The Philosophy of Karl Popper (1902-1994) FFDI Zagreb, 31 March – 4 April 2014

1. Preview: some key points of Popper’s philosophy 2. Karl Popper: life and works 3. Influences & intellectual backgrounds 4. The methodology of the empirical sciences 5. Popper’s social philosophy 6. “Critical Rationalism” and its ethics [7. Popper on evolution, world-3 and mind] [8. Popper’s influence] Critical Evaluation (ch.7-8 were skipped and are hence not relevant for the exam) The Philosophy of Karl Popper (1902-1994)FFDI Zagreb, 31 March – 4 April 2014 Prof.Dr.Dr. Winfried Löffler University of Innsbruck Department of Christian Philosophy Karl-Rahner-Platz 1 A-6020 Innsbruck, Austria winfried.loeffler@uibk.ac.at www.uibk.ac.at/philtheol/loeffler

1. Preview: some key points of Popper’s philosophy • The central role of criticism: Conjectures & Refutations • Falsificationism: scientific claims are open to test &refutation (unlike ideologies, vague prophecies etc.) • “I know that I know nothing” (Socrates): science is not a growing body of knowledge, but a hypothetical, unstable building on unstable foundations • “We are erring upward”: science develops closer-to-the truth, by elimination of false theories. Popper is a realist concerning theories • The “open society”: political proposals and holders of political power should be kept open to criticism • Preference for democracy and anti-collectivism

1. Preview: some key points of Popper’s philosophy • Most main works available in Croatian! • What to read by & about Popper in FFDI library: • Bookshelf with some books by K.P. (right side, soon after the entrance door!) • Selection of other books on the first table after the door • About 30 articles in Journals, see FFDI electronic catalogue (type in “Popper” as keyword!) • Entries on Popper in Handbooks, Companions, Guides etc. on Philosophy of Science, Political Philosophy, History of Philosophy etc.

2. Karl Popper: Life and Works • 1902 born in Vienna • 1918 quits grammar school • engages in social work and communist movement • interest in Freud, Adler, Marx • 1919 „key year“: - turns away from Marxism (riots) - turns away from psychoanalysis (discontent with Adler/Freud) - fascination of Einstein (light-bending experiment 1919) • 1922-24 carpenter-apprentice; education as elementary school-teacher • 1925-29 studies mathematics, physics, psychology, philosophy, education as secondary school-teacher • 1928 Doctor of Philosophy, Vienna University • 1929- critically distanced guest of the „Vienna Circle“ (Schlick, Carnap, Neurath and others) • 1934Logik der Forschung / Logika naučnog otkrića

2. Karl Popper: Life and Works • 1935/36 meets Tarski, Gombrich, Moore, Russell, Schrödinger,Bohr • 1937 Christchurch / New Zealand • 1944 The Poverty of Historicism / Bijeda historicizma • 1945 The Open Society and its Enemies /Otvoreno društvo i njegovi neprijatelji • 1946 London School of Economics, conflict with Wittgenstein • 1949 Professor of Logic and Scientific Method at the LSE • 1961 Popper’s paper at the meeting of German Sociologists Association starts the „positivism debate“ (Positivismusstreit); Critical Rationalism (Popper) versus Critical Theory (Adorno, Horkheimer, Habermas) • 1965 Nobilitation, „Sir“ • 1971 Emeritus • 1976 member of the „Royal Society“ • 1994 died in London

2. Karl Popper: Life and Works • Other important books: • 1963 Conjectures and Refutations • 1972 Objective Knowledge • 1974 Schilpp (Ed.), The Philosophy of Karl Popper (LLP) • 1977 The Self and its Brain (with J. Eccles) • 1982 The Open Universe. An Argument for Indeterminism • 1990 A World of Propensities • 1994 Knowledge and the Body-Mind-Problem • Prominent pupils („critical rationalists“): • Joseph Agassi, [Imre Lakatos], Alan Musgrave, William Bartley III., etc. • Influence on: Hans Albert, Thomas S. Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend, etc.

