Industrial Control

1. Industrial Control Cross 11, Tapovan Enclave Nalapani Road, Dehradun 248001 Email: info@iskd.inContact : +918979066357, +919027669947

2. Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system security Real time industrial process control systems to monitor and control remote or local industrial equipment Vital components of most nation’s critical infrastructures Risk of deliberate attacks!

3. SCADA Systems 1990: mainframe computer supervision 1970: general purpose operating systems 1990: off the shelf computing Highly distributed with central control Field devices control local operations

4. SCADA Components Corporate network segment Typical IT network SCADA network segment Servers and workstations to interact with field devices Human-machine interfaces Operators Software validation Field devices segment Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC) Remote Terminal Units (RTU) Intelligent Electronic Devices (IED)

5. SCADA and PLC Overview

6. Process Control System (PCS)

7. Safety Systems

8. SCADA Incidents • Flaws and mistakes • 1986: Chernobyl Soviet Union • 56 direct death, 4000 related cancer death • 1999: Whatcom Creeks Washington US pipeline rupture • Spilling 237,000 gallons of gasoline that ignited, 3 human life and all aquatic life • 2003: North East Blackout of US and Canada • Affected 55 million people, 11 death • 2011: Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster Japan • Loss of human lives, cancer, psychological distress

9. Attackers • Script kiddies • Hackers • Organized crime • Disgruntled insiders • Competitors • Terrorists • Hactivists • Eco-terrorists • Nation states

10. Programmable Logic Controllers • Computer based solid state devices • Control industrial equipment and processes • Regulate process flow • Automobile assembly line • Have physical effect

11. Related Work • Security working groups for the various infrastructure sectors of water, electricity and natural gas • US Departments of Energy and Homeland Security: investigation into the problem domain of SCADA systems

12. Traditionally vendors focused on functionality and used physical security measures • An attempt was made to try to “match” physical security mechanisms online • Vulnerabilities: • Classification by affected technology • Classification by error or mistakes • Classification by enabled attack scenario

13. SCADA and PLC Security • Increased risk to SCADA systems, introduces another element of risk to the PLC and all of the control elements • PLC’s dictate the functionality of the process • PLC programming software and SCADA control software can be housed on the same machine • The newest PLC hardware devices allow for direct access to the PLC through the network

14. SCADA and PLC Security

15. SCADA and PLC Security • Prior to the Stuxnet attack (2010): it was believed any cyber attack (targeted or not) would be detected by IT security technologies • Need: standard be implemented that would allow both novice and experience PLC programmers to verify and validate their code against a set of rules. • How do we show that PLC code and be verified and validated to assist in the mitigation of current and future security risks (errors)?

16. Application of Touch points External Review 3. Penetration Testing 1. Code Review (Tools) 6. Security Requirements 4. Risk-Based Security Tests 2. Risk Analysis Requirement and Use cases Architecture and Design Test Plans Code Tests and Test Results Tests and Test Results

17. PLC Security Framework (PLC-SF)

18. PLC Security Framework (PLC-SF)

19. PLC Security Framework (PLC-SF) • Components: • PLC Security Vulnerability Taxonomy • Design Patterns • Severity Chart • Engines: • Taxonomy Engine • Design Pattern Engine • Severity Engine

20. Vulnerabilities Analysis • Attack Severity Analysis • Building the Vulnerability Taxonomy • Potential Exploitation of Coding Errors • Modeling PLC Vulnerabilities

21. Attack Severity Analysis – Severity Chart • Each row of the Severity Chart represents a different level of security risk, within the PLC error found • The error levels range from A – D, with A being the most severe and D being the least severe • Each column represents the effects which can occur in the PLC and those that can occur in the SCADA system PC

22. Attack Severity Analysis – Severity Chart

23. Attack Severity Analysis – Severity Chart • Severity Classifications: • Severity Level A: Could potentially cause all, or part, of a critical process to become non-functional. • Severity Level B: Could potentially cause all, or part, of a critical process to perform erratically. • Severity Level C: Denote a “quick fixes” • Severity Level D: Provide false or misrepresented information to the SCADA terminal.

24. Building the Vulnerability Taxonomy • Purpose: • To aid the process of detecting these vulnerabilities in the PLC code • Intended to be extensible • Created such that it can be expanded as: • Future versions of PLC’s are created • New errors are found

25. Building the Vulnerability Taxonomy

26. Potential Exploitation of Coding Errors

27. Would allow for a placement point for a system bypass • Software-based exploits of SCADA • Understanding of industrial control systems • Specification-based Attacks againts Boolean Operations and Timers (SABOT)

28. SABOT Attack • Encode understanding of the plant’s behavior into a specification • SABOT downloads existing control logic from the victim • SABOT finds mapping between the specific devices and the variables within the control logic • SABOT generates malicious PLC payload