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'Bio- chem , arms control and the frontiers of science and technology’. David J. Galbreath Professor of International Security University of Bath. Scientific context.
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'Bio-chem, arms control and the frontiers of science and technology’ David J. Galbreath Professor of International Security University of Bath
Scientific context • “We are facing a time of rapid advances in science and technology. New chemical compounds and production methods are constantly being researched and discovered, affording the global community many benefits but also bringing with them certain risks…” Director General’s Opening statement, 16th Conference of the States Parties 29th November 2011 • “The Conventions objective…will only be successfully achieved and maintained if advances in science and technology are effectively monitored and evaluated….” Report of the advisory panel on future priorities of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 25th July 2011.
Outline • Context • Problem • Conceptual approach • Preliminary results • Our team and outputs
Scientific Context • Bio-chemistry as a conjoined science • Bio-research as a citizen science • Bio-engineering as a growing science • Bio-risk as increasing factor
Political content • Chemical Weapons Convention (1992) and the OPCW (1997) • Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (1975) and the problem with compliance • National governments and national resilience • Publics and hazard • Weaponisation and proliferation
Biochemical threat spectrum chart adapted from: Pearson, G. (2002) Relevant Scientific And Technological Developments For The First CWC Review Conference, University of Bradford.
Our research problem • Science and Technology innovation is fast • National political solutions are slower • International political solutions are slower still • Key question: How to develop systems of governance that allow for bio-chemical security for all?
Bio-Chem 2030: Questions • What is the relationship between science and technology (S&T) advances and how we think about security and control? • How are security governance mechanisms able to shift with the demands of S&T advances?
Bio-Chem 2030: Questions • What is the relationship between arms control, education and resilience? • How do power, interests and knowledge impact on the international communities ability to be good managers of bio-chem insecurities?
Research Goals • How to manage arms control beyond and beneath the state, • Understand how power, interests and knowledge together produce models of institutional governance, • How advances and controversies around bio-chem, synthetic biology and dual use inform models of institutional governance.
Our crossroads • International regimes • Power politics • Converging interests • Shared norms and knowledge • Governance • Multilateral • Regulatory • Policy networks
Arms Control approach • Why arms control? • Traditional model of arms control • Reactionary • Backwards facing • Deterrence • Compliance • Limitations in the arms control approach?
Education approach • Why the Education approach? • The traditional education approach • Mutual • Status quo orientated • Non-binding • Low-cost • Problems with the Education approach?
Anticipatory approach • A new form of anticipatory governance • Forward facing • Multi-level • Multi-directional • Wider stake-holder pool
Project Design (Stream 1) Bio-Chemistry Regime(s)
Bio chem regime, probs and solutions • Science and Technology innovation is fast • National political solutions are slower • International political solutions are slower still • Key question: How to develop systems of governance that allow for bio-chemical security for all?
Project Design (Stream 2) Local level Assessment and Networking Feasibility Study
Examples • The convergence of chemistry and biology – new risks, new opportunities for international cooperation [Ralf Trapp] • Chemical Incapacitants , S&T and the CWC [Michael Crowley] • An assessment of the emergence of the hacker/DIYbio community in Synthetic Biology and its implications for S&T threat perceptions and responses [Catherine Jefferson] • Analysis of different perceptions of synthetic biology, its security implications and potential for international cooperation [Brett Edwards] • Analysis of different perceptions of nanotechnology/targeted drug delivery, its security implications and potential for international cooperation [Kathryn Nixdorf]
Thank you • Prof David Galbreath (PI) • @EuroSecProf • Brett Edwards (RO) • @bwiedwards • www.biochemsec2030.org • @BioChemSec2030