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International Conference on Hydrogen Safety Validation Testing in Support of Hydrogen Codes and Standards Development. Robert Burgess, Mark McDougall, Norm Newhouse, Carl Rivkin, William Buttner, Matthew Post National Renewable Energy Laboratory Hydrogen Technologies & Systems Center
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International Conference on Hydrogen SafetyValidation Testing in Support of Hydrogen Codes and Standards Development Robert Burgess, Mark McDougall, Norm Newhouse, Carl Rivkin, William Buttner, Matthew Post National Renewable Energy Laboratory Hydrogen Technologies & Systems Center September 12th, 2011 Project ID # 3C1 THIS PRESENTATION DOES NOT CONTAIN ANY PROPRIETARY, CONFIDENTIAL OR OTHERWISE RESTRICTED INFORMATION
NREL/DOE General Approach • Work with codes & standards technical committees and stakeholders to identify knowledge gaps • Define research & development tasks required to close knowledge gaps • Supply testing and analysis expertise, with DOE support • Provide results to the technical committee, thereby promulgating standards with a sound technical basis
Validation Testing Overview • ASME BPV (American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Boiler & Pressure Vessel code) • Flaw Testing of Stationary Composite Pressure Vessels • SAE (Society of Automotive Engineers) J2579 • Vehicular 70MPa Compressed Gas Storage System ASME SAE • SAE (Society of Automotive Engineers) J2601 • High Pressure Dispensing Protocol • CSA HPRD1 (Canadian Standards Association, Hydrogen Pressure Relief Device) • Compatibility Testing for Hydrogen Pressure Relief Devices SAE CSA
Lincoln Composites CSA SAE Powertech ASME National Renewable Energy Laboratory
H2Incidents component failures examples • Stainless Steel (403) Failure in Liquid Hydrogen Line • A bourdon tube ruptured in a pressure gage after 528 hours of operation in a liquid H2 system. Tube was manufactured from 403 SS, suggested change to 303 SS. • Water Electrolysis System Explosion • Electrolysis system separator plate failed. Embrittlement may have been contributing factor. Explosion could have been prevented by process gas sensor. Explosion resulted in fatality. (no material information provided) • Failure of Stainless Steel Valves • Valve springs made from 17-7pH were found in pieces, causing valves to fail. Valve manufacturer was not informed of hydrogen service, suggested change to stainless steel materials. • Hydrogen Explosion at Coal-Fired Power Plant • An explosion at a coal-fired power plant killed one person and injured 10 others. The delivery truck driver was unloading compressed hydrogen gas, which is used to cool the plant's steam generators. Evidence pointed to the premature failure of a pressure-relief device (PRD). • H2Incidents.org data supplied by PNNL
Fuel Cell Vehicles (FCVs) Integrating hydrogen, electrical, and fuel cell systems Compressed Hydrogen Containment System Fuel Cells Battery System Electric Drive Motor Electric Power Control
SAE J2579 Summary • Validation Test Results • Three month test duration • Known chemical attack failure mode was replicated • Test methods lessons learned were identified • NREL Report No. SR-5600-49867 • Future validation testing • Localized fire • Stress rupture • Cryo-compressed/Hydride 70MPa Type 3 tank after residual strength burst test
ASME Summary • Validation Test Results • Good correlation between increasing flaw depth and burst pressure • 40% flaw shows sufficient burst margin • Results published in ASME proceedings • Future validation testing • Pipeline • Stress rupture Tank after residual strength burst test
SAE J2601 Results: Thermodynamic Modeling SoC SoC – State of Charge
SAE J2601 Summary • Validation Test Results • Good correlation between test results and thermodynamic modeling • Sufficient safety margin for temperature and pressure overfill constraints • Future validation testing • RFID fill • Cryo-compressed Fueling at NREL’s Wind to Hydrogen demonstration facility
CSA HPRD1 Hydrogen Service Suitability • Initial testing identified leak issues at hot and cold conditions • Failures were attributed to test conditions that were unrealistically harsh • HPRD1 technical committee was able to review the data and modify test sequences • Partial validation testing was completed • Future testing • Full sequence testing • Surrogate valve testing (known hydrogen compatibility issues) • Creep testing Mirada PRD schematic
Future Capability ESIF Energy Systems Integration Facility, NREL facility scheduled for 2013 completion, to include sensor lab, components lab and high pressure test lab