3. Influences and Intellectual Backgrounds • WW I and the collapse of 19th century world; “the social question” • The Einsteinian Revolution in Physics • The foundational crisis in mathematics (late 19th/20th cent.): realism versus intuitionism • Neo-Kantianism (J. Fries, L. Nelson etc.): any scientific activity, any reference to “experience” makes certain presuppositions, but they are not provable. Vicinity to Hans Vaihinger’s fictionalism: “The Philosophy of As-If” • Gestalt theory and Karl Bühler’s philosophy of language; every observation is a “seeing-as-x”, no “theory-free” experience • The “Vienna Circle”: Verificationism, Anti-metaphysical stance

4. The Methodology of the Empirical Sciences • 4.1 Two problems and one solution: Falsificationism! • The demarcation problem: “science”  “pseudoscience”, “metaphysics” • The inductionproblem: According to a common methodology, science proceeds “inductively”, via (1) collecting evidence and (2) generalizing it to a theory. But, according to Hume, induction is unreliable (our belief in uniformity of nature is psychological only; and we do not know whether our experience so far represents the whole world correctly)

4. The Methodology of the Empirical Sciences • 4.1 Two problems and one solution: Falsificationism! • Solution of the “Vienna Circle”: Verificationism! • verification principle (a criterion for cognitively meaningful sentences): „a sentence is meaningful if and only if there is an empirical method for its verification“ • Verification: testing and stating that it is true. • Meaningful are: (a) logical sentences, (b) simple empirical sentences, (c) constructions out of (a) and (b); e.g. theories • All beyond that: meaningless! (Hence: anti-metaphysical stance!) • Demarcation between science and non-science: verifiability! • Induction: general theories can at least “partially be verified” by an “induction principle”, they get a certain probability; later on: Carnap’s book “Inductive logic and probability” (1950)

4. The Methodology of the Empirical Sciences • 4.1 Two problems and one solution: Falsificationism! • Popper’s solution: Falsificationism! • Falsification: testing and stating that it is false • Asymmetries between verification and falsification: all-sentences hard to verify, easy to falsify; there-is-sentences easy to verify, hard to falsify • Disastrous consequence for Vienna C.: even simplest laws of nature are meaningless („all copper conducts electricity“, … !) • Falsifiability: empirical data can be described which would refute the theory. Example: “water freezes at 0°C” is falsifiable! • background: Marx and Freud/Adler, theories compatible with any data, „explanations“ for anything and everything, no interesting predictions, not falsifiable! • Notice: not a criterion of meaning, but of demarcation! • Demarcation problem:scientific sentences = falsifiable sent.s! • Induction problem: disappears… - see following page

4. The Methodology of the Empirical Sciences • 4.1 Two problems and one solution: Falsificationism! Popper’s account of the progress of science: trial and error! • hypotheses = creative ideas, not conclusions from experience • risky hypotheses = those with high content, likely to get refuted • science = testing hypotheses, exposition to criticism, attempt to eliminate falsifiedhypotheses • established theories: „well-corroborated“, but not dogmas • Well-corroborated hypotheses are not more probable, they just “survive” longer! • in the long run: verisimilitude increases; Popper is a „realist“ • Induction problem: disappears, since hypotheses are not derived from exper., and corroborated hypotheses do not get more probable.

