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Safety Study Report: Introduction of Glass Cockpit Avionics into Light Aircraft

Safety Study Report: Introduction of Glass Cockpit Avionics into Light Aircraft. Qualitative Analysis Results Loren Groff. Safety Issues Identified. Training requirements Pilot information about system failure modes Equipment-specific training and resources

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Safety Study Report: Introduction of Glass Cockpit Avionics into Light Aircraft

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  1. Safety Study Report:Introduction of Glass Cockpit Avionics into Light Aircraft Qualitative Analysis Results Loren Groff

  2. Safety Issues Identified • Training requirements • Pilot information about system failure modes • Equipment-specific training and resources • Equipment malfunction and service difficulty reporting

  3. Issue 1: Training • Manufacturers • Provide training that includes aircraft systems • Included in purchase price of new aircraft • Insurance providers • Vary by pilot and company • Typically exceed regulatory requirements

  4. Issue 1: Training • FAA • Developed FAA-Industry Training Standards (FITS) in response to new advanced aircraft • Included generic glass cockpit avionic information in manuals and handbooks • Did not include specific training or testing requirements • Has not yet updated knowledge tests • Staff has proposed recommendations in this area

  5. Issue 2: System Failure Modes • Pilot reported loss of airspeed and altimeter readouts on PFD • Subsequent loss of control • Ballistic parachute recovery • Luna, NM: April 9, 2007

  6. Issue 2: System Failure Modes Airspeed

  7. Issue 2: System Failure Modes Vertical speed Airspeed Altitude

  8. Issue 2: System Failure Modes • Aircraft flight manual (AFM) is required to include information about equipment malfunctions • The AFM supplement did not include system input failure information • Staff has proposed a recommendation in this area

  9. Issue 3: Equipment-Specific Training • Wide variation in glass cockpit avionics system design and operation between manufacturers • Software-based systems can be modified

  10. Conventional Attitude Indicator

  11. Attitude and Heading Reference System (AHRS)

  12. Issue 3: Equipment-Specific Training • Experience with conventional instruments and/or generalized training do not adequately prepare pilots to operate glass cockpit avionics • Staff has proposed a recommendation in this area

  13. Simulator Training • Not possible or prudent to demonstrate all failure modes in the aircraft • Approved flight simulators may not be available to all GA pilots

  14. PC-based Trainer

  15. Simulator Training • Software applications or procedural trainers could be used for equipment-specific avionics training • Staff has proposed a recommendation in this area

  16. Issue 4: Tracking Equipment Reliability • Coconut Creek, FL: Jan. 15, 2005 • Loss of control in IMC • Pilot reported unspecified avionics problem • Multiple prior PFD replacements

  17. Tracking Equipment Reliability • FAA requires manufacturers to report select equipment problems • FAA Service Difficulty Reporting (SDR) System • Required for Parts 121, 135, and 125 • Not required for General Aviation • No SDR records for the accident aircraft

  18. Tracking Equipment Reliability • FAA is reviewing Part 23 certification • FAA/Industry process study cited SDR reporting deficiencies • Staff has proposed a recommendation in this area

  19. Summary • Anticipated safety improvements were not evident in the study • Additional equipment information, training, and malfunction reporting are needed

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