UNICEF Social Protection Work an overview Show and Tell on Social Protection Bonn, 2011

1. UNICEF Social Protection Work an overviewShow and Tell on Social Protection Bonn, 2011 “Social Protection for Families and Children” Tuesday, May 20, 2014 David Stewart Child Poverty and Social Protection Unit, UNICEF

2. General Overview • UNICEF’s work and the UNICEF approach • The impacts of social protection • The reasons behind reluctance

3. A quick reminder of the need for social prot.

4. A quick reminder of the need for social prot.

5. A quick reminder of why

6. UNICEF’s work and approach to Social Protection

7. UNICEF Social Protection Framework • Progressive realization • National ownership • Moving towards systems

8. UNICEF’s definition “Social protection is the set of public and private policies and programmes aimed at preventing, reducing and eliminating economic and social vulnerabilities to poverty and deprivation.”

9. UNICEF’s work on Social Protection • UNICEF supports social protection in 104 countries (71 cash transfer programs in 52 countries) reaching about 12 million households

10. UNICEF’s work on Social Protection

11. UNICEF’s work on Social Protection

12. The impacts (of cash transfers!)

13. Cost or the need to work for not attending school

14. Evidence of SP impact on Nutrition Food expenditure Nutrition outcomes

15. Evidence of SP impact on Health Utilisation Health outcomes

16. Evidence of SP impact on Education ? Enrolment and attendance Outcomes

17. Evidence of SP impact on Child protection ? ? Child Labour Violence

18. SP in times of crisis: example from Malawi Length of time that food stores are projected to last by household (“intervention” households receive a cash transfer under the Mchinji Social Cash Transfer Pilot; “control” households do not)

19. Cost or the need to work for not attending school

20. Impact of abolishing school fees on enrolment

21. Social protection is not a silver bullet…

22. Social protection is not a silver bullet…

23. The reasons behind reluctance

24. What the bottlenecks and what can we do? 1- What are the three main blockages to bring the social protection agenda forward at national level? 2- What are the key changes at the global/regional level that could help unlock some of these national blockages?

25. Design and implementation issues

26. Design and implementation issues  Conditionality • HH decision makers lack information or knowledge. • Address norms that can harm children • Political support

27. Design and implementation issues  Conditionality • HH decision makers lack information or knowledge. • Address norms that can harm children • Political support Conditionality • HH ability to make most rational choice • Implementation • Marginalize the most vulnerable X

28. Design and implementation issues  Conditionality • HH decision makers lack information or knowledge. • Address norms that can harm children • Political support Conditionality • HH ability to make most rational choice • Implementation • Marginalize the most vulnerable X ? Conditional vs. Unconditional

29. Reasons behind reluctance Dependency – a hand up, not a hand out

30. Reasons behind reluctance Dependency – a hand up, not a hand out

31. Reasons behind reluctance Dependency – a hand up, not a hand out • Long term effects of improved human capital • Address market failure (lack of access to credit, insurance) • Reduce burden on social networks • Infusion of cash can lead to multiplier effects in local village economy

32. Households invest in livelihood activities—though impact varies by country Maize and garden plot vegetables Pigs Less impact Mixed impact Stronger impact

33. Reasons behind reluctance It’s too expensive!

34. Subsidy vs SP spending Source: Fiszbein, Kanbur and Yemtsov (2013): “Social Protection, Poverty and the Post-2015 Agenda,” The World Bank

35. In summary… • Children are overrepresented among the poor • For UNICEF: progressive realization, national ownership and a move towards systems. • The evidence clearly shows SP makes a difference for children. • We need to listen and understand the reluctance to expand programmes, and how to address these concerns.

36. UNICEF Social Protection Work an overviewShow and Tell on Social Protection Bonn, 2011 Thank you! Contacts: dstewart@unicef.org

37. For more information… • UNICEF Social Protection Strategic Framework: http://www.unicef.org/socialprotection/framework/ • Transfer project : http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/transfer • Protection to Production project : http://www.fao.org/economic/ptop/home/en/

38. What the bottlenecks and what can we do? 1- What are the three main blockages to bring the social protection agenda forward at national level? 2- What are the key changes at the global/regional level that could help unlock some of these national blockages?

