Issue ownership and valence competition

1. Issue ownership and valence competition Dr. Matthew Wall, Political Campaigns: Week9

2. Introduction • How do campaigns seek to influence voters? The dynamics of political communication and mechanisms of influence. Lectures 9 – 12. • At the national level, parties have a range of possible strategies to play in order to encourage electoral support. • Can campaign by emphasising: issues, policies, past performance, candidates/leaders, negative aspects of opponents, to name a few. • A campaign at the national-level is characterised by the balance of these emphases both in the media and by the parties/candidates involved.

3. Introduction • These campaign emphases are linked to fundamental conceptions of the nature of vote choice. • Do voters typically rely on well-established partisan cues, which campaigns simply seek to ‘activate’? This relates to the ‘party identification’ literature discussed in earlier classes, as noted, many scholars point to an ongoing decline in partisanship. • Do voters act ‘rationally’, by voting for the party that is the most similar to them in terms of policy position? • Do voters act ‘pragmatically’ voting for the party/leader they judge most competent to address the problems faced by the country? • This week, we focus on a school of thought that favours the later perspective – Issue ownership and valence competition.

4. Structure of today’s talk • 1) The ‘classic’ rational choice doctrine – positional competition on issues and the median voter theorem. • 2) Issue-ownership/valence as an alternative conception of vote choice and campaigning: • The theory of issue ownership and valence politics, and implications for campaign practice. • The sources of issue ownership. • The measurement of ‘ownership’ behavior among voters, media and candidates/parties.

5. Models in political science • In political science models are used to predict and account for political outcomes. • There is a vast modelling tradition in political science with the outcomes studied ranging from the conduct of parties and voters in elections, to the behaviour of dictators, to the impact of nuclear weapons on international relations, to the behaviour of politicians in committees, to the management of public resources among many, many others.

6. Models in political science • The dominant paradigm in political science modelling is rational choice theory. • This theory originated in attempts to characterise decision-making in the economic sphere. • While there are many variants of RCT there are a few underlying assumptions that make RCT modelling feasible.

7. Models in political science • The core proposition of RCT is that individuals are instrumentally rational – that is, when faced with a set of choices, they choose the option that they believe will best enable them to achieve their goals: • Individuals are self-interested – when faced with a set of choices they rank order the options available to them according to which option gives them the greatest utility (benefits minus costs). • This involves weighing the costs of each option against the benefits. • Individuals then choose the option that offers them the highest utility (or, in uncertain situations, the option that offers the highest expected utility).

8. Models in political science • As such, rational choice models in political science explain individual actions and the outcomes that such actions lead to in terms of the preferences of individuals with regard to a given outcome, and their beliefs about how the various options they face relate to those preferences. • Given these stated assumptions, rational choice models apply logic and mathematics to evaluate the consequences of a given set of preferences and beliefs in a given choice context.

9. Downsian model of spatial competition • Anthony Downs’ An Economic Theory of Democracy (1957) represents a pioneering use of economic techniques and the logic of modelling to the political/campaigning sphere. • His model assumes that: • 1) Individuals vote for the party that they expect will yield the highest utility for them if they get into office (in terms of policies). • 2) Voters use the position of parties on the left-right dimension as a heuristic in deciding which parties will yield them the highest utility. • 3) Voters prefer parties which are closer to their ideal position in the left-right space. • 4) Parties are motivated solely by a desire to get into office and compete for votes by adapting their policies.

10. Downsian model of spatial competition • These assumptions allow us to map voters and parties into a ‘policy space’ and to examine the strategies that we expect them to pursue. • This process allows us to speculate about the types of policies that might emerge in a competitive democratic system.

11. Downsian model of spatial competition • This approach allows us to demonstrate some interesting tendencies in political competition. • Arguably the most famous theorem identified using this approach is the ‘median voter theorem’ which states that: • With 2 parties competing on a single policy dimension both parties should adopt policies as close as possible to that of the median voter.

12. Median voter model • The median voter theorem actually represents an adaptation of Harold Hotelling’s model of spatial location of businesses location in a one-dimensional setting. • Suppose that two owners of refreshment stands, George and Henry, are trying to decide where to locate along a stretch of beach. • Suppose further that there are 101 customers located at even intervals along this beach, and that a customer will buy only from the closest vendor. • In the diagram below George locates his stand at point A, Henry at point C. • The 51st customer (who has fifty customers to her left and the other fifty to her right) is located at point B.

