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Service delivery and citizen security in Bogota (1995-2003). Gerard Martin Georgetown University Colombia Program (USAID funded) gm@georgetown.edu. What made rapid and profound change possible?. Paul Bromberg: “When you work hard, you will get results”.
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Service delivery and citizen security in Bogota (1995-2003). Gerard Martin Georgetown University Colombia Program (USAID funded) gm@georgetown.edu
What made rapid and profound change possible? • Paul Bromberg: “When you work hard, you will get results”. • Hard work can still lead to policy failure; how did they proceed to overcome obstacles and implement radical reforms?
On crisis and Sputniks 1) No Olympics (no Sputniks) 2) Post local governance crisis: 3) (Post)-violence crisis: city perceived by all as in urgent need of change 4) Demo: 6% (1964-73) versus 2,5% (1995-2003) 5) Age: 15-29 yrs = 34% in early 1980s, versus 28% in 2000s
City Development plans • Coherent, integral (N) • Precise goals and objectives (N) • Ambitious – city wide (N) • Hammered down and mainstreamed (N) • Constant benchmark (N) • Institutional engineering: administrative and legal reforms: Plan Maestro Seguridad, Codigo de Policia; Sub-Sec Seguridad, POT etc. (N) • New vocabulary RESULT: leadership > credibility
Thematic areas and objectives of the three administrations (Bogotá, 1995-2003) Source: Gerard Martin y Miguel Ceballos, Bogota: Anotomia de una transformacion, 2004.
Institutional and management reform to improve services • Enlightened technocratic elites. • Professional bureaucracy: redefining functions + responsabilities • Example: Sub-Sec Citizen Security; Consejo de Seguridad; Consejo ampliado de Seguridad; Consejos locales de seguridad
Transparent allocation of resources • Ley 80 taken seriously • E.g. Fondo de Seguridad y Vigilancia • General restructuring of contracting • Goals, rules, requirements and evaluation methods widely published RESULT: direct impact on quality of service; public works prove that money is well spend: improved credibility / no corruption charges
Citizenship and legitimacy • Public officer as educator (M) • Public space = citizenship (M) + inclusion/equity (P) • Norms, values, rules = producing civic society + SC RESULT: reformulation of social contract
Actors: NGO free model? 1) Strengthening of Centros IDIPRON 2) ZONAS SEGURAS PROGRAM of Chamber of Commerce
Demand driven quality services • Less mini-police stations, but better build, on more strategic locations and user friendly • Additional in service training for police officers RESULT: credibility with clients + agency
Community driven dimension • Frentes de Seguridad Local • Community controlled parks • Community Policing • Increased offer of services: increases choice RESULT: people know who is responsible.
Shorter routes + stronger oversight E.g.: (i) introduction of Consejos Locales de Seguridad + Local Security Plans + Consejo Distrital Ampliado • Easy to scale up • Robust checks and balances RESULT: voice + perception of voice
Continous M&E Strengthening knowledge and oversight: • Crime Observatory -SUIVD • Parks Observatory • Other observatories: integrated transportation (movilidad) RESULT: city administration knows city > leadership; shared knowledge > credibility increased
Innovative forms of information • City TV + Canal Bogota • Communication strategies • M + P talking etc • “Bogota como vamos” + public accountability • Publications RESULT: voice / change in political incentives
Ex-post • Bogota model + language part of political agendas • Mayors for president • Other cities are following • Renewed belief in public institutions • Improved image of public good + public office • Practical turn in academia
Can it be repeated? Bogota: • Mayor Garzon Other cities: • Manizales, Pereira, Monteria… But: • Superficial copy cat does not work • Beyond charisma: professional bureaucracy, deep leadership, integrated long and short circuits of poor oriented service delivery