4. The Methodology of the Empirical Sciences • 4.2 Once again: Popper versus “naïve inductivism”: • (Naïve) inductivism: • hypotheses are „deduced“ from observations by induction • hypotheses can be confirmed/justified by „matching“ observations, • their probability increases with matching observations • Popper: Naïve inductivism is logically and psychologically wrong! • Logically: • general theories are never totally verifiable • hence, they are not confirmable ( partially verifiable)! • The argument „but up to now, induction has worked well, hence induction cannot be an illegitimate process“ is itself inductive, hence question-begging / petitio principii • theories can only be corroborated in experience (survive many severe empirical tests), but: they do not get „more probable“ by this corroboration! • Psychologically: Theory/idea first, then experiment / observation

4. The Methodology of the Empirical Sciences • 4.3 A closer look at “falsification” • When is a hypothesis falsified? • A popular, but wrong cliché: “According to Popper, a hypothesis is falsified when one of its predictions fails, when there are non-matching observations…” • Unrealistic; do we really abandon a well-established hypothesis just because of a few irritating data? • Logically, modus tollens: • IF (H is true & our OBServations etc. are correct), THEN E occursBUT E does not occur • HENCE something in the “package” (H & OBS & …) is false! • Popper: “Falsification” only if a) there is falsifying observation + b) there is a testable (or at least criticizable) and better hypothesis to explain this observation! non-E alone is not enough!

4. The Methodology of the Empirical Sciences • 4.4 What are the falsifiers? • First question: Experiences / observations or sentences? • Popper: theories/ hypotheses are (sets of) sentences, and only sentences can refute sentences! • Hence, the falsifiers are sentences, so-called basic statements. • There is no “pure experience” / “theory-free experience” / “simply given” • Hence, what is acknowledged as a “basic statement” is also a matter of hypothesis / agreement / convention! And open for critical discussion: did we really measure what we wanted to? etc. • Science is an unstable construction on swampy fundaments.

4. The Methodology of the Empirical Sciences • 4.5 What is the empirical content of a hypothesis? • Remember Eddington’s solar eclipse experiment: a risky forecast that could have failed in many ways (e.g. no bending-effect observed, much too big/small effect observed). • Einstein’s theory was an interesting, non-trivial hypothesis. It had high empirical content. • “Empirical content” of a hypothesis: = its “forbidden basic statements”, its “potential falsifiers” (paradoxically!) • The more empirical outcomes a hypothesis forbids, the more empirical content it has! (Then, a “highly falsifiable hypothesis”!) • [+ some other definitions by Popper, omitted here] • “Degree of corroboration” of a hypothesis: equals empirical content. I.e., if a highly falsifiable hypothesis de facto survives testing, then it has a high degree of corroboration.

4. The Methodology of the Empirical Sciences • 4.6 The ultimate goal of science • … is truth! = Realism. However, not decidable / measurable “how close to truth we have come yet”. • “Verisimilitude”: closeness to the truth. Falsified theories may still have high verisimilitude, e.g. Newton’s physics. • Popper, later: “Degrees of verisimilitude” (a very technical issue, related with degree of corroboration; omitted here)

4. The Methodology of the Empirical Sciences • 4.7 Popper on probability theory • Interestingly: Popper rejects inductivism and its idea that hypotheses may rise/fall in probability, due to new evidence. • But: huge chapter in Logika naučnog otkrića, 1934. (Pioneering synthetic work, Kolmogorov’s axiomatization was 1933!) • Popper: Degrees of corroboration do not follow the mathematical probability calculus (intuitively unsatisfying)

4. The Methodology of the Empirical Sciences • 4.7 Popper on probability theory • Later Popper: the “propensity interpretation” of probability • Since 19th century: objectivism versus subjectivism in probability theory: when we talk about probabilities, do we talk about objective tendencies in nature (objectivism), or degrees of belief in the observer (subjectivism / personalism)? Open till today. • Problem of objectivism: if – as it is mostly said – probabilities are frequencies in large series of repeatable events (e.g., coins or dice), would singular events not have probabilities? • Problem of subjectivism / personalism: too subjective / irrational? • Propensity theory: an objectivist theory that can also handle singular events (examples). Objects have propensities / inclinations. • A rather metaphysical account (what are probabilities, ultimately?); no epistemological guide how to find them. ( frequencies, beliefs!) • Important for indeterminism: Objective propensities, open future

