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Physical Attacks are Salient Threats to Sensor Networks • Sensor network applications that operate in hostile environments • Volcanic monitoring • Battlefield applications • Anti sensor network forces • Physical attacks are inevitable in sensor networks • Physical attacks: destroy sensors physically • Simple to launch • Small form factor of sensors • Unattended and distributed nature of deployment • Can be fatal to sensor networks • Different from other types of electronic attacks
Outline • Physical attacks in sensor networks • Modeling Policy-driven physical attacks • Measurement of Policy-driven physical attacks • Countermeasures to physical attacks • Final remarks
Physical Attacks – A General Description • Physical attacks are those that result in the physical destruction of sensors • Two broad types of sensor destruction methods • Bombing: • Brute-force physical destruction with bombs/ grenades; Sensors in the attack area are destroyed. • Fast; Not accurate due to blind destruction. • Sweeping: • Detecting sensors by detecting signals emitted by sensors then isolating an area for the detected sensor; Reaching the isolation area; Destroying small size sensors through physical destruction methods. • Slow; Accurate destruction of only isolated area.
Attacker Objectives and Dilemma • Two objectives of the attacker • Destroy sensor network. • Preserve the sensor network deployment field. • Attacker might have certain bias between them. • How the attacker can achieve its objectives with certain bias? • Choose Bombing or Sweeping? • Bombing is good at rapidly destroy sensor network, but causes too large causalities to deployment field. • Sweeping is good at preserve sensor network deployment field, but it is slow in destroying sensors. • A policy-controlled combination of Bombing and Sweeping to achieve the desired bias between the two objectives • Policy-driven physical attacks
Policy-driven Physical Attacks • Targeting phase • Search for sensors by detecting signals emitted by sensors and isolating an area (isolation-area) for each detected sensor. • Destruction phase • Choose destruction method (bombing or sweeping) according to policy and information of the detected sensor. • If choose bombing • Use brute-force physical destruction with bombs/ grenades or tanks/ vehicles on the isolation area of the detected sensor. • If choose sweeping • Reach the isolation area of the detected sensor • Destroying small size sensor through physical destruction methods (like physical force, radiation, hardware/ circuit tampering).
Modeling of Policy-driven Physical Attacks • Sensor network signals • Passive signal and active signal • Attacker capacity • Signal detection and sensor Isolation • Sensor destruction methods • Attack Model • Attack model procedure • Attacker’s bias between two objectives • Attack action control
Network Parameters and Attacker Capacities • f: Active signal frequency • Rps: The maximum distance can detect a passive signal • Rass: The maximum distance can detect an active signal emitted by a normal sensor • θ: Isolation accuracy • ri =di θ • Isolation/sweeping area: Dswi=πri2 • Vmv: Attacker moving speed • Vsw: Attacker sweeping speed • μ: bombing rate • Rb: Radius of destruction area of each bombing
Metrics and Quantification of Policy • AC: Accumulative Coverage • EL: Effectively Lifetime is the time period until when the sensor network becomes nonfunctional because the coverage falls below a certain threshold α • Coverage(t): Instant network coverage at time t • DC: Destruction Casualty If the attacker attacked a set of n sensors K = {S1, ..., Sn}, and the destroyed area for sensor Si is Di, then • P : In Policy-driven Physical Attacks, the policy (P) represents the bias among the twin objectives of the attacker.
Impact of Destruction Methods on DC, ACand Attack Action Control • Impact of Sweeping and Bombing on DC (Destruction area) Dswi=πri2 ,Dboi=π(ri+Rbe)2 Rbe is is the bombing area error margin which represents the extra casualty (extra destruction area) caused by the less- accurate bombing. • Impact of Sweeping and Bombing on AC (Time cost) Tswi = tswi + tmvi = πri2/vsw + d’i/vmv Tboi = tboi = Dboi/ π Rb2/ μ = π(ri+Rbe)2 / π Rb2/μ • Selection between Sweeping and Bombing Fbo(i)= Tboi * (Dboi)P Fbo(i)= Tswi * (Dswi)P - Choose Bombing if Fbo(i) ≤ Fsw(i)
Countermeasures to Physical Attacks • For Blind Physical Attacks • Overly and optimally deploying sensors to prolong lifetime of sensor networks under blind physical attacks • For Search-based Physical Attacks • Deterring the search process (at the target phase) • Physically protecting sensors
Final Remarks • Physical attacks are patent and potent threats to sensor networks. • Policy-driven physical attacks can achieve desired bias between the twin objectives of the attacker (rapidly destroying sensors, and preserving the deployment field). • Viability of future sensor networks is contingent on their ability to resist physical attacks. • Our research is an important first step in this regard.
Q&A Thank You !