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National Security Strategy – United Kingdom Presentation to the 20 th Meeting of EU Director Generals for Civil Protect

National Security Strategy – United Kingdom Presentation to the 20 th Meeting of EU Director Generals for Civil Protection. Peter Tallantire Cabinet Office United Kingdom. Ljubljana 19-21 May 2008. Mutual learning opportunities. Exchange of best practices: United Kingdom:

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National Security Strategy – United Kingdom Presentation to the 20 th Meeting of EU Director Generals for Civil Protect

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  1. National Security Strategy – United Kingdom Presentation to the 20th Meeting of EU Director Generals for Civil Protection Peter Tallantire Cabinet Office United Kingdom • Ljubljana 19-21 May 2008

  2. Mutual learning opportunities Exchange of best practices: • United Kingdom: • National Risk Method • The Netherlands: • National Safety and Security Strategy

  3. The Role of the Cabinet Office • The Role of the Cabinet Office • The aim of the Cabinet Office is: • To make government work better • The Cabinet Office Objectives: • Supporting the Prime Minister • Supporting the Cabinet • Strengthening the Civil Service • Cabinet Office Groups / Secretariats: • Security, Intelligence & Resilience, Civil Contingencies, Foreign & Defence Policy, European & Global Issues, Economic & Domestic, and Ceremonial • Service Cabinet and its Committees • Broker agreement between Departments where policy initiatives cannot otherwise be agreed

  4. The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom:

  5. Security Challenges TERRORISM CONTEST strategy in place Serious and sustained threat from violent extremists. Threat levels published. Mass casualty impact using CBRN technology and can include CNI targets. STATE LED THREATS TO THE UK No state or alliance has both the intent and the capability to threaten the UK militarily UK subject to high levels of covert non- military activity by foreign intelligence organisations. GLOBAL INSTABILITY and CONFLICT and FAILED and FRAGILE STATES Violent and serious conflict within states Difficult to predict shocks or conflicts. NUCLEAR WEAPONS and other WMD Stockpile of nuclear weapons No state currently has the intent or capability to pose a direct nuclear threat to the UK but risk might emerge in the future. CIVIL EMERGENCIES Over half the COBR activations in 2007 Ability to respond to disruptive challenges such as FMD, pan flu, fuel shortages, power failures and extreme weather. TRANS NATIONAL ORGANISED CRIME fraud, illegal drugs trade, weapons, immigration and human trafficking Threat to legitimate livelihoods, undermine & corrupt economies, societies & governments ; cause or exacerbate state failures leading to civil war or violent conflict. Support of terrorist networks? DRIVERS OF INSECURITY Climate change, competition for energy, poverty / inequality, globalisation & increasing interdependence of risks.

  6. Working Together • CONTRIBUTION OF INDIVIDUALS & COMMUNITIES • Individuals have essential role to play: • BEING VIGILANT AGAINST TERRORISM • PLANNING FOR AND TAKING A MORE ACTIVE ROLE IN RESPONDING TO EMERGENCIES • PLAYING PART IN TACKLING LONGER TERM CHALLENGES • VOLUNTEERING & DIALOGUE TO ENSURE SHARED VALUES UPHELD STRENGTHENING NATIONAL SECURITY STRUCTURES • JOINT PARLIAMENTARY NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE • STRENGTHEN FORWARD PLANNING • IMPROVE STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE ON PRIORITIES THROUGH BETTER CONNECTIONS • NATIONAL SECURITY FORUM • PULISH NATIONAL RISK REGISTER

  7. National Risk Assessment Matrix • 5 Key Very high • 4 High T38, H41 • Impact Medium H4, H48, T3, T4 T13, T37, T39, T41 • 3 H6, H25 H26, H38, T5 T10, T18, T26 T35, T46, T59 Low • 2 • 1 • 1 • 2 • 3 • 4 • 5 • Likelihood

  8. 5 4 3 2 1 1 2 3 4 5 National Resilience Planning Assumptions • Risks • What risks should drive planning? • What is the reasonable worst case, taken across those risks plus • Consequences • What are the generic consequences? • Reasonable worst case warning time? • Regional variation? • Military involvement? • Interdependency? = Essential Services Planning Assumptions Functional Planning Assumptions

