excessive work hours, high overtime costs, etc. • Additionally, there are yet the unknowns: • Increased Police requirements brought on by: • Impending opening of the Clinical Center CRC • Clinical Center B-2 Dock Revitalization • Etc.

47. Analysis of Readiness Conclusions(continued) • Implications of not having right mix of skills and abilities or tools and materials • Inability to effectively and efficiently carry out mission • Inability to recruit and retain Police officers • Poor stewardship of government resources • Tactical disadvantage • Safety and security of the NIH community and its facilities will be compromised

48. Financial Perspective

49. Unique Financial Measures • FMU-1: Overtime Costs for Police Branch • FMU-2: NIH Police training investment losses due to turnover • Findings and Conclusions • FMU-1: Police overtime costs more than tripled from 2001 • CY2001 = $580,000 • CY2002* = $1,973,000 • Conclusion:Until NIH can offer pay and benefits competitive with other federal and local state jurisdictions, overtime costs will continue at the above level.

50. Unique Financial Measures • FMU-2: Training investment losses • In FY 2002, we lost officers in whom we had invested more than $250,000 in training • Conclusion: Turnover is costing NIH in many ways • Overall Conclusion: Overtime costs combined with lost training costs equate to more than the enhanced pay and retirement benefits we are seeking!