14. Median voter model • In the beach situation either George or Henry stand to gain more customers by changing their location on the beach! • If George moves closer to point B he will keep his customers and gain some of Henry’s. The same logic applies for Henry. • Mathematical theory (and common sense) tells us that point B is the equilibrium location for both vendors – once both are located there – any movement will result in a loss of custom. • Hence in this situation we would expect both vendors to locate at point B (i.e. at the median customer)

15. Median voter model • The same logic applies in a one-dimensional political space when two parties are competing. • Instead of customers on a beach we have voters with policy preferences. • Instead of ice-cream vendors competing with location we have political parties competing with policy positions. • The prediction, when there are 2 parties and one dimension of competition is that both parties will converge their policies on those of the median voter.

16. A simplified one-dimensional ‘policy space’ – taxes versus spending Voter A Voter B Party A Party B Voter C Very low taxes with private provision of services High taxes for government to provide a range of services

17. Median voter model • Of course, this model is a very simplified version of political reality. • It does not hold for more than two parties or more than one dimension of political competition. (e.g. competition about EU integration, immigration, etc.). • A major critique is that the act of voting itself is not rational! You have nearly a 0% chance of being the ‘decisive’ voter, so you secure no policy benefits from voting. • If voting itself is irrational, how can the decision of who to vote for be modelled as a rational, self-interested choice? • Known as ‘the paradox that ate rational choice theory’ (Fiorina)

18. Median voter model • However it does provide a powerful and persuasive account of why political parties may come to resemble each other in terms of the policies that they advocate. • It also gives us an insight into the conditions where such an outcome is more likely (i.e. where there are only 2 major parties, where there are fewer issues of political contestation). Does it help to explain patterns in the UK? • If it doesn’t apply in 2 party systems, this leads us to ask – why not? For example the polarisation of the US system in recent years has been explained by the fact that candidates have to appeal to their ‘bases’ in primaries (within party competition for nomination).

19. Valence politics and issue ownership • An alternative to the ‘spatial approach’. • On many issues, there is widespread agreement as to the desired outcome: Employment, sustainable economic growth, a clean environment, defense against terrorism, less crime etc. • These issues are described as ‘valence’ issues as opposed to ‘positional’ or ‘pro-con’ issues. • Performance of governments on these issues is seen to be a matter of competence, rather than as a reflection of ideology. • As such, in the minds of voters, parties are not characterized by their different positions on these issues as by their capacities and track records.

20. Valence politics and issue ownership • Under this model, the electoral choice of voters is heavily influenced by their perception of the most important issue facing the country at election time. • This sets the terms of reference for their evaluations of parties/candidates. • The expectation of the theory is that voters will support the party/candidate that they perceive is the most competent in dealing with the issues that they perceive as most important.

21. Valence politics and issue ownership • Voters’ estimates of the issues that are the most important vary from election-to-election, often due to ‘the state of the world’. • In times of economic crisis, employment and economic management figure more highly, in times of war, foreign policy and defence. • However, some argue that voters’ perceptions of the most important valence issues are open to manipulation: through mass media, and the words and actions of political candidates.

22. Measurement of the Issue Ownership Model • Typically via analysis of representative surveys. • Model performance is evaluated in terms of capacity of analysts to correctly predict vote choice via analysis of voters’ perception of the most important issue and the competence of the competing parties on these issues. • Such models are compared against ‘spatial’ models which look at how close voters and parties are on pro-con issues. • Research in the UK (Clarke et al., 2011 in syllabus) indicates that valence models out-perform spatial models in explaining voter behavior (though spatial model also improve prediction, and combined models are the best performers).

23. Implications for campaigns • Parties/candidates go into campaigns with relatively fixed perceptions as to their competences on various issues (we discuss the source of these competences later). • Their objective is to orientate the campaign towards a focus on those issues that they ‘own’ i.e. where they are seen as being more competent than their alternatives. • In this way, they seek to influence the evaluations of voters – pushing them to priorities the issues that play best for the party/candidate.

