Central European University May 3 rd , 2005 The Representational Base of Consciousness

1. Central European UniversityMay 3rd, 2005The Representational Base of Consciousness • Andrew Brook • Paul Raymont • Department of Philosophy & • Institute of Cognitive Science • Carleton University • Ottawa, ON, Canada

2. Kinds of consciousness • We can be conscious of: • The world around us and, via proprioception, states of our own bodies • Our own representational states (‘conscious of being conscious’) • Ourselves as subject of these states • Our objective is to develop a theory of consciousness that unites the three kinds one with another and all of them with cognition. • Alternatives to our approach: • Different theories for each kind of consciousness: e.g., creature vs state consciousness, access vs. phenomenal consciousness • Consciousness separated from cognition: zombies and inverted spectrum thought-experiments

3. Representational base • Whether you hold that consciousness simply is something representational or cognitive or you hold that it is something different from representation or cognition, you will agree that it has a representational base. • Not all representations are conscious, not by anybody’s concept of consciousness. But consciousness has a representational base. • The two best worked-out views of the representational base: • HOT model • Transparency model • Big problems await both views. • Alternative? Self-presenting representations (SPR), aka a same- or single-order model. Our SPRs are of a rather special kind.

4. HOT and transparency HOT model: Thought (unconscious) Perception Anything (or nothing) Conscious state!!!! Transparency Model: Via (but not of) a Representation Conscious of world Anything (or nothing) Consciousness of representation? (And of self?) An inference from consciousness of

5. Principle of representation • Both HOT and transparency accept a certain Principle of Representation: • RP: Representations represent something other than themselves and only something other than themselves. • Not only do they accept PR. If RP were right, some form of the HOT model or transparency model would be the only options available.

6. HOT model: problems • However, the HOT model faces problems. Recall the model: Thought (unconscious) Perception Anything (or nothing) Conscious state!!!! But what if the thought is about nothing real? Thought: imagining oneself perceiving (Nothing) (Nothing) Conscious state!!!!

7. Transparency model: problems The transparency model also faces problems. Again, recall how it goes: Via (but not of) a representation Conscious of world Anything (or nothing) Consciousness of representations is by an inference from consciousness of Problems: 1. The step from consciousness of how something is represented to consciousness of the representation is tiny. 2. Pains, itches, and other bodily sensations are not known via an inference. (Dretske on pain) 3. No account of one content, two or more modes of representing: difference between seeing a corner and feeling a corner

8. RP vs. self-presenting representations So let us take a look at RP. It is not obviously true: again, pains, itches, etc., and also mood states such as aimless depression Is there an alternative to RP? Yes. Representings, at least some representings, may be self-presenting. Consider 1. 1. I am reading the words on the screen in front of me. It is plausible to suggest that the representation expressed by 1. can make me conscious of three things: 1. I am reading the words on the screen in front of me

9. Representational base • This three-part structure is our candidate for the representational base of consciousness: • Representational baseus – an act of representing that is all the representation needed to be conscious not only of its object, if any, but also of the representing itself and of oneself as its subject. • Note the emphasis: other things may be needed, too. • The bar code as an analogy. • A bar code contains information about what it is ‘about’ (item and price), about itself – a few of the bars are an integrity check on the bar code itself, and about the thing that has it. • Or a gauge (Dretske favours this example but it does not in fact favour him).

10. Results so far • Even the results so far have a significant yield. They show that: • RP is far from obviously true • The idea behind transparency, that we are not directly aware of our representations, is false • HOTs are at best unnecessary • (And as a bonus) No Ich-Vorstellung is needed • Our notion of the representational base also gives us a unified account of the base of all three kinds of consciousness: of the world, of one’s own representational states, and of oneself as their subject. • So far, so good.

11. Global representation • However, the base of consciousness is usually far ‘bigger’ than an individual representation, traditionally understood. It is usually a, • Global representation – representing many objects as a single complex object and/or taking up many representations as traditionally conceived in a single representation. Suppose that one has representings that could be expressed by: 1. I am reading the words on the screen in front of me, 2. I am puzzled by your comments 3. I am enjoying the music I hear outside 4. I believe our agreement was to meet at 6:00 5. I thought I understood Kant's notion of the object 6. I wish the world were a fairer place

12. Elements united in a global representation • Here there are three different elements that could be united in a single global representation: 1. I am reading the words on the screen in front of me 2. I am puzzled by your comments 3. I am enjoying the music I hear outside 4. I believe our agreement was to meet at 6:00 5. I thought I understood Kant's notion of the object 6. I wish the world were a fairer place

13. Joint consciousness • Central to the idea of a global representation of objects is what we will call joint consciousness: • Joint consciousness – to be conscious of an act of representing by having it, a feeling by feeling it, an action by doing it, and/or the objects of these states, is to be conscious of other representings and/or objects in the same way, and of the group of them as a single group. • That is, the base of joint consciousness is representational acts of which one is aware simply by having, feeling, or doing them, and not (merely) as the object of some other representing.

