Vampire Attacks: Draining life from wireless ad-hoc sensor networks

1. Vampire Attacks:Draining life from wireless ad-hoc sensor networks Guided By: Presented By: Prof. R.R WelekarRashmiJangre

2. TOPICS TO BE DISCUSSED • INTRODUCTION • APPLICATIONS • CHARACTERISTICS • ATTACKS • EXISTING SYSTEM • PROPOSED SYSTEM • FUTURE SCOPE • REFERENCES

3. Introduction Wireless Sensor Network : • Wireless Sensor Networks are a special category of ad hoc networks that are used to provide a wireless communication infrastructure among the sensors deployed in a specific application domain. • A sensor network is a collection of a large number of sensor nodes that are deployed in a particular region.

4. Ad hoc Wireless Sensor Network : • Ad hoc • Each node participates in routing by forwarding packets. • decentralized type of wireless network • all devices have equal status in the network

5. APPLICATIONS: • Continuous connectivity • Instantly deployable communication for military and first responders • Ubiquitous on demand computing power • Monitor environmental conditions , factory performance and troop deployment.

6. Characteristics of Wireless Sensor Networks • Wireless Sensor Networks mainly consists of sensors. Sensors are - • low power • limited memory • energy constrained due to their small size. • Wireless networks can also be deployed in extreme environmental conditions and may be prone to enemy attacks. • Although deployed in an ad hoc manner they need to be self organized and self healing and can face constant reconfiguration.

7. ATTACK N/W LAYER DOS ATTACK DDOS ATTACK Resource Consumption attack Replay Flooding VAMPIRE ATTACKS VAMPIRE ATTACKS

8. Vampire attack: Definition: Vampire attack means creating and sending messages by malicious node which causes more energy consumption by the network leading to slow depletion of node’s battery life. Features: • Vampire attacks are not protocol specific • They don’t disrupt immediate availability • Transmit little data with largest energy drain • Vampires do not disrupt or alter discovered paths

9. VAMPIRE ATTACKS

10. Carousel attack • adversary composes packets with purposely introduced routing loops • sends packets in circles • targets source routing protocols

11. Strech attack • An adversary constructs artificially long routes • Increases packet path lengths, • Honest hop count = 3 • Malicious hop count =6

12. MITIGATION METHODS CAROUSEL ATTACK: • Forwarding nodes check source route for loops STRETCH ATTACK: • more challenging to prevent • Loose source routing

13. Existing system Provable Logical Protocol(PLGP): • Developed by Parno,Luk,Gaustad & Perrig • Used to resist vampire attacks • Two phases: - TOPOLOGY DISCOVERY PHASE - PACKET FORWARDING PHASE

14. TOPOLOGY DISCOVERY PHASE • Each node starts as its own group size one, with virtual address zero • Groups merge with smallest neighbouring group • Each member prepends group address to their own address • Network converges to a single group

15. Packet forwarding phase • All decisions made independently by each node • Node when receives packet finds next hop by finding most significant bit • Every forwarding event shortens logical distance to destination

16. plgp in presence of vampires • Forwarding nodes don’t know the path of a packet • Honest node may be farther away from destination than malicious nodes • Theoretical energy increases by O(d) • Worse if packet returns to vampire as it can reroute

17. Provable security against vampire attacks • No backtracking property implies vampire resistance • PLGPdoesnot satisfy no-backtracking property - packets are forwarded along the shortest route - nodes cannot be certain of path previously traversed by a packet -adverseries always lie about local metric cost. -PLGP still vulnerable

18. Proposed sysyem • PLGP with attestations(PLGPa): -> add a verifiable path history to every PLGP packet -> attestations are nothing but signatures to validate its path -> every forwarding node verifies attestation chain

19. Plgp satisfies no-backtracking • All messages signed by originator • Hopcount of packet p THEOREM: • A PLGPa packet p satisfies no-backtracking in the presence of an adversary controlling m < N - 3 nodes if p passes through at least one honest node.

20. Comparison of existing vs proposed system PLGP PLGPa • Doesnot have attestation • Forwading nodes doesn’t know path of packet • Backtracking • Vulnerable to vampire attacks • It is PLGP with attestation • Each packet has a verifiable path history • No Backtracking • Resistant to vampire attacks

21. Future Scope • Ad hoc wireless sensor networks promise exciting new applications in the near future. • As WSN’s become more and more crucial to everyday life availability faults become less tolerable • Thus high availability of these nodes is critical and must hold even under malicious conditions.

22. References • Eugene Y. Vasserman and Nicholas Hopper “Vampire Attacks: Draining Life from Wireless Ad Hoc Sensor Networks”- IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON MOBILE COMPUTING, VOL. 12, NO. 2, FEBRUARY 2013. • Mr M Rajesh Khanna,S.Divya, Dr. A.Rengerajan “Securing Data Packets From Vampire Attacks in Adhoc-Sensor Networks” International Journal of innovative research in computer and communication enginnering Vol.2 ,special issue 1, march 2014 • SarveshTanwar,Prema .K.V. “Threats and security issues in ad-hoc network” IJSCE Vol. 2,issue 6,january 2013

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