4. The Methodology of the Empirical Sciences • 4.8 Science and metaphysics • Against ordinary language philosophy: there are genuine philosophical problems! • Remember: The falsification criterion is a demarcation criterion science/non-science, but not a meaning criterion. • Hence, there might be non-scientific, but meaningful statements! • Three Arguments for the admissibility of metaphysics:(1) metaphysics is heuristically useful, e.g. Greek atomism(2) met. clarifies hidden presuppositions behind any observation (3) realism, regularity of nature as metaphysical assumptions • Hence, science de facto in intertwinement with metaphysical claims (later: Lakatos’ “research programs”, “Kuhn’s paradigms”!)

5. Popper’s Social Philosophy • Not simply an application of theoretical philosophy, Logika naučnog otkrića did not yet provide a complete philosophy of science. • “Critical Rationalism” only after the 1944/45 books on social philosophy • Two motivations: • Philosophy of science: Historicism, totalitarianism is scientifically defective (especially in The Poverty of Historicism) • Popper’s divergent moral-political preferences: Individualism, autonomy, egalitarianism, avoiding of suffering (especially in The Open Society) • Overall impression: not fully coherent, tensions to theor. philosophy

5. Popper’s Social Philosophy • 5.1 The Poverty of Historicism: Popper on Laws of History and Society • “Historicism”: general laws and essences determine history • Two versions: (1) anti-naturalistic: social science is unlike natural science, not formalizable, no mathematical approach, hidden “essences”: Plato!(2) naturalistic: laws studied in science, predictions: Comte, Marx! • Popper on “social laws and predictions”: somewhat ambiguous;- technical predictions, social planning: possible and necessary- prophetic predictions, inevitable fatum: highly problematic- small-scale social “laws”: e.g. “no full employment without inflation”- but no comprehensive laws describing whole society (Marx!)- however, there are large-scale trends; may turn around.

5. Popper’s Social Philosophy • 5.1 The Poverty of Historicism: Popper on Laws of History and Society • Problematic about “Historicism”: Holism and defective evidence-base • Holism: (1) Individuals are not separable, (2) the collective’s interests are prioritized, (3) social structures have their own dynamics • Interestingly, Popper shares (1) and (3) in theoretical philosophy! (“there is no subject in epistemology”; science is being done within traditions and institutions) • Hence: Popper primarily opposes (2), collectivism. • Holistic versus piecemeal social engineering %

5. Popper’s Social Philosophy • 5.1 The Poverty of Historicism: Popper on Laws of History and Society • Holistic versus Piecemeal Social Engineering • Examples of s.e.: new social security system (Obamacare), new form of taxation, reform of penal law and criminal persecution, etc. • Holists make plans without experience and evidence-base. But there are people who are affected by them! • Plea for responsibility and evidence-based social experiments • No irreversible experiments • Social engineers may well have vague target-ideas, but not holistic overall-conception • Negative utilitarianism: reducing suffering, not making people happy

5. Popper’s Social Philosophy • 5.2 The Open Society • Initially no publishers for the book (harsh on Plato and Aristotle); its value as exegesis of Plato contestable • 5.2.1 Why is Plato a “historicist”??? No history; eternal ideas & essences?? • But Plato interpreted social change (depravation from “golden age”, should be stopped; Marx: conversely!) • And Plato wanted to be politically influential, tried it in Syracuse • Eternal ideas & essences prevent us from empirical correction & learning

5. Popper’s Social Philosophy • 5.2 The Open Society • Central criticism: Plato’s totalitarian – authoritarian thought! • Irreversible class-distinctions • Interest of leading class = interest of the state • Only leading class has a right to education, virtues, military instruction, arms, earning money • Censorship and propaganda • Economic independence & autarky, isolationism • “Justice” according to Plato: not equality, but “suum cuique”, fulfilling natural duties & role • The “wise leaders” / philosopher kings may apply all means for the sak of the state, including lies (“persuasion”!) and betrayal, neglect of individual human interests in favor of the system and its ideas • In sum: not his history of philosophy, but his anti-individualism, anti-egalitarianism and group-bias which blames Plato a “historicist”.