24. Implications for campaigns • Certain contexts will favor certain parties. • Conversely, a catastrophe in ‘their’ domain may skew the odds in their favour. E.g. Fukushima disaster corresponded to boost in support for German Greens in 2011 state elections in Germany. • Governments may direct economic policy to encourage favourable short-term evaluations of their economic performance, even if this is not ideal in the medium/long term ‘political business cycles’.

25. Implications for campaigns • A major implication here is that parties may ‘talk past’ each other: rather than presenting and defending different policies on the same issues – each party focuses on ‘their’ issues, and tries to avoid engaging with issues owned by their opponents. • Problematic in that this may make it very difficult for voters to make an informed choice among competing policies – which is one idealized form of representative democracy. • Candidates and parties must become skilled at manipulating the agenda of public forms ‘staying on message’ and not getting pulled into talking about the core issues of opponents.

26. Measurement of ‘talking past’ hypothesis • Sigelman and Buell (2004) reading rely primarily on campaign statements (by either candidates or campaign spokespeople) in Us Presidential campaigns as recorded in the New York Times. • The code these statements according to what issues they mention. • They then examine the overall ‘issue profiles’ of campaigns to see how similar they are – the ‘talking past’ hypothesis contends that they should be very different. • Overall, high level of similarity found – indeed opposing party profiles in a given race are more similar than profiles of the same party compared with previous party candidates.

27. Measurement of ‘talking past’ hypothesis • However, less agreement is apparent when parties’ ‘issue profiles’ are measured using either party manifestos or campaign advertisements. • Thus, it seems that when parties exert greater control over content, there is less ‘convergence’. • Nevertheless, this research indicates that there is far more issue convergence than strong interpretations of the ‘Issue ownership’ approach may anticipate.

28. Implications for campaigning • It is difficult for a given party or candidate to orientate the campaign exclusively towards ‘their’ issues. • 1) They are challenged by opponents seeking alternative issue prioritization. • 2) They are forced by media to deal with issues that they do not wish to – especially debates when candidates are forced by moderators to address identical topics. • 3) Candidates and parties ignore the ‘state of the world’ at their peril, they cannot be seen to have no position on issues that are flagged as important by the media, voters, and opponents.

29. Sources of issue ownership • How does a party come to ‘own’ an issue. • 3 key sources: • 1) The key constituencies of the party – parties tend to be positively evaluated on issues that are of concern to their core supporters. E.g. the Democratic Party on Social Welfare policies in the USA. • 2) Performance in government – a party’s ‘track record’ of paying attention to and performing on a given issue in power. Note that in coalition systems, parties will often seek ministries on ‘their’ core areas. • 3) Party communications/association of a party with that issue in the media.

30. Sources of issue ownership • Issue ownership is generally viewed as a rather stable, long-term phenomenon. • However, it is not entirely so: • Poor or unexpected positive performance in government can change public evaluations. • Gradual ‘de-emphasis’ of an issue in party communications and activities. • Alternatively, a strong emphasis on a non-owned issue. • Particularly when an issue is emerging as politically relevant, it can be politically ‘up for grabs’.

31. Measurement of ownership • Waalgrave and de Swert (2007) reading distinguishes ‘implicit’ from ‘explicit’ measures of ownership. • Implicit measures are arrived at by looking at the proportions of voters identifying an issue as ‘most important’ who vote for a given party. E.g. how many voters who identify ‘Environment’ as most important issue vote Green. • Explicit measure: Proportions of survey respondents who identify a party as ‘best placed to solve’ or ‘most able to handle’ a given issue.

32. Conclusions • ‘Rational choice’ versus ‘ownership’ models provide alternative understandings of campaigns, political competition and voter decision-making. • While rational choice models compare positions in identical issue spaces, ownership models compare competing visions of what issues should be considered important. • Parties seek to develop and protect images of competence in key issue areas.

33. Conclusions • However, such reputations are not easy to change, and parties thus compete to define the agenda to suit their strengths. • This is not easy, as they are challenged by media actors and opponents. • Formal analysis indicate that such considerations are an important part of vote choice, indeed the importance of this type of campaigning seems to be growing, as partisanship and ideological consistency are in decline among electorates.