Lesson Seven: Insurgency - Beyond Vietnam

1. Lesson Seven: Insurgency - Beyond Vietnam Columbia University 26 October 2006

2. Please Note: The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the position of the United States Military Academy, the Department of the Army, or the U.S. Department of Defense.

3. Terrorism History Nuggets • First VBIED (or “Car Bomb”) terrorist attack? New York City, September 1920 • Terrorist: Italian anarchist Mario Buda • Vehicle: Horse-drawn wagon • Target: Corner of Wall and Broad streets (directly across from JP Morgan Company) • Attack: The wagon—packed with dynamite and iron slugs—exploded at precisely noon in a fireball of shrapnel, killing 40 and wounding more than 200.

4. Terrorism History Nuggets • Second VBIED (or “Car Bomb”) terrorist attack? Haifa, Palestine (now Israel) January, 1947 • Terrorists: Stern Gang (a pro-fascist splinter group led by Avraham Stern that broke away from the right-wing Zionist paramilitary Irgun) • Vehicle: Truck • Target: British police station in Haifa • Attack: A truckload of explosives was driven into the station, killing 4 and injuring 140. (The Stern Gang would soon use truck and car bombs to kill Palestinians as well, as part of their extremist agenda)

5. Terrorism: Key Terms • Ideology • Indoctrination • Radicalization • Rationalization • Emotions • Moral Disengagement • Communicative Acts • Facilitators/Causes • Learning Organization • Counter vs. Anti • Hard/Soft Power • Vision • Power • Strategy • Tactic • Duty • Shame • Freedom fighter • Self-sacrifice • Will to kill • Skill to kill AB95-5.PPT // ##

6. Certain aspects are fundamental • Political act • Desire for political change • Terrorism is typically non-state in character • (Note the separate but related topic of state terrorism – typically antithetical to the desire for political change.) • States can terrorize, but they are not terrorists. • Terrorists do not abide by norms • They target innocents • They seek psychological trauma

7. Contemporary Insurgencies • Nigeria • the Philippines • Sri Lanka • Thailand • Turkey • Uzbekistan • Afghanistan • Bangladesh • Chad • Colombia • Iraq • Nepal Common strategic objective = Force the government to overextend itself in dealing with the threat, thereby allowing the insurgency to gain support and commit further attacks against the government. What else do these have in common?

8. Underlying Conditions: Local • Could includepolitical, economic and social conditions, before terrorism • Unemployment or other unmet aspirations • Socio-demographic pressures • Authoritarian/repressive regimes • Ethnic fissures (Tamils, Chechens) • Chaos & capacity • Weak/failing states Expectations Opportunities

9. Underlying Conditions: Global • Grievances that transcend geographic boundaries • Could include global animosities • e.g., Sunni vs. Shia • Could include foreign occupation • Afghanistan, Iraq • Israel & Palestinian Territories Demands/Grievances Power to enact change

10. Conditions & Facilitators • Global weapons proliferation (especially in weak/failing states) • Technology • Communication and transportation shrinks time and space; enable networked forms of terrorism (including fundraising aspects) • Weapons: invention of dynamite helped launch capabilities • Global criminal networks • Profit motive • Money laundering • Trafficking in drugs, humans, explosives, other ‘bad stuff’ • Ideologiesfuel both local and global perceptions of injustices and need for action/retribution

11. Facilitating Ideologies of Violence • Nationalist (e.g., Anti-colonial groups, territorial objectives) • Ethno-nationalist/Separatists (liberation, territorial objectives) • Left-wing (e.g., radical Communists revolutionaries) • Right Wing (often target race and ethnicity) • Anarchist • Environmentalist • Religious(e.g., militias, jihadists, etc.- “attack on Islam”) • Others (e.g., apocalyptic, charismatic cults, philosophies of “Man is evil” - Hobbes, et al.) • Overall: These all reflect the importance of perceptions, emotions, strategic influence, information warfare; The Vision Thing