5. Popper’s Social Philosophy • 5.2 The Open Society • 5.2.2 Hegel and Marx, “the false prophets” • Critique of dialectics: true contradictions destroy logic and science, falsification • Fallible claims are better than Hegels “absolute knowledge” (by the way, many of Hegel’s “absolute” claims turned out empirically wrong!) • A differentiated view on Marx’ economism: • Valuable for the development of social science! (Econ. factors!) • But cultural products are not only “Überbau”, overlay, superstructure. • Politics has more room to act & engineering than Marx believes

5. Popper’s Social Philosophy • 5.2 The Open Society • 5.2.2 Hegel and Marx, “the false prophets” • Popper’s (normative) alternative proposal (OS, ch. 17): • Protection of the weakest • We need structures against limitless capitalism (the paradox of freedom: limitless freedom defeats itself!) • Economic interventionism instead of limitless capitalism. (Social market econ.) • I.e., Popper by that widely shares Marx’ moral standpoints • (that may explain “everybody’s Popper”, i.e. everybody finds “his” quotations. Interestingly, Popper is today often presented primarily as a prophet of libertarian capitalism. Influence of F.A.v. Hayek?)

5. Popper’s Social Philosophy • 5.2 The Open Society • 5.2.3 On Revolution, Reform and Democracy • Marx’ prophecies false and unsafe • No guarantee that after a revolution there will be no privileged groups any more • But if the targets are unsafe, then revolution as a means is illegitimate, since it causes victims • Revolution/violence perhaps only for the sake of installing democracy! • Democracy: rule of the majority,  “the majority is always right” = control of power-holders, esp. elections = removability of bad power-holders • History as such has no meaning – we should be designers/engineers of it, not prophets.

5. Popper’s Social Philosophy • 5.2 The Open Society • 5.2.4 The basic problem of political philosophy (OS 7) • … is not: “what is the best form of state?” / “who should rule?” (since Plato’s Politeia, Aristotle’s Politika, 2300 years of tradition) (Reason for this: even if we have the optimal form of state, we have no guarantee for good & competent persons!) • But it is: “how could bad holders of political power be removed from their position before causing big damage?” • Of course: preference for democracy & open society, the best known system for that task.

5. Popper’s Social Philosophy • 5.2 The Open Society • 5.2.5 Against “Sociology of Knowledge” (OS 23) • Sociology of knowledge (SOK): “knowledge” is just a product of social, historical, psychological, biographical and other contextual factors. • Popper: A “doubly reinforced / doubly entrenched dogmatism”:(1) SOK Makes unfalsifiable claims(2) The opponent’s criticism is declared a case of the SOK theory (“you just oppose because you…”) • importance of the subjects, their minds, their freedom to choose between ideas! Importance of ideas (world-3!) which are available. • However: at some points, Popper comes close to SOK: the way towards “objectivity” only by collaboration of many scientists, public criticism and its institutions; crazy ideas will be singled out, correction of too-subjective standpoints.

6. Critical Rationalism and its Ethics • 6.1 “Critical Rationalism” • a sort of general, comprehensive theory of sciences (comprising natural & social science, humanities etc.) and of political agency • methodological standpoint: conjectures & refutations • „scientific“ theories: open to criticism! (otherwise: dogmas, „immunized“ theories) • a stable mid-position between irrationalism and uncritical / general rationalism %