  9. Planning Assumptions - Functional • Human Fatalities with Infectious Disease • People with Illness • Human Fatalities caused by Conventional Incidents • Human Casualties caused by Conventional Incidents • Biological Release • Radiological Environmental Contamination • Radiological Release • Chemical Releases • Debris / Rubble • Major Flooding • Influx of British Nationals • Infected Animals • Fire and Rescue Cover

  10. Planning Assumptions - Essential Services • Water Supply • Transport • Oil and Fuel • Gas • Electricity • Telecoms • Health • Financial Services

  11. The Future – Continue Building Capability Technical: Mass fatalities Humanitarian Assistance CBRN (Model Response) Telecomms resilience Planning Flu; and … Human: The Human Component of Resilience Crisis leadership capacity Professionalism through standards

  12. Raise the Bar Catastrophic Events: Wide Area Flooding ‘Black Start’ Recovery Continue Learning the Lessons (Newton, Pitt, Anderson) CCA ‘6000-mile Service’ London Olympics 2012 New or more physical capabilities The human component New/more/different procedures Horizontal Mutual Aid Training – especially collective. ‘Reaching Out’: Citizens and their families Citizens in communities

  13. National Security Strategy The Netherlands The first results: National Risk Assessment Mass Evacuation Task Dick Schoof Director-general for Public Safety and Security Ministry of the Interior & Kingdom Relations, The Netherlands Ljubljana, 19 - 21 May 2008

  14. Short background Netherlands’ Security Strategy National Security Strategy published May 2007 There is a need for a more coordinated and integrated approach on National Security More complex society Increaseddependence on complex systems Diffuse and changing threats Interdependence dimension of threats International dimension of threats Focus: all-hazard approach

  15. What is National Safety & Security? • Focus on 5 vital interests: • - Territorial security • - Physical security • - Economical security • Ecological security • Social & political stability • Scope: • (Potential) disruption of society • throughout the entire security chain

  16. National SecurityStrategy Which threats do we face? And what is the impact? What do we need to do? What do we need to have? Threat/risk analysis Risk Assessment Tasks Capabilities (planning assumptions) Policy arrangements Horizon scanning National threatprogress report (short & long term horizon scanning) National risk assessment Advice national capabilities

  17. National Risk Assessment • 2007-2008 priority is given to: • Climate change • Polarization and radicalization • Certainty of the energy supply • In total 13 risk scenarios

  18. Impact Risk Diagram E I II D C III B A Likelihood Veryunlikely Unlikely Possible Likely Very likely

  19. 3 Risk categories • High impact and highly probable: • Flupandemic • Oil crisis • High impact but unlikely: • Malicious disruption of electricity • Floods • Low impact but highly probable: • Polarisation and radicalisation • National black-out electricity

  20. Overall analysis high impact risks: • High impact criteria: • costs • disruption common life • psychological/social impact • Shortage vital products and services • Management of vital products and services • In critical phase: government cannot do it alone • Self help of citizens

  21. Shared responsibilities • Government (Central, Regional, Local) • Private sector • Citizens • Cooperation with non-profit and international organizations • Dilemma’s • How to activate the private sector without financial donations? • How to raise awareness of citizens without a real time threat? • Risk communications

  22. Mass evacuation • 2 scenario’s: coast and rivers • Conclusion: • Coast: preventive evacuation is no option • Rivers: preventive evacuation is possible

  23. 10 actions for the future 1. Itensify preparation flu pandemic 2. Review IEA mechanism (oil crisis) 3. National operational evacuation plan 4. National strategy distribution of shortage (securing, guarding, energy, (drinking) water) 5. Research solidness communication (C2000, cell broadcast) 6. National information system (Netcentric) 7. Continuity vital infrastructure 8. Increase self helpness citizens 9. Investigation capabilities civil-military cooperation 10. Broaden mass evacuation to CBRN and forest fires

  24. In the near future • End of May reports: • National Risk Assessment + Mass Evacuation Task •  Council of Ministers • Advice: all information is made public • Follow-up international conference on national safety & security • Questionnaire: to set up a network of people (government, science, private sector) interested in issues of particular aspects of national safety & security • Analysis outcomes questionnaire will follow before the Summer

  25. Thank you for your attention • Questions?

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