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New Airport Safety Nets for Controllers- from Concept to Implementation. Roger Lane EUROCONTROL Airport R&D Unit Safety Forum Brussels June 2016. Prevention. 80% of Humans are caused by accidents !. Not all airports accidents are predictable !. Timeline for new Airport Safety Nets.
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New Airport Safety Nets for Controllers- from Concept to Implementation Roger Lane EUROCONTROL Airport R&D Unit Safety Forum Brussels June 2016
Prevention 80% of Humans are caused by accidents !
Timeline for new Airport Safety Nets 2006 – 2009 EUROCONTROL Project (ITWP) developed the initial concept and performed 2 Real Time Simulations. Studied actual Airport Incidents and Controller tasks 2010 – 2016 SESAR continued the development of the concept in P06.07.01 and performed many V2 and V3 Validations, including in January the first live trial using real surveillance data and traffic at Riga Airport 2016 – 2017 The Safety Nets are also being integrated into the EUROCONTROL A-SMGCS Specification document that is being updated by the EUROCONTROL A-SMGCS Task Force. 2017 – 2020 The Airport Safety Nets and A-SMGCS Routing are now part of the European Implementation - Pilot Common Project (PCP) and 21 major European airports have been identified to implement them.
Some Acronyms A-SMGCS RMCA(Previously named RIMS or Level 2) CATC (new) CMAC (new)
RIGA Tower Electronic Flight Strips A-SMGCSAdvanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control Systems A-SMGCS Screen
Runway Monitoring and Conflict Alerting (RMCA) Alerts are triggered based only on the mobiles position – it has proved very hard to tune with no false alerts
OSLO – 25/2/2010 AFL A320 Departs from TWY M LUXEMBOURG – 21/1/2010 B744 lands on Vehicle Why do we need new safety nets? Not all airports have RMCA (ATCOs often work alone on their position) The ones with RMCA are still having incidents RMCA is triggered at the last moment Based only on surveillance
CATC – Conflicting ATC Clearances Covers the situation where a controller forgets they have given one clearance to a mobile and then try to give another clearance which could lead to an incident or worse accident.
Example of a CATC ZURICH AIRPORT 15 March 2011 two Airbus A320s nearly collide on take off It was found that both aircraft had been cleared for take off on, respectively, runway 16 and runway 28, by the same controller after he had forgotten about the first clearance he had issued.
Example of a CATC LOS ANGELES- 1 Feb 1991 – US Air B737 lands and hits a Metroliner because the Controller was distracted and forgot about the Metroliner that was already lined up on the same runway. 34 Dead
CONFLICTING ATC CLEARANCES (CATC) – An indicator (small Orange line) on the EFS and Radar Label menu shows that a LINE UP (or TOF) clearance should not be given to AFL2683 as an aircraft on 2.5 mile final has a LANDING clearance on the same runway
CONFLICTING ATC CLEARANCES (CATC) – If the ATCO inputs the clearance then there is an additional warning window asking him or her to confirm their intention. Cancelling closes the window.
CMAC (Conformance Monitoring Alerts for Controllers) Covers the situation where there is a non conformance to procedures or instructions. Examples are Flight Crew not doing what they have been instructed to, like lining up / taking off without a clearance, taxiing the wrong way or entering a closed runway or taxiway.
Requirements for Future Safety Nets ? A-SMGCS Surveillance – RIGA validation confirmed the need for accuracy and reliability Airport Safety Nets - Current RMCA (+ New CMAC and CATC) Routing Service EFS (Electronic Flight Strips) Capable of inputting the necessary clearances (e.g. PUSH, TAXI, HOLD, LINE UP, Conditional Line Up, TAKE OFF. LAND, CROSS, ENTER) ATCO Training Timely input on the EFS essential to avoid false alerts
2006 – ITWP Project Launched 2007 – ITWP Workshop 2007 – ITWP RTS (CATC and CMAC) 2008 – ITWP Workshop 2008 – ITWP RTS (CATC and CMAC) Summary 2009 – ITWP Functional and HMI Requirements 2011 – ITWP+INATMIG Prototype V2- RTS (CATC ) 2009 – SESAR 1 Launched P06.07.01 2012 – ITWP+INATMIG Prototype V2- RTS (CMAC ) 2016 – SESAR STEP 1 OSED SPR and INTEROP 2015/6 – 4 x V3- Integrated RTS (CATC and CMAC ) 2013/5/ – ITWP Integrated V2- RTS (CATC and CMAC +D-TAXI and AGL) 2012 – DLR V3- RTS (CATC ) 2016 – V3- LIVE and SHADOW MODE (CATC and CMAC with D-TAXi and AGL )
Prevention Safety is no Accident