39. The time to invest in children is now

40. Addressing the drivers of child poverty • Household monetary poverty • Inequitable access to quality services • Child and household characteristics that may increase the likelihood of discrimination or disadvantage  Design and implementation matter

41. Programme scale (BOE)

42. Subsidy vs SP spending Source: Fiszbein, Kanbur and Yemtsov (2013): “Social Protection, Poverty and the Post-2015 Agenda,” The World Bank

43. Evidence of SP impact on nutrition: the “critical window” South Africa’s Child Support Grant (CSG) is closely linked to improvements in nutrition. The CSG is an unconditional cash transfer (paid out to mothers) which began in 1998 and now reaches 11 million children. However, the age at which children begin receiving the CSG determines how large the impact of the program on height-for-age (HA) will be. The impact is positive when treatment started at the youngest age but decreases as age of initial treatment rises. There is a critical window of opportunity for SP to have an impact on long-term nutritional outcomes. Heterogenous Treatment Effects by Age of Treatment

44. Design & Implementation issues

45. Design and implementation considerations ~ There is no one-size-fits-all in SP design and implementation. ~ • Size of the transfer : should reflect the cost of a nutritious diet and adjust to price increases. (Rule of thumb of 20 % of mean consumption) • Frequency of the transfer: Delivery needs to be predictable, timely and convenientto allow planning and consumption smoothing. Frequent transfers increase the probability that money is spend on food and health. • Age at enrollment of the beneficiary: the sooner the higher the impact on nutrition outcomes and child development (critical window 0-2 y.) Recipient of the transfer: Benefits paid to women significallyincrease the proportion of household expenditures that go to food Type of transfer: depending on the context and the preferences of beneficiaries, also on the availability of the necessary food items in that particular region/country. UNICEF’S position on key design issues: • Conditionalitiesshould not be assumed to be most effective in all contexts (little evidence that it is more effective, added cost, risks of reducing access, increased strain on beneficiaries, etc.) • Targeting: human rights, political, resource and capacity considerations • SP design should be inclusive of socially vulnerable groups and child-sensitive: - consider intra-household distribution issues - critical window of opportunity in child’s development

46. Social cash transfers targeted to poorest of the poor can have productive impacts • Long term effects of improved human capital • Nutritional and health status; educational attainment • Labor productivity and employability • Transfers can relax some of constraints brought on by market failure (lack of access to credit, insurance) • Helping households manage risk • Providing households with liquidity • Transfers can reduce burden on social networks and informal insurance mechanisms • Infusion of cash can lead to multiplier effects in local village economy

47. Impact on productive assets and local economy: • Kenya: • CT-OVC programme had a significant impact on the accumulation of some productive assets, especially among some subgroups within the evaluation sample. • Receipt of the CT-OVC led to a 15 and six percentage point increase respectively in the share of smaller and female-headed households owning small animals. • Moreover, the CT-OVC transfer was associated with a seven percentage point increase in household participation in a non-farm enterprise for female headed households, and a similar decrease was recorded for maleheaded households. • Lesotho : • By stimulating demand for locally supplied goods and services, cash transfers have productive impacts. These effects are found primarily in households ineligible for the transfers. This finding is not surprising given that the eligibility criteria for the CGP favour asset and labour-poor households. • Recipient households receive the direct benefit of the transfer plus a small spillover effect of LSL 0.15 per LSL 1.0 loti transferred. Their total income increases by LSL 3.79 million (LSL 3.42 million in real terms). The ineligible households benefit from spillovers amounting to an increase in income of LSL 3.59 million (LSL 1.08 million in real terms) with each transfer. • The productive impacts vary by sector. The cash transfers stimulate the production of crops and livestock by LSL 0.19 and LSL 0.28 per loti transferred. The largest positive effect is on retail,

48. Impact on productive assets and local economy: (2) • Ghana LEAP: • Increase in non consumption expenditure: increasing savings, reducing indebtedness, asset disinvestment and re-engaging with social networks increasing savings, drawing down indebtedness, increasing gifts, and investment in some productive activities • LEAP has a positive impact on some aspects of productive activity, particularly among smaller households, supplied both more own male farm labour, as well as hired in more male farm labour—an impact evident in the qualitative work as well. • The qualitative work also found that the transfer in some cases provided working capital for income earning activities, ranging from petty trading to increase on-farm productivity. • The use of negative livelihood coping strategies, such as working as kaaya-yei porters in the south, was also reported to have been reduced.

49. Impact on productive assets and local economy: (3) • Zambia • significant impact on the accumulation of livestock and agricultural implements. Large effects were found on both the share of households (21 percentage points) owning animals and on the number of animals owned, especially for larger sized households • positive impact on agricultural activity. Receipt of the CGP led to an 18 percent increase in the area of worked land as well as an increase in the use of agricultural inputs, including seeds, fertilizers and hired labour. • led to increased production – approximately a 37 percent increase in the value of overall production. The increase in production appeared to be primarily sold rather than consumed on farm; the CGP led to a 12 percentage point increase (from a 23 percent base) in the share of households selling their harvest. • Finally, in term of labour supply, receipt of the CGP transfer led family members to reduce participation in, and intensity of, agricultural wage labour. The impact was particularly strong for women – a 17 percentage point reduction in participation and 12 fewer days a year. Both males and females increased time spent in family agricultural and nonagricultural businesses

50. Shift from casual wage labor to on farm and family productive activities No clear picture on child labor (but positive impacts on schooling) 1) Particularly older boys Shift from casual wage labour to family business—consistently reported in qualitative fieldwork