14. Structure of a global representation • Representing is the representational base not only for consciousness of its object (if any), itself, and oneself. It is also the representational base for consciousness of all representings. • Three options for the structure of a global representation: • 1. Component representings are the object of a H-O global representation. • 2. Component representings combine in some single-order way. • 3. Component contents are taken up and integrated in a global representation but component representings are replaced by a single global representation. • James and arguably Kant believed 3. It is plausible and ontologically simpler than the alternatives. However, there are some prima facie serious objections to it.

15. Objections to single representation idea • Obj. 1 – Representation is polymodal: we see one thing, hear another, taste a third. Are not these each separate representations? • Response: Accounted for by the notion of objects in a single representation coming to us formatted or marked – some form of modality indicator. • Obj. 2 – Incompatible representations: binocular conflict, Necker cube. • Response: To be a problem for our view, incompatible representations would have to be, simultaneous all in one subject X all simultaneously conscious for that subject None of the cases just mentioned meets the third condition.

16. Objections to single representation idea 2. • Obj. 3 – Pictures within pictures • Response: Each blade of grass is a distinct picture? If not, i.e., if we have to stop somewhere, why not at the first step? • So where are we at? • Well, even after responding to these objections, we do not view the support that we have offered for 3., the idea that a global representation is not made up of component representations, as decisive. • However, it is fairly strong, certainly strong enough to justify us in accepting the view.

17. The challenge of externalism Externalism, the general idea: (For all x) (if x represents, then something external to x is at work) Externalism, the general problem: The content of conscious states seems to be entirely internal to them. Examples: 1. When I move to Timbuktu, the content of most of my conscious states continues unchanged. 2. “When I close my eyes, I cease to see [the world around me]. The world does not vanish but something ceases to exist when I close my eyes. And this something has to be in me.” (Dretske 1995, p. 36) The general conclusion: Conscious content is different from representational content.

18. Is externalism a problem for us? Step 1. Grant at least most forms of externalism. Reason? “What [a brain state] represents . . . are not facts one can discover by looking in the cortex, at the representation. One could as well hope to figure out what, if anything, a voltage difference between two electrical contacts in a computer means (represents, signifies) by taking ever more exact measurements of the voltage.” (Dretske1995, p. 37) Step 2. Distinguish: 1. Something being external to a representation, traditionally conceived (to a mode of representing in our jargon), and, 2. Something being external to a person,or at least not knowable by a person.

19. Is externalism a problem for us? 2. • Also distinguish, • 3. An element external to a representation being known, and, • 4. not being known by the person who has the representation (hereafter, ‘us’). • Step 3. Distinguish four possibilities with respect to the external element. • The element external to a representation could be: • internal to us (e.g., function), or, • also external to us (e.g., causal or nomological link), and, • known by us (possible with most), or, • not know by us(Twin Earth)

20. Is externalism a problem for us? 3. • Step 4. Separate out the cases. • If the element external to a representation is either internal to us (e.g., function) or known by us (e.g., causal link or whatever), then it is available to be part of conscious content and there is no problem. • If the element external to a representation is both external to us and not known by us (e.g., twin earth), then it is not available to us cognitively at all. • If not, then it would not be part of conscious content. However, it would not be part of the representational content available to the organism either. So again , there would be no misalignment between conscious and representational content, none that mattered anyway. • (Shades of Fodor’s methodological individualism.) • Step 5. The conclusion. No form of externalism poses a threat to our picture of the representational base of consciousness.

21. Final remarks • A theory that the global representation is the representational base of three kinds of consciousness has some real strengths. • As we said, it opens the way to a unified account of the three kinds of consciousness, namely, consciousness of: the world; one’s own representations; and oneself as subject. • It also opens the way to an account of consciousness that unifies consciousness with the rest of representation and cognition. • And it opens the way to nice accounts of: • the unity of consciousness • consciousness of self and its special features, • the subject of consciousness. • Guess what the rest of our book is about?

22. … and soon it will time for, Thank you

23. Acknowledgements • Paul Raymont, former SSHRC Post-doctoral Fellow and my • co-author, who contributed some of the key ideas in this paper. • Heidi Maibom, who helped us to think about externalism • more clearly.