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Approximate Mechanism Design Without Money. App. Mech. Design Without Money . VCG. Mechanism Truthfulness Without money. Money is the root of all evil!. Security issues Banking issues Ethical Considerations Legal Considerations. App. Mech. Design Without Money. VCG. Facility Location.
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App. Mech. Design Without Money VCG Mechanism Truthfulness Without money
Money is the root of all evil! Security issues Banking issues Ethical Considerations Legal Considerations
App. Mech. Design Without Money VCG Facility Location Election Mechanism Truthfulness Without money Approximation
Problem Classes Class 1 Opt SP Mechanism With money Intractable Opt Sp Mechanism With money & Intractable Class 3 No opt SP Mechanism Without Money Class 2 No Opt SP Mechanism With Money Picture is from slides of [1]
Facility Location - Definitions Network, Graph Agents Location Profile Deterministic Mechanism Randomized Mechanism SP and GSP
Facility Location - Summary Picture is from slides of [1]
Trees – Median is optimum A A B B D F F C C G E Picture is from slides of [1]
Facility Location - Summary Picture is from slides of [1]
Facility Location - Summary Picture is from slides of [1]
Maximum Cost A y B
Facility Location - Summary Picture is from slides of [1]
Maximum Cost – Randomized UB 2d d B B C A D E 1/2 1/4 1/2 1/4 1/4 Picture is from slides of [1]
Facility Location - Summary Picture is from slides of [1]
Election - Definitions Voters Candidates Preference List Preference Profile Approximation
Election – Definitions (cont.) • Matching • Mechanism • Benefit • Single • Mechanism • Benefit
Matching C1 C2 1 2 2 2 1 1 OPT=3 2 1 OPT’=4 1 2 3 n
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Refrences • N. Alon, M. Feldman, A. D. Procaccia, M. Tennenholtz. Strategyproof Approximation Mechanisms for Location on Networks. CoRR, 2009 • A. D. Procaccia, M. Tennenholtz. Approximate mechanism design without money. In Proceedings of the 10th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (ACM-EC), 2009 • J. Schummer and R. V. Vohra. Mechanism design without money. In N. Nisan, T. Roughgarden, E. Tardos, and V. Vazirani, editors, Algorithmic Game Theory, chapter 10. Cambridge University Press, 2007.
1/4 A B C F D 1/2 E 1/4
B 1/4 A 3/8 C C A B 3/8