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The Significance of RCM2 applied to the CH-47D, Chinook

The Significance of RCM2 applied to the CH-47D, Chinook. Presented by Nancy Regan, The Force, Inc. CH-47D, Chinook RCM Process Systems Analyzed RCM Results and Benefits Summary. Agenda. RCM. The Traditional View of Failure. 1955: Commercial Airline Industry.

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The Significance of RCM2 applied to the CH-47D, Chinook

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  1. The Significance of RCM2 applied to the CH-47D, Chinook Presented by Nancy Regan, The Force, Inc.

  2. CH-47D, Chinook RCM Process Systems Analyzed RCM Results and Benefits Summary Agenda

  3. RCM

  4. The Traditional View of Failure 1955: Commercial Airline Industry  Philosophy: As equipment gets older, it’s more likely to fail. 85% aircraft components scheduled for overhaul or replacement Early 1960s: Crash rate ~ 60 crashes/million takeoffs  67% of crashes due to component failure Action taken to decrease crash-rate:  Reduced overhaul/replacement intervals  Crash rate increased Wear-Out Zone CONDITIONAL PROBABILITY OF FAILURE Low Level of Random Failure AGE

  5. A 4% Bath Tub curve Simple or complex items that have direct contact with product. Ex. Tires, Brake Pads, Pumps Slowly increasing failure rate, then wear out zone 2% B Steady increase in probability of failure C 5% Low when new, then increases to steady failure rate D 7% Complex equipment. Ex. Electronics, Hydraulics, Pneumatics E 14% Random Infant mortality, then random F 68% Six Patterns of Failure Stanley Nowlan and Howard Heap: Engineers, United Airlines

  6. Reliability Centered Maintenance 2 A process used to determine what must be done to insure that any physical asset continues to do what its users want it to do in its present operating context.

  7. …During the return leg of a combat re-supply mission, my crew and I were in level flight (8500' PA, 32 degrees C) with an Apache (AH-64A), when we had a cockpit indication of a #2 engine chip. We executed the emergency procedure, shutdown the #2 engine, and turned for a direct route to Bagram A.B. Afghanistan. We notified the Apache of the situation and told them that we were going to start a "cruise climb" to clear the last two mountain ranges between us and the airfield. We made the decision that a precautionary landing would not be prudent due to the mine threat in the area. Now we are single-engine, with 7 passengers, in an extreme "Hot/High" environment and still managing a 550 FPM climb well within our 30 minute temperature limits. I am guessing that it was just a couple of minutes when the Apache called and asked how high we were planning to go since they were already approaching their engine temperature limits. I said that I was at 10,300' and was planning on going to 11,000' since there were 10,500' mountains between us and the airfield. The Apache pilot asked if we had started our second engine again to climb, and I replied in the negative. The Apache pilot said that he would just "stay down here" and keep an eye on us since he was "temping out" his engines. After leveling off at 11,000' and 105 KIAS the Apache asked if we could slow down 10 knots since we were pulling away from him. He again asked if we were still single-engine. We, the "fast-movers," were vectored away and we completed the flight to a roll-on landing at Bagram. We checked the chip detector after shut down and it turned out to be "normal fuzz" there ending an eventful flight where nothing was damaged except the Apache's self-esteem.

  8. RCM2 Process To Develop Justified Maintenance Requirements, the RCM Review Group Answers Seven Questions: 1. What are its functions and associated performance standards? 2. In what ways can it fail? 3. What causes it to fail? 4. What happens when it fails? 5. Does it matter if it fails? 6. What can be done to predict or prevent each failure? 7. What do we do if we cannot prevent the failure?

  9. 1. What are its functions and associated performance standards? • 2. In what ways can it fail? • 3. What causes it to fail? • 4. What happens when it fails? • 5. Does it matter if it fails? • 6. What can be done to predict or prevent each failure? • 7. What do we do if we cannot prevent the failure? FMEA Questions 3-4: (Failure Modes Effects Analysis) RCM2 Process

  10. Question 5:CONSEQUENCE ASSESSMENT  Hidden  Operational  Safety/Environmental  Non-Operational RCM2 Process • 1. What are its functions and associated performance standards? • 2. In what ways can it fail? • 3. What causes it to fail? • 4. What happens when it fails? • 5. Does it matter if it fails? • 6. What can be done to predict or prevent each failure? • 7. What do we do if we cannot prevent the failure?

  11. Question 6:PROACTIVE TASKS Preventive Maintenance  On-Condition TasksPredictive Maintenance Application of Condition Based Maintenance (CBM)  TBO Items  Retirement Life Items RCM2 Process • 1. What are its functions and associated performance standards? • 2. In what ways can it fail? • 3. What causes it to fail? • 4. What happens when it fails? • 5. Does it matter if it fails? • 6. What can be done to predict or prevent each failure? • 7. What do we do if we cannot prevent the failure?

