The current status of AWG-LCA and KP negotiations Liberal Seburikoko

1. ecbi Nairobi , 1st March 2010 The current status of AWG-LCA and KP negotiations Liberal Seburikoko european capacity building initiative initiative européenne de renforcement des capacités for sustained capacity building in support of international climate change negotiations pour un renforcement durable des capacités en appui aux négociations internationales sur les changements climatiques

2. Outline Introductory background Selected AWG-LCA texts Selected AWG-KP texts Conclusion

3. Introductory background • Negotiations on AWG-LCA and AWG-KP stalled for months, with heavily bracketed texts at the beginning of Copenhagen • Many outstanding issues had to be forwarded to ministers for consideration and resolution in the form of draft decisions • Ministers sidelined these and focused on the Copenhagen Accord

4. Introductory background (2) • COP and CMP decided to extend the mandates of both AWGs • There are now 3 documents arising from Copenhagen: • Two reports of the AWGs • Work undertaken by COP15 • This keeps alive the documents and the work coming out of the two tracks • BUT it is not obvious that these draft decisions would form the basis of future negotiations

5. Introductory background (3) How to achieve a LBA based on the present work of both AWGs is a question of political will to ensure adoption happens at COP 16 and CMP 6 in Mexico KP amendments were only discussed in plenary – no decision taken by the COP/CMP President How these amendments will develop in 2010 will be important to consider as this may require amendments to the Kyoto Protocol

6. Focus on AWG-LCA: Different drafting groups set up by LCA Chair achieved different levels of progress (e.g. adaptation, REDD and technology transferwere at an advanced state of maturity than shared visionand mitigation) Contact Group on LCA neither concluded its work nor reported back to the plenary meeting of the COP The draft decisions do not prejudge the legal form of the final agreed outcome Reference to a LBA outcome of further negotiations under the AWG-LCA by COP 16 was dropped at the very last moment of the high level segment

7. LCA (2): Shared Vision • Temperature target- reference to 350/400ppm removed from draft text • Long-term goal – no consensus on 85% and 50% reductions by 2050. The former leads to a 75% chance of staying below 2oC whilst the latter relates to a 50% chance only. • Peaking – no consensus: “ASAP” and “2015”. Peaking by 2015 is necessary to keep the 1.5oC target feasible • Review – language was weakened. It focuses on long-term global goal instead of the adequacy of emission targets. All references to LDCs and SIDS as benchmark were removed. Option for 2015 should be retained and start review in 2013

8. LCA (3): Mitigation • All options remain on the table (including unhelpful ones) but practically no consensus on any significant mitigation issues. • A text of bunker fuels is reintroduced but wholly bracketed • 3 areas where consensus was reached: • LDC may prepare Low-emission dev plans, and submit NCs and GHG inventories at their discretion • Principles of establishing a mechanism to record mitigation actions and facilitate matching support • The need to prepare GHG inventory and submit to the COP annually w.e.f 2011 in accordance with existing guidelines

9. LCA (4): REDD Target for REDD: controversial as many DCs did not want to be bound by the EU proposed target and some linked it to the level of financing for REDD. Scale of REDD and whether it should take place at national or sub-national level divided negotiators. Issues around baseline uncertainties, leakage and scientific uncertainties would arise if REDD was allowed to undertaken sub-national activities Financing: whether REDD should be funded through a carbon market or a fund. MRV: establishing reference emission levels (REDD)or reference levels (REDD+) were not agreed and related to the scope of REDD+ activities. This will continue to be challenging

10. LCA (5): Adaptation Adaptation is PRIORITY for LDCs and SIDS – BUT Confusion between adaptation to impacts of CC and adaptation impacts of response measures remains. BAP separates the latter from adaptation and places it under mitigation building block (1bvi). There is a huge risk of LDCs and SIDS loosing out with adaptation funds being diverted to rich oil producing countries. Need to support mechanism to address loss and damages (not for response measures) Need to establish priority, simplified, expeditious and direct access to adaptation funding for vulnerable countries Building upon NAPAs is paramount to speed up implementation Adaptation financing must be grant-based, from public sources and must support full project cycle – from design of strategies to implementation

11. LCA (6): Finance • Discussions were inconclusive – as a result the whole text is bracketed. Some of the major issues include: • Establishment of a Finance Board within a transparent system of governance under the guidance of and accountable to the COP • Establishment of a Climate Fund (CF), governed by a Board with equitable and balanced representation and serviced by a Trustee and a Secretariat. The CF to provide simplified, improved and effective (direct) access to financial resources in a timely manner.GEF to be reformed to ensure that it responds more effectively to the needs of developing countries. • Provision of scaled up, predictable, new and additional and adequate funding to developing country Parties for enhanced implementation of the Convention. Private sector financing and other innovative sources of funding would supplement the provision of public financial resources • The question of who will contribute how much remains unresolved

12. Focus on AWG-KP Developing countries felt that amending Annex B numbers for Annex I was top priority - other issues were not as important. For developed countries, other issues such as LULUCF, mechanisms, methodologies etc were also important. For LDCs - Extending the share of the proceeds to the other flex mechanisms (JI and Emissions trading) were important and required an amendment of the KP. These were not discussed

13. KP (2): Scale of emission reductions Targets:range of targets for Annex I remains 25-45% by 2020. No consensus on level of ambition for aggregate AI reductions Length of commitment period: parties disagreed on 5years (2013-2017) or 8 years (2013-2020) period. An 8-year period would mean much longer time to consider AR5 and consequently delay in responding to the latest science Base year: general agreement on 1990 as base year but some parties preferred having reference years and multiple base years. Surplus AAUs: whether to cap carry-overs or discounting? QELROs: no consensus on translating pledges from AI into QELROs?

14. KP (3): LULUCF Forest management: no decision on how to account for this in the 2nd commitment period. Land based approach: i.e. whether or not parties should account for all activities on their lands. This could affect the KP environmental integrity. Most developed countries wanted this off the table but PNG objected. No progress registered. CDM and role of non-permanence: afforestation/reforestation is based on premise that carbon is stored temporarily in forests. There was discussion on revising this and requesting SBSTA to undertake a work programme looking at alternatives.

15. KP (4): Flexible Mechanisms A number of key issues remained in the text: CCS and nuclear activities under the CDM, and standardised baselines. No consensus on whether or not to forward these to the COP/MOP or to request the SBSTA to develop procedures and modalities for further action. Other issues include: Markets: inclusion of crediting on the basis of NAMAs, extending emission trading to developing countries, establishing new market mechanisms, etc Supplementarity of flex mechs: whether to introduce a cap (e.g. 30%) on the use of flex mechs in achieving A1 QELROs

16. KP (4): Flex Mechanisms (cont’d) Extending the share of proceeds to Joint Implementation Improving Regional distribution through postponement of the registration fee by parties with fewer than 10 projects or establishing a quota for projects hosted in LDCs, SIDS and African countries

17. Conclusion: Some pre-requisites for breaking the deadlock : • Politics: Vulnerable countries are politically engaged – but not enough alliances to have a more powerful role in the negotiations. This will be paramount in order to breaking the deadlock on many issues • Planning and strategy: There is room for improvement here: “failure to plan is planning for failure”. • Need Persistence and patience: need to gear up for intense technical preparation on some key issues including methodological issues (REDD, MRV), finance (exploration of innovative sources by the newly established high-level panel)

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