12. Religion and Political Violence What makes religious ideologies unique? • Long-term view of history and future • Sense of crisis, threat of secularization, globalization • Believe they are involved in an epic struggle of good vs evil • Believe in their own revealed truth from God; piety and persistence in the faith will give you the strength to overcome anything • Acting along desires of a diety – audience is thus not necessarily human. • Doing the bidding of a higher power; demands sacrifice; rewards in this life and the next • Feel unconstrained by law – higher calling

13. Religion and Political Violence Religious ideologies are the most powerful radicalization agents, because they: • Explain the state of the world, particularly why believers are continuously persecuted, oppressed or discriminated • Explain how and why violence may be condoned and necessary • Are often theologically supremacist - meaning that all believers assume superiority over non-believers, who are not privy to the truth of the religion • Are exclusivist - believers are a chosen people, or their territory is a holy land • Are absolutist - it is not possible to be a half-hearted believer, and you are either totally within the system, or totally without it (and only the true believers are guaranteed salvation and victory, whereas the enemies and the unbelievers - as well as those who have taken no stance whatsoever - are condemned to some sort of eternal punishment or damnation, as well as death)

14. Religion and Terrorism • Overall, religious ideologies help foster polarizing values in terms of right and wrong, good and evil, light and dark - values which can be co-opted by terrorist organizations to convert a "seeker" into a lethal killer.

15. Religion and Global Insurgency • Unlike politically-focused ideologies (left-wing, right-wing, nationalist, etc.), religion transcends geopolitical boundaries, and can sustain a global insurgency • Global insurgency = overthrow the established system of governments, replace it with something else • Global Islamic Insurgency = replace Westphalian system with a Caliphate • Adherents believe their religion is under attack and requires all Muslims to defend Islam • Globally Networked

16. New York & Washington, DCSept. 11, 2001

17. Karachi, PakistanMay 8, 2002 June 14, 2002 Attack on U.S. Consulate Bus attack 14 Dead, including11 French engineers 12 Dead50 Injured

18. Bali, IndonesiaOctober 12, 2002 202 Dead350 Injured Citizens from 21 countries, mostly Western tourists, were killed in the blasts

19. Casablanca, MoroccoMay 17, 2003 44 Dead107 Injured

20. Jakarta, IndonesiaAugust 5, 2003 12 Dead60 Injured J.W. Marriott Hotel, Jakarta

21. Riyadh, Saudi ArabiaNovember 8, 2003 April 21, 2004 Attack on Security Services Headquarters 3 simultaneous suicide car bomb attacks on Al-Muhayaapartment complex 4 Dead148 Injured 17 Dead122 Injured

22. Istanbul, TurkeyNovember 20, 2003 27 Dead400 Injured Primary Targets: British consulate and the HSBC bank headquarters

23. Madrid, SpainMarch 11, 2004 191 Dead1,035 Injured

24. Jakarta, IndonesiaSeptember 9, 2004 9 Dead173 Injured Australian Embassy was primary target

25. London, UKJuly 7, 2005 54 Dead716 Injured

26. Countering a Global Insurgency Using All Instruments of National Power: The MIDLIFE (formerly DIME) Approach to CT • Military • Intelligence • Diplomacy • Legal • Information • Financial • Economic

27. GWOT (Good Guys) VNSAs (Bad Guys) M I D L I F E

28. Countering GI - Issues of Concern / Contested Terrains

29. Global Application of CT Strategy Middle East Europe Security Operations Economic, Political Development Ongoing Missions Proliferation Security Initiative Partnership Development Security Cooperation • Deny Safe Havens • Build Capacity • Amplify Moderates • Improve Governance • Secure WMD • Attack Terrorists • Develop Partnerships • Economic • Development • Educate & Train • Short-term and Long-term actions required Africa South East Asia Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Initiative Security Cooperation Programs Horn of Africa JTF Humanitarian Operations CT Fellowships

30. Countering Insurgencies • Economic and political dimensions • Create economic & political opportunities to meet aspirations • Consider foreign policy dimensions (state sponsorship, bias) • Chaos & capacity • Law enforcement, border security; containment • Weapons proliferation & criminal networks ($35-40b) • Pressure states and private companies to prevent • The battleground of ideologies is particularly important • Exploit ideological vulnerabilities