6. Critical Rationalism and its Ethics • 6.1 “Critical Rationalism” • uncritical rationalism: any idea/assumption/theory/proposal is acceptable on if defendable/provable by experience or conclusive argument • Popper’s assessment: (1) U.R. refutes itself, not defendable/provable by experience/conclusive argument; (2) Any scientific/political activities make some presuppositions – no problem, they must just be criticisable! • irrationalism: not reason, but emotions and passions are the ultimate powers of human activity; appeals to reason are unrealistic. • Examples: existentialist politics; group-driven policies (nationalism, racism…) • Popper: (1) logically stable, but ends up in violence; (2) tendency to inequality (nobody can love all people!); (3) even „humanitarian“ irrationalism tends to paternalism and violence (Open Society ch. 24: “The attempt to make heaven on earth invariably produces hell.”)

6. Critical Rationalism and its Ethics • 6.1 The ethics behind “Critical Rationalism” • In sum: irrationalism is unrefutable, but morally defect. • Crit.Rat. not ultimately justifiable, „irrational belief in reason“ • Hence a question of decision; all in all, with more human consequences (Popper sees a strong tie between critically-rational procedure and humanitarian moral standpoint!) • The moral convictions/options behind CR: - universal equality and egality in rights - fight against anybody’s suffering is a moral duty - but fight for well-being of others is reserved for friends - tolerance against anybody who is himself not intolerant • Epistemological aspect: - impartiality, anyone’s criticism might be useful - phantasy as important tool of criticism, dogmatism suppresses phantasy

7. Popper on Evolution, world-3 and mind • 7.1 Popper on evolution and evolutionary epistemology • Superficial similarity: evolution/variation/struggle for existence/natural selection  Popper’s idea of scientific progress/creative new ideas/competing hypotheses/test & falsification • However: early Popper: Evolutionary biology is untestable, close to a circular claim: “survival of the fittest / best-adapted”: but who are the best-adapted? Those who survive. I.e., “those who survive, survive”. • Popper later: Evolutionary biology as a promising metaphysical research program. Popper is interested in singling out the testable components of evolutionary biology. • Attention: to the present day, Popper is taken as a “witness” by anti-evolutionists (“Evolutionary biology is not science!”); however, these claims are highly exaggerated. • Evolutionary epistemology: Popper generalizes his “theory-ladenness of any observation” claim. Any observation/thinking/… is a highly complex decoding of signals from our environment, “anticipating theories are built into our sense-organs etc.” • Critical evaluation: (1) These (rather constructivist) claims are in tension to Popper’s realism! (2) Problematic comparison: theories, product-ideas etc.  mutation of genetic information. Mutation is unguided, theorizing is deliberate!

7. Popper on Evolution, world-3 and mind • 7.2 World-3 and mind • World-1: Physical phenomena, world-2: Psychical/mental phenomena (wishes, beliefs, thoughts, …), world-3: contents of wishes, beliefs, thoughts. • Examples: theories, hypotheses, arguments, conjectures, refutations, problems, book-contents, stories, interpretations, myths, ideologies, mathematical objects, objects of art, tools, etc. – (similarities to Dawkins’ “memes”!) • World-3 objects are created by humans (not eternal!), even the natural numbers. (Popper is no “Platonist” in that point). But: they have objective logical properties, connections between them. Example: there are more natural numbers than were originally thought of, there might be logical consequences or contradictions between theories that nobody intended or thought of, etc. The system of contents might have surprising properties. • World-3 objects (e.g. the idea of a washing machine) causally influence world-2 objects (e.g. my wish to possess one), and the latter influence world-1 objects (e.g. allocation of energy and raw materials to build one). • w-2 emerges evolutionarily from w-1, and w-3 from w-2. • Problems: how is “causality” to be explicated here? Inflation of w-3 “objects”, if we don’t constrain them to theories? Do mathematical objects “begin to exist?”