  12. RCM2 Process 1. What are its functions and associated performance standards? 2. In what ways can it fail? 3. What causes it to fail? 4. What happens when it fails? 5. Does it matter if it fails? 6. What can be done to predict or prevent each failure? 7. What do we do if we cannot prevent the failure? Question 7:DEFAULT ACTIONS Failure Finding Task •  Check if the item is in a failed state. One-time change •  Physical equipment modification, change in Training, Supply, or Equipment Operating Procedure, Correction/update to Technical Publications. No Scheduled Maintenance

  13. Test Pilot Depot Artisan Flight Engineer Equipment Manufacturer Mechanic RCM2 Review Group Engineer Facilitator

  14. Failure Data and Maintenance  Effective to: • Determine high cost items, high maintenance man-hour consumers, etc. • Determine if a task is worth doing • Identify failure finding intervals  With respect to identifying Maintenance tasks and associated intervals, typically historical data is inadequate. • Reports only what failed. • Describes what was done to repair the failure rather than what caused it. • Doesn’t describe failures that are currently being prevented or plausible failures that haven’t occurred. • Describes failures which may be the effect of some other failure. • Inadequate information for determining On-Condition Tasks, Overhaul, and Replacement intervals.

  15. Engineer Test Pilot Depot Artisan Flight Engineer Equipment Manufacturer Mechanic Facilitator RCM2 Review Group In the absence of specific data on failure rates and characteristics, intervals are largely determined based on service experience.

  16. RCM2 complies fully with SAE Standard JA1011: “Evaluation Criteria for Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) Processes.” The Need for a Standard

  17. Systems Analyzed

  18. CH-47D Systems Completed • Flight Control System • Advanced Flight Control System • Flight Hydraulic System • Power Train • Engine Air Particle Separator • Fuel System • -714A Engine (including FADEC) • -714A IETM • 400 Flight Hour Cycle Service/Modular Daily

  19. Results and Benefits

  20. Power of RCM • Reengineered Maintenance Schedule • Maintenance task is generated for • an identifiable and explicit reason • Simulation Updates • Physical Redesigns • Procedural Redesigns • Training Redesigns • Operational Redesigns • Technical Publication Redesigns RCM applied to the Interactive Electronic Technical Manual

  21. CH-47D RCM2 Recommendations REDESIGNS SYSTEM Physical Publications Training Operational Procedural Simulator 14 16 3 1 53 0 -714A Engine 13 18 4 8 17 2 -714A FADEC 1 20 0 0 0 0 -714A IETM 5 16 2 0 36 0 Flight Control Flight Hydraulics 2 1 0 2 19 0 Advanced Flight Control System 6 0 0 1 10 0 8 1 0 1 27 0 Power Train 2 0 5 0 4 0 EAPS 1 0 0 2 0 0 Fuel System 52 77 9 15 166 2 Total (321) 12 15 7 5 13 2 Implemented 37 61 2 10 152 0 In-progress 3 1 0 0 1 0 Disapproved

  22. Results • Improved understanding of Full Authority Digital Electronic Control Unit (FADEC) • Developed an accurate and useable pilot fault code matrix • Improving troubleshooting guide • Capitalized on -714A technology to increase readiness and reduce mission aborts • Established correct emergency and operating procedures

  23. Inventory Management Activity Serviceability Criteria Stock Levels Backorders Fault Isolation Demand Rate Management Activity Publications FH Program Budget Scheduled Maintenance Inherent Reliability Inherent Reliability Training Depot Quality GTW Capability Diagnostic Error Environment Demand Rate Supply Availability Operation Induced Quality Defects Cost per Repair Cycle Time M&O/Acquisition Activity GTW Capability Activity Focus: Inventory Management • Current A/C Performance • Component • Subsystem • System Inventory Management • System Status • - A/C Tail # • Unit • Fleet

  24. AMAC 2410 Inherent Reliability Diagnostic Error CargoBaseline Operation Induced Quality Defects LIDB RecapAnalysis Demand Rate Management Activity Field Directed Insights RCM2TeamAnalysis Demand Rate ReductionOpportunities • Data Analysis • Data Mining • Metrics DTLOMS Depot Teardown Assessment

  25. Sumary Summary • “We’re making a big difference here.” • “It gives the users a voice.” • “This is worth a zillion dollars if we can get this information out.” • “It is a direct interface between us and the manufacturer.” • “I have never seen such enlightenments in my career.” • “I want to know why we aren’t as good as we think we are and I want to know how we can be as good as we need to be.”

  26. Nancy Regan nancyregan@theforceinc.com 617-921-5408

  27. P-F Interval • Inspection interval is governed by how quickly the failure occurs once it is detectable … not how often it occurs. • The P-F interval allows inspection intervals to be sensibly assigned. • Component remains in service until its failure resistance falls below a defined level. New Bearing Installed P: PC link bearing detectable play  (Potential Failure Condition)  F1: exceeds .010” play  Resistance to Failure F2: Bearing separates from race  Time 200 Flight Hours 400 Flight Hours © 2003 The Force, Inc.

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