31. Implications for Information Operations • How to combat an idea-based global network? • Map the influences within the network; Identify their most influential members; who is trusted most? Whose ideas carry the most weight? • Avoid strategic miscommunications that reinforce their beliefs • Deprive them of the ability to discredit the U.S. and the West • Combat the enemy in the strategic battlespace of ideas and perceptions

32. Implications for Information Operations • This is a War of Ideas: We need to convince them (potential supporters and recruits) that we (liberal democracies) offer a better way than separatist Islamic Jihad (but without attempting to convert them to our way of life) • Foster/strengthen a universal belief that the globalized community of responsibly governed states offers a more viable future of dignity, respect, security, prosperity for everyone • Note: this does not say “promote democracy” • Develop an effective counter-ideological message- Manage perceptions/be more proactive in the information battlespace- Undermine the perceived legitimacy among supporters • Work to bolster the image of American morals and values being compatible with those of the Arab and Islamic world, where we are too often portrayed as greedy, selfish hedonists

33. Counterterrorism Strategy • Human intelligence networks are critical (although non-efficient use of manpower) • Must have continual presence – cannot go into a village “looking for the terrorists” • Evaluate trends and potentials, capabilities and intentions, and provide an operational net assessment • Must not over-react; terrorist strategy may be to provoke over-reaction, leading to further alienation and possible supporters among populace • Tactical level: thwart an attack, pursue and bring to justice attack perpetrators • Strategic level: build resilient communities

34. Winning Long Wars We face a hostile ideology-global in scope, atheistic in character, ruthless in purpose, and insidious in method. Unhappily the danger it poses promises to be of indefinite duration. Farewell Radio and Television Address to the American People by President Dwight D. Eisenhower, January 17, 1961. In the long run, winning the war on terror means winning the war on ideas, for it is ideas that can turn the disenchanted into murderers willing to kill innocent victims. National Security Strategy (March 2006), p. 9

35. Defeating an Ideology Takes Time • Communism • Communist ideology gained prominence in 1919 • US opposition began in 1946 • 43 years of Cold and Hot War to defeat the ideology • Communism ultimately collapsed from within • Violent Islamic-Based Extremism • Threads of history thousands of years long • Potentially more legitimacy with a religious based ideology, especially when conditions support • group based vs. state based – more difficult to apply cold war strategies Key Lesson: Marginalizing an ideology requires patience and promoting reform from within

36. Questions?

37. Global Human Networks

38. Key Human Network Features • Cliques, cells, bridges – all components of networks in which contingent relationship, based on trust, are formed • Sophisticated organizational forms; “Living, breathing organisms” with no state/geographical boundaries • Can include hierarchical organizations within the overall network • Becoming preferred method of communication, coordination, cooperation & collaboration • Political Activists • Organized Crime • Terrorists • Academic Researchers

39. Shared Beliefs in the Salafist Network Core tenets of the Sunni insurgents’ ideology and key ideologues: • Taymiya, Wahhab: inspired Salafist (“pure” Islam) movements among Sunnis • Banna: Every aspect of Western thought is a threat to Islam • Mawdudi: God’s sovereignty is absolute; thus, no laws created by man are valid • Qutb: Muslims who do not conform to jihadi interpretations are infidels (ok to kill); separation of church and state is anathema to true Islam • Azzam: Jihad is a necessity wherever Muslim lands are invaded or occupied, including Afghanistan • Azzam and Zawahiri: manhaj (blur the paradigm of defensive jihad with the idea of jihad against the West) • Zawihiri: In order to bring down the apostate regimes in the Middle East (the near enemy), we must focus on the superpower patrons – the U.S. and the West (the far enemy).