7. Popper on Evolution, world-3 and mind • 7.2 World-3 and mind • Popper & Eccles: The Self and Its Brain • Dualist position, w2 in interaction with w1, w2 not just an epiphenomenon. • Mind & language-acquisition develops in interaction with w1, w2, w3-objects; self-consciousness presupposes language (and as such w3). • Minds as partially independent of physical hardware, important role of freedom. • Problem of downward causation from w2 to w1 without violation of fundamental laws of thermodynamics. Popper and Eccles propose rather speculative answers…

8. Popper’s influence • Popper 1934 as key book. Forced the Vienna Circle to retract and modify important ideas (e.g. Carnap 1936, Testability and Meaning: liberalization of verification principle to confirmation principle!) • Thomas Kuhn: Popper and Vienna Circle agree in misconception of science as totally rational enterprise, neglect of factual history of science (“historiographic revolution in the philosophy of science”). Exaggeration of falsification and role of anomalies (unfitting results). Kuhn turns to a more sociological view of science (“normal science” and its “paradigms”, anomalies get more and more pressing, “scientific revolution”/ “paradigm shift”. • Imre Lakatos: Sophisticated falsificationism, “Scientific research programs”: in their core “hard” convictions similar to Kuhn’s paradigms, on the periphery belt of protective hypotheses similar to Popper’s falsifiable claims. Progress by new hypotheses which explain the anomalies and have some new, additional testable consequences. • Political philosophy: Open Society as source of ideas and quotations for conservative as well as mid-left political parties, part of popular political philosophy. OS-institutes in many former communist countries, vague connection to Popper’s ideas.

9. Critical Evaluation • 9.1 On the Philosophy of Science • Attention: some critiques of Popper are overly simple and unfair. “A theory is not falsified just because of some unfitting evidence!” – right! And this was also Popper’s opinion, see ch. 4.3 above) • This problem of holism of testing (“what exactly in our building is false?”) was well-known to Popper. He just has no good purely logical solution. (Logically, you can always blame some background assumption to be false, and defend your hypothesis). • Popper’s answer: “...but a good, critical scientist would not do that!”. OK, but then Popper has moved from describing scientific/falsifiable theories to good scientific behavior. (Godfrey-Smith, Theory & Reality)

9. Critical Evaluation • 9.2 On the Philosophy of Science • The blind spot: no probability and confirmation (I): Probabilistic theories with unlikely outcomes are not easily falsifiable. Are they hence unscientific?? “How improbable is too improbable?” • The blind spot: no probability and confirmation (II): The bridge-building example: when building bridges, why do we prefer an old, well-corroborated to a newly invented, highly falsifiable, but untested and unfalsified theory? Is not the old one “more probable”, how can this intuition be covered? • Analogies between science, market-ideas and evolution are problematic metaphors only: in science and marketing, people search for something and consciously adapt ideas; mutation is an unguided process.Ideas can arbitrarily be combined, genes cannot, etc.

9. Critical Evaluation • 9.2 On Political Philosophy • Interesting questions of coherence: is there an internal link between falsificationism and Popper’s moral-political stance, or are these 2 independent motives? • Advocate of undue conservatism? Some problems seem to huge and urgent for piecemeal treatment. • (A problem for which Popper perhaps should not be blamed; factual change of realities): Popper’s machinery of political deliberation is focused on states and smaller local communities. But some problems have become global. Almost no institutions yet to handle them (UN, Kyoto protocols, …). • (A problem for which Popper perhaps should not be blamed; hits almost any political philosophy): the implementation problem. What if people don’t want to participate? • Negative criticism on others, no very concrete positive proposals.

