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Background

Background. History. TCSEC Issues. non-standard inflexible not scalable. The Global Information Grid (GIG) and the Common Criteria (CC). Global Information Grid Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 (reference (d)) and Title 10, U.S.C., Section 2223 (reference (a))

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Background

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  1. Background

  2. History

  3. TCSEC Issues • non-standard • inflexible • not scalable

  4. The Global Information Grid (GIG) and the Common Criteria (CC) • Global Information Grid • Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 (reference (d)) and • Title 10, U.S.C., Section 2223 (reference (a)) • All DoD and Intelligence Community Computers • Information Assurance G&PM: • 5.2.20. Consult the IA Technical Framework (IATF) and published • Common Criteria (CC) Protection Profiles for guidance regarding common • classes of network and system attacks, interoperability and compatibility with • the defense-in-depth strategy, and IA solutions that should be considered to • counter attacks. • 5.2.21. Acquire IA solutions that have been evaluated using the Common • Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme based on the National Information • Assurance Program (NIAP) process. • NIAP - Collaboration between NIST and NSA for security evaluation

  5. Common Criteria Sections I. Introduction and General Model II. Security Functional Requirements III. Security Assurance Requirements

  6. I. Introduction and General Model • Defines general concepts and principals of IT security evaluation. • Provides constructs for defining and selecting security objectives • Provides guidelines for writing high-level specifications

  7. II. Security Functional Requirements • Provides functional components

  8. III. Security Assurance Requirements • Provides assurance requirements • Evaluation Criteria of PP and ST • Provides evaluation levels with a predefined scale (EAL’s)

  9. Common Criteria I. Introduction and General Model

  10. I. Introduction and General Model Definitions- Target of Evaluation (TOE) — An IT product or system and its associated administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an evaluation. Protection Profile (PP) — An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs. Security Target (ST) — A set of security requirements and specifications to be used as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.

  11. I. Introduction and General Model Protection Profiles • Operating System • Firewall • Database • Smart Card • etc.

  12. I. Introduction and General Model Security Targets • NT 4.0 • Oracle 8 • Checkpoint-1 • Visa SmartCard • etc.

  13. Requirements Structure • Class • Family • leveling-specifies if components are hierarchic • Component • dependencies-other components that are relied upon

  14. Requirements Structure CLASS_FAMILY.Component Class FIA-Identification and authentication Family FIA_UID-User Identification Component FIA_UID.1-Timing of Identification

  15. Common Criteria II. Security Functional Requirements

  16. II. Security Functional Requirements Hierarchy of Security Functional Requirements

  17. II. Security Functional Requirements • Security Functional Component • Dependencies • -Components rely on other components for satisfaction • Operations • -Iteration • -Assignment: • FAU_ARP.1.1 The TSF shall take [assignment: list of the least disruptive actions] upon detection of a potential security violation. • -Selection: • FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events: • a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions; • b) All auditable events for the [selection: minimum, basic, detailed, not • specified] level of audit; • -Refinement

  18. II. Security Functional Requirements Security Functional Classes Class FAU FCO FCS FDP FIA FMT FPR FPT FRU FTA FTP Name Audit Communications Cryptographic Support User Data Protection Identification & Authentication Security Management Privacy Protection of TOE Security Functions Resource Utilization TOE Access Trusted Path / Channels

  19. Common Criteria III. Security Assurance Requirements

  20. III. Security Assurance Requirements Definitions- Package — A reusable set of either functional or assurance components (e.g. an EAL), combined together to satisfy a set of identified security objectives. Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) — A package consisting of assurance components from Part 3 that represents a point on the CC predefined assurance scale.

  21. III. Security Assurance Requirements Hierarchy of Security Assurance Requirements

  22. III. Security Assurance Requirements Security Assurance Classes Class ACM ADO ADV AGD ALC ATE AVA APE ASE AMA Name Configuration Management Delivery & Operation Development Guidance Documents Life Cycle Support Tests Vulnerability Assessment Protection Profile Evaluation Security Target Evaluation Maintenance of Assurance

  23. III. Security Assurance Requirements Evaluation Assurance Levels

  24. Current Certified Protection Profiles • C2 =Controlled Access Protection Profile (Version 1.d) • B1=Labeled Security Protection Profile (Version 1.b) • Traffic Filter Firewall Protection Profile for Low Risk Environments (Version 1.d)

  25. Controlled Access Protection Profile (CAPP) • Version 1.d • Written by NSA • Designed to replace C2

  26. C2 vs CAPP

  27. New Items in CAPP • 5.1 Security Audit-lists 19 auditable events • All modifications to the values of security attributes • Actions taken due to audit storage failure • 5.3.2 Strength of Authentication Data • Single guess has less than 1/1,000,000 chance • Multiple attempts in one minute have less than 1/100,000 chance • 5.4 Security Management-specifies requirements and roles. • 6.2 Delivery and Operation

  28. Labeled Security Protection Profile(LSPP) • Version 1.b • Developed by NSA • Designed to replace B1

  29. B1 vs LSPP

  30. New Items in LSPP • 5.1 Security Audit-lists 19 auditable events • All attempts to import user data, including any • security attributes • Actions taken due to audit storage failure • 5.3.2 Strength of Authentication Data • Single guess has less than 1/1,000,000 chance • Multiple attempts in one minute have less than 1/100,000 chance • 5.4 Security Management-specifies requirements and roles. • 6.2 Delivery and Operation

  31. ISO/IEC PDTR 15446 • Expands on PPs and STs • PPs and STs for composite TOEs • Functional and Assurance Packages • Generic and Worked Examples

  32. Websites of Interest Common Criteria NIST- csrc.ncsl.nist.gov/cc CC Toolbox- niap.nist.gov/tools/cctool.html Others GIG- cno-n6.hq.navy.mil/files.htm NIAP- niap.nist.gov

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