40. Shared Beliefs in the Salafist Network Resonance of the Al Qaeda message (principle of jihad) is one form of network protocol, like a secret handshake which confirms a lot of tacit knowledge between two people Religious dimension: Sunni insurgents’ ideology exploits certain Islamic teachings in order to push the global umma into bringing down the world order of responsibly governed states Political dimension: As a whole, the Muslim world has many developmental challenges due to political corrupion; these can only be overcome by bringing down the world order of responsibly governed states and replacing it with Islamic rule in the form of a caliphate Social dimension: Social reinforcement of the core tenets of the ideology eventually raises it to a level of sacred obligation

41. Network Vulnerabilities • Harmony/Disharmony report • Analysis of captured AQ documents in OEF and OIF • Reveals concern over disagreements within movement • Suggests ways to interdict/degrade lines of communications between network nodes • Offers insights into ways some members of the movement have subverted the authority of senior commanders (preference divergence)

42. Agency Theory • Three main areas of preference divergence within the organization/movement: • Tactical control • Transaction integrity • Ideological authority • Protocols: Humans need trust in order to work together toward any goal • Preference divergence impacts the level of trust/expectations of shared effort toward common goal

43. Network Viruses • Viruses = malicious code that infects computers, network routers, etc. and propagates, spreads itself to others on the network, often by corrupting the normal protocols used for information and financial transactions • Are there viruses we can use to negatively impact the network integrity of the global salafist insurgency? • Independence Day – “plant a virus into the mother ship . . .” • Functional Agency (FA) Viruses to exacerbate preference divergence within an organization

44. FA Virus #1: Tactical Control • Political and ideological leaders—the principals—must delegate certain duties to middlemen or low-level operatives, their agents. • But because of the need to maintain operational secrecy, terrorist group leaders cannot perfectly monitor what their agents are doing. • Thus, preference divergence creates operational challenges which can be exploited to degrade a terrorist group’s capabilities.

45. FA Virus #1: Tactical Control • Preference divergence over controlled use of violence; terrorists cannot afford too alienate the center of gravity, or risk losing all support • Preference divergence over “who’s in charge” • Preference divergence over who needs what kinds of situational awareness • Preference divergence over what should be done to maintain security

46. FA Virus #1: Tactical Control • Abu Bakr Naji • one of AQ’s leading strategists • published a number of texts discussing problems that confront the global network • e.g., organizational difficulties in resolving chains of command, ferreting out spies within the organization, and reigning in overzealous recruits. • also worries about low-ranking members of the movement will initiate their own large-scale attacks against high-value targets. • for more, see Stealing al Qaeda’s Playbook • What does newly established Shura Council in Iraq signify re: desire among some leaders for greater tactical control over activities?

47. FA Virus #1: Tactical Control • What could UBL do to destroy his own credibility, popular ratings? If you were UBL, what would you fear or worry about most? • Perception of strategic drift • Highlight disconnect between rhetoric and actions • Publicize CT successes and tactical failures; discredit perception of competence • Publicize the differences between AQ leaders and affiliate groups and the internal dissension within the AQ leadership • Make information management more difficult; degrade the C2 network channels with noise, static

48. FA Virus #1: Tactical Control • Create uncertainty over which affiliate group is responsible for particularly brutal attacks against innocent Muslim; • provide “claims” of responsibility on behalf of dozens of groups each time • try to force real culprits to “prove” their ownership of an attack • in doing so, they may reveal more than they want to (OpSec challenge), and may also alienate the local population/support base by demanding recognition for murdering Muslims • Force leaders to consider punitive actions against agents/operatives • Flood the network nodes with requests for info/requests for clarification of intent, strategy, etc. Goal: overwhelm the decision-makers from within

49. FA Virus #1: Tactical Control • Cellular structures complicate C2 • Secure long-distance communication is time consuming and expensive • How can we increase their concern about network infiltration, forcing them to spend more time on screening new members, allowing less time for planning/conducting attacks? • Overall focus: degrade level of trust regarding leadership, leaders’ competence, personal agendas, etc. as well as forcing them to focus more on operational security and tactical control

50. FA Virus #2: Transaction Integrity • Expectations of money to support operations will be made available in a timely fashion • Expectations that individual recipients will do the correct things with those funds • Problem: Limited or no accountability • Because of operational security needs, a clandestine organization cannot offer much transparency regarding its finances • This allows considerable latitude for abuse, corruption • Use their need for secrecy against them