On Constitutional protection of human rights

1. On Constitutional protection of human rights Professor Eivind Smith Universityof Oslo

2. HR as a «trump word» • We are all in favour of «human rights» • The makes the expression a «trump word» (like «democracy» or «the rule of law») • Euphoria risks to prevent us from critical discussion: • Which human rights? • Which formulations? • Which means of protection? • Draft constitutions deserve critical discussion!

3. On the constitution-amending processes in Iceland and Norway • You know better than me what’s going on here • In Norway: • 1814-2014) • Advanced for its time • Now: «Modernise» the HR «catalogue»? • Commission (1/2012), different bills (9/2012), one definitive vote (in 2014?), 2/3 majority required • Reactions: between euphoria and scepticism

4. International treaties as models for constitution-making • International conventions in the field of HR are typically a compilation of • rather sweeping formulations of rights and freedoms, in combination with • rather sweeping formulations on the power to restrict (or to admit restrictions) • Important parts (but not all) of the Norwegian drafts are constructed this way • How about Iceland?

5. «Traditional» constitution-making • Reasonable to use a similar technique in international law-making covering radically heterogeneous societies • Should similar reasons command constitution-making? • Tradition: A limited number of provisions that are • reflecting National needs (natural resources?), • Typically shorter and (seemingly) clearer, but • subject to interpretation by courts (and others)

6. Restrictions/limitations? • Sweeping clauses on the power to limit rights «protected» by the Constitution • Iceland: Draft art. Art. 9 (2) • Norway: Draft art. 115: «Enhverbegrensning i rettigheter som er anerkjent i denne grunnlov, må være fastsatt ved lov og respektere kjernen i rettighetene. Begrensningen må være forholdsmessig og nødvendig for å ivareta [tungtveiende] allmenne interesser eller andres menneskerettigheter. Det kan ikke i noe tilfelle gjøres slike begrensninger i §§ 93, 94, 95, 96, 99 første punktum og § 105. Tilsvarende gjelder for § 97 ved spørsmål om straff.»

7. Unofficial (= my) translation «Any limitation of rights enshrined in the present Constitution must bebuilt upon statute and respect the essence of those rights. The restriction must be proportional and necessary for securing [heavy-weighing] public interests or the human rights of others. In no case, such limitations may concern Articles 93-96, 99 (1) and 105. The same goes for Article 97 [on retroactivity] in questions regarding punishment.»

8. Some remarks on the draft • If sweeping declarations that could hardly by applied according to their face value, a broad clause on exceptions may be justifiable. But: • What is «public interests»/«the common good»? • The draft addition («heavy-weighing»): Why? Does it provide much help? • What is «proportional»? • Which HR deserves priority in «hard cases»? • First of all: Who decides …

9. Who decides? • … when a restriction is acceptable? • The law-maker (the Parliament)? But why then should we have «constitutional» protection? • Domestic courts? But: who ought to decide clear-cut political questions like what «public interests» actually command (or which one of two or more conflicting interests to prefer)? • a) International courts? But why then protection by the Constitution? • b) How about the «living instrument»: Who should change the Constitution’s meaning?

10. Some paramount questions • How about popular sovereignty (Art. 2 of the draft constitution of Iceland)? • How about the rule of law [Rettssikkerhet]? • The quest for legal certainty/knowing in advance which rules to apply [forutberegnelighet]? • by reading the relevant provisions • without being entirely dependent of legal expertise (or expensive lawyers)? • Do Constitutions need to repeat what flows from domesticated treaty-based rights?