Political Science 345: The Legislative Process Class 14: Policymaking

1. Political Science 345:The Legislative ProcessClass 14: Policymaking Professor Jon Rogowski

2. Parties and policy • For the last several weeks we have often returned to the theme that parties are important for determining legislative outcomes • But note: • Partisanship is highly predictive of voting behavior in Congress • Split control of government often blamed for gridlock

3. A brief aside • Divided government • At least one of the legislative chambers is controlled by a party opposite the president’s party • Gridlock • A majority of legislators favors policy change but is unable to pass new legislation

4. Relevance of Divided Government Unified Divided Unified government means that one party controls the presidency, the House, and the Senate.

5. It should matter, right? • Checks and balances requires multiple governing bodies to agree in order for new policy to pass “We have been too entranced by the Madisonian system of government… The system of checks and balances and interlocked gears of government… requires the consensus of many groups and leaders before the nation can act; … we underestimate the extent to which our system was designed for deadlock and inaction.” (James Macgregor Burns 1960, 63) • In 1992, President G.H.W. Bush campaigned against the “deadlocked” Democratic Congress

6. Assessing the impact of divided government • Is significant legislation less likely to be enacted during divided government than during unified government? • Is Congress more likely to launch high-profile investigations of the Executive Branch under divided government than under unified government?

7. In a word: No

9. Why not? “For much of the last half-century, Americans have chosen divided government for good reason: We like it. As endless commissions look for ways to make government more efficient and political scientists sing the praises of the parliamentary system, voters shout something very different. We don't trust government, they declare, and we don't want to give either party a free hand. They take the already formidable institutional checks and balances one step further by imposing a political check between the executive and legislative branches. … When pollsters ask, is it better for the same party to control both Congress and the Presidency, usually no more than one third of the respondents answer yes. Even right now, with all the attacks on Congress, that figure has only climbed to 43 percent, according to a Wall Street Journal-NBC News poll taken in early August. And in hundreds of interviews all over the country in even-numbered years, I have found voters readily explaining that they split their tickets with malice aforethought, consciously curbing what they see as the excesses of both parties.” - Cokie Roberts, 1992

10. < 1/3 >= 2/3 >= 3/5 < 2/5 p Pivotal Legislators v m f Liberal Conservative

11. Where do we go from here? • So, maybe parties don’t matter. Or at least not as much as we think. • Perhaps the American people prefer divided control. Then why do we sometimes see unified control? • Maybe there is another reason.

12. Pivots • The conventional wisdom: the ostensibly increasing tendency for policy stalemate (gridlock) in US policy making was predominantly attributable to divided government. • David Mayhewfound out that, governing regimes in US politics invariably need to exert substantial effort to overcome various obstacles to policy making, but, as an empirical matter, this is true in unified as well as divided government. Moreover, when the natural propensity for gridlock is overcome, the winning coalitions credited for such achievements are almost invariably larger than minimum-majority in size and thus bipartisan in composition.

13. Super-Majoritarian Procedures • Despite rhetoric of majority rule, some of our most important political institutions are governed by non-majoritarian principles. • Veto • Two-thirds vote of both chambers required to override a presidential veto • Filibuster • Three-fifths vote of Senators required to bring cloture (end a filibuster)

14. Floor agenda (median voter) model Not propose q Median Voter in Congress (m) m Propose

15. Pivotal politics game Not propose m or 2f-q q yes Median Voter in Congress (m) 2v-q President yes yes f (pivot) no v (pivot) Propose no no q q

16. p v f m f m v p Equilibrium Policies Outcomes I II III IV V Gridlock Status quo

17. v p f m f m v p q Region I: Full Convergence Outcomes Region I = q≤ 2f - m I Status quo

18. v p f m f m v p q q q’ Region II: Partial Convergence Outcomes Region II = 2f – m < q < f II Status quo

19. p v f m f m v p q1 q2 Region III: Gridlock Interval Outcomes Region III = f ≤ q ≤ v III Gridlock Filibuster Zone Veto Zone Status quo

20. Points that p prefers to q v p Points that v prefers over m f m f m v p q Region V: Full Convergence Outcomes Region V = q ≥ 2v - m V

21. v p Points that v prefers over q f m f m v p q Region IV: Partial Convergence Outcomes Region IV = v < q < 2v - m IV Status quo

22. p v f m f m v p Equilibrium Policies Outcomes I II III IV V Gridlock Status quo

23. p v f m f m v p Moderate President Outcomes I II III IV V Gridlock Status quo

24. Democrats Republicans Unified Government m Liberal Conservative Partisan Context Divided Government f m v p Liberal Conservative v p f

25. Pivotal differences?

27. Basic support for the idea

28. Examples: 11-member legislatures • Legislator locations: 0, 0.10, 0.20, 0.30, 0.40, 0.50, 0.60, 0.70, 0.80, 0.90, 1; Democratic president • Legislator locations: 0, 0.10, 0.20, 0.30, 0.40, 0.50, 0.60, 0.70, 0.80, 0.90, 1; Republican president • Legislator locations: 0, 0.05, 0.10, 0.15, 0.20, 0.25, 0.80, 0.85, 0.90, 0.95, 1; Democratic president • Legislator locations: 0.25, 0.30, 0.35, 0.40, 0.45, 0.50, 0.55, 0.60, 0.65, 0.70, 0.75; Democratic president