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This article discusses the issue of overcapacity in fishing and its impact on sustainable exploitation. It explores the various causes of overcapacity and the consequences it has on the economy and the environment. The article also presents different management strategies to address the problem, including limited entry, catch limits, and individual transferable quotas (ITQs). Overall, the article emphasizes the importance of monitoring and adjusting capacity to ensure sustainable fishing practices.
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The fishing capacity problem and its management David Agnew 47 Princes Gate, London d.agnew@imperial.ac.uk
Definitions and measurement • OVERCAPACITY is, for a given resource condition, the situation where the amount of fish that can be caught over a period of time by the fully utilised (unconstrained) fleet is greater than required to ensure a target level of sustainable exploitation. • Ct = q.E.Bt • Bt+1 = p(Bt) + Rt - Ct • using CPUE, E, B characterise q for fleets • Estimate maximum possible Cmax • Cmax should be <= YMAX
Causes of overcapacity • Non-maleable capital • Open access creates individual incentives • Government intervention (subsidies) – in and out • Overseas subsidies – export of capital in access agreements • Technology developments – effort creep • Management systems • That encourage capital stuffing/race to fish • With intrinsic boom/bust cycle mismatches • Unstable management reference points – MSY
Example – North sea cod Subsidised building
Arctic cod Unstable management systems • Management by output control (TAC) assumes full knowledge and compliance • Output management does not usually track capacity (or q) • YMAX should be limit not target reference point
Consequences • Economic waste • Resource overexploitation • Capital transfer – exporting the problem • IUU • Discarding, highgrading, blackfish • Overcapacity problems often negate all other management attempts, eg ecosystem based management
Management of capacity • IPOA • Efficient transparent and equitable management of capacity by 2003 (!) or 2005
Incentive blocking • Limited entry • Non-domestic capacity • Buy back • Gear and vessel restrictions, catch limits • TACs • Easy to implement, particularly suited to mixed developing country fisheries • Combinations of limited entry & TAC work but require monitoring • Encourage competition and race to fish – likely to end up here again!
Incentive adjusting • ITQs • ITEQ individually transferable effort quotas • Taxes & royalties • Territorial user rights to fish (TURF) • Saving (rather than recapitalising) supra-normal profits • Inspire responsibility/ stewardship • Remove incentives to overcapitalise • Complex to implement
Conclusions • Monitor and continually adjust capacity • Move away from YMAX brinkmanship • Change management approaches to deal with boom-bust • Subsidies …. Refs: Report of the technical working group on the management of capacity, 1998. FAO fish tech papers 386 & 409.