Repetition questions

Important: Go tothelibraryand browse someofPopper´stexts (in Croatian). • Withoutgoingintoexactyeardetails: In whichepochs in Popper´slifedid he develophismaintheses? • Whatare neo-Kantiantraits in Popper‘sphilosophy? • Getclearaboutthe Vienna Circle philosophy, e.g. byusingsomeexternal text-source in thelibrary. • Whatis an importantdifference in scope / rolebetweenthe Vienna Circle‘sverificationprincipleandPopper‘sfalsificationprinciple? • Whichlethalproblemdid Popper discover in the Vienna Circle‘sverificationism? • Whatisthedifferencebetweenfalsificationandfalsifiability? • Are there (falsifiableandfalse) hypotheses? • Accordingto Popper, whenmayscientistsregard a hypothesisasfalsified? Contrastthisto a widespreadmisunderstandingof Popper. • Summarizethetwoproblemsthat Popper regardedascentralforthephilosophyofscience. Howdoes he thinkhisfalsificationismsolutionworks? • Whatiswrongwiththe oft-heardclaim: „scientistsderivehypothesesfromthedata…“? • Howdoessciencedevelopaccordingto Popper? • Whatisthedifferencebetweenconfirmationandcorroboration? • Whatisverisimiltude? • Can a hypothesisbefalsifiable, falsifiedandverisimilar at the same time? If so, canyouthinkof an example? If not, why not? • How do newhypothesesemerge?

Whyshouldscientistsbewillingtoriskyclaims? • Sketch Popper‘stargetcalled „naive inductivism“; whyisitwrong? • Whichpointsof naive inductivism do soundmost plausible foryou, andwhy? • Whatis a basicstatementaccordingto Popper andhow do we find them? • Whyisit not simplyobservationthatfalsifieshypotheses? • Explainthenotionof a „highlyfalsifiablehypothesis“! Whatotherimportantnotionsarerelatedwithit? • Whyare „degreesofcorroboration“ not tobeconfusedwithprobabilities? • What do scientificrealists (such as Popper) claim? Whatwouldbetheoppositeopinion? • Sketch thedifferencebetweenobjectivistsandsubjectivists in probabilitytheory. • Sketch keypointsandlimitsofPopper‘saccountofprobability. • The Vienna Circle was muchmore intolerant towardsmetaphysicsthan Popper. Why? Andwhy was he tolerant in thispoint? • Whatis a „historicist“, what a „sociologistofknowledge“ in Popper‘sterminology? • Whydoes Popper rejecthistoricism? • Whatis „piecemealsocialengineering“ andwhatisproblematicaboutit? • Explain „positive“ and „negative utilitarianism“. • Who isentitledtotrytomakepeople happy? Why?

Explain „positive“ and „negative utilitarianism“. • SummarizethemainpointsofPopper‘scritiqueof Plato. • WhataretheultimatedrivingforcesbehindPopper‘spoliticalphilosophy – isitrather an applicationofhistheoreticalthoughtorsomeindependent moral-politicalstandpoints? • WhatisPopper‘sstancetowardseconomicinterventionsbythestate? Search quotationsof OS 17 in thelibraryor also on the www. • WhatisPopper‘sverdictabout Marx? • Whatis Poppers opinionaboutviolentinterventions in politicalsystem, evenforhumanitarianreasons? Also browse theinternet on thatandseewhether Popper iscorrectlyquoted. • Whyisthebasicproblemofpoliticalphilosophy not thequestionforthe optimal form ofstate? • All in all, in theoreticalandpracticalphilosophy: whoisthebearerofknowledgeanddecisionaccordingto Popper, ratherthe individual orthegroup/society/scientificcommunity. • Whatwould „uncriticalrationalism“ beandwhyisitmisguided? • Whyispoliticalirrationalism so dangerous? Giveexamples. • Sketch theethicsbehindcriticalrationalism. Isitprovable/deducablefromsomewhere? • Istheobjection „but we do not testsinglehypotheses, but always a networkofhypotheses; hencePopper‘sfalsificationismismisguided“ correct in youropinion? • Sketch someobjectionsagainstPopper‘spoliticalthought. What do youthink? • Whatisyour personal summaryofPopper‘sthought („Popper in a nutshell)?

The Philosophy of Karl Popper (1902-1994) FFDI Zagreb, 31 March – 4 April 2014