Structure Problem 1: Inability to Integrate Department and Agency Effort Well

1. Structure Problem 1: Inability to Integrate Department and Agency Effort Well Autonomy Seeking No Effective Model of Integration -- overburdened Non-crisis Issues Do Not Receive Presidential Attention Integration Difficulties No Effective Model of Integration -- disobeyed Role Conflict Failure of Lead Agency Approach Centralization of Policy in WH Reliance on Czars Tendency toward “Super Cabinet”

2. Structure Problem 2: Inability to Fix Accountability for Some Missions Organizational Autonomy Unpreparedness for Non-traditional Missions Poor Definition Accountability Difficulties Layers/Sedimentation Overreliance on Military Hinders Ability to Act as “Benevolent Hegemon” Crossed Wires Departments Vie for Primacy, Control Departments Refuse to Share Shadow Organizations Homeless Missions

3. Structure Problem 3: Strong Functional Organizations Control Policy Formation Large Span of Control Weak Integrating & Strong Functional Lack of Unity of Effort and Purpose Flawed Decisions Small, Weak NSC Staff Slow Decisions Lowest Common DenominatorDecisions People Work Outside the System Policy Stalemate Decisions “Papered Over” Decisions Dissatis-faction

4. Structure Problem 4: Strong Functional Organizations Control Policy Implementation Congress Resources Functions, Not Cross-cutting Missions Departments Control Strategy Implementation EOP, NSC, OMB Unable to Direct Resources to Mission Capabilities Lack of Unity of Effort and Purpose Reluctance of NSC to “Do Operations” or “Micromanage” Lose, Compromise, Stymie Organizations Often Eschew Missions Implementation Tracking

5. Structure Problem 5: Failed Integration in Regional Matters Failed Integration in Regional Matters Poor Performance in Regional Venues Regional Structures Are Dominated by Individual Departments and Their Cultures DOD Has Better Regional Representation than State Incorporation of Interagency Components in Combatant Commands “Military Face” Inconsistent Regional Networks

6. Structure Problem 6: Limited Country-level Unity of Purpose Ineffective Presidential Delegation Limited Country-level Unity of Purpose Autonomous Functional Departments Departmental Incentives to Protect Organizational Equities Ambassadors Not Seen as President’s Representative Ambassadors Often Not Backed up in Washington “Laissez-Faire” Ambassadors Ambassadors Focus Primarily on State Issues

7. Structure Problem 7: Complicated Country-level Unity of Purpose “Heavy Footprint” in a Country Complicated Country-level Unity of Purpose Dual Chains of Command Codified in Law Cultural Resistance to Integration of Political-Military Command Complicated, Disjointed, Unclear Chains of Command Pursuit of Different Objectives in the Field Confusion over Who Is in Charge

8. Structure Problem 8: Ineffective Interagency Mechanisms Confuse Multilateral Actors Inadequate, Outdated Appreciation for Multilateral Institutions Poor Performance in Multilateral Venues Autonomous Departments and Agencies Confused Multilateral Partners Ineffective Delegation of Presidential Authority Hostility in the Multilateral and International Environment Lack of Coordination and Integration of U.S. Policy Department of State’s Lack of Authority Partners Have Difficulty Identifying Locus of Decision-making Partners “Shop Around” for Favorable Positions Lack of Long-term Commitment to Multilateral Institutions Lack of Flexibility in International Negotiations

9. Structure Problem 9: Authority and Responsibility for Federal Homeland Security Coordination Remains Unclear Perpetuation of Federal Stovepipes in Homeland Security Context Poor Performance of Homeland Security Missions Lack of Additional Authority to Secretary of Homeland Security to Integrate Federal Resources Unreliability of Coordination in a Catastrophic Crisis Weak Horizontal Integration Pressure to “Federalize” Emergency Management No Lead Agency or Individual for Prevention and Protection Missions Uncertain Federal Response to Catastrophic Incidents Departmental Competition over Missions Poor Information Sharing

10. Structure Problem 10: Collaborative Decision-making Relationships among Federal, State, and Local Authorities Remains Unclear Constitutional Division of Power between Federal and State and Local Authorities Inadequate, Inefficient, Inappropriate Investments in Infrastructure Protection Unclear Collaborative Relationships State and Local Authorities Not Adequately Represented in Policy Development No Standardized Process for Input into the Development of National Policy

11. Processes Problem 11: The National Security Process Rarely Produces Timely, Distributed or Integrated Decision Analysis. Authority Is Centralized in Cabinet Officials Sequential Interdependence Departmental Identification Ad Hoc Organization Ineffective National Security Process System Participants Tend to Think of Process as a Top-down Effort Decline in the National Standard of Living The End-to-End Process Is Fractured to Poor Effect Putative Rationality Bureaucratic Mandates Opaque Decisions Paralyzed Subordinates

12. Processes Problem 12: Assessments tend to be static, heavily qualified, tailored and restricted to senior leaders, who are overburdened and not in a position to use them. Highly Formalized Process with Premium on Static, Bottom Line Assessment Product Driven by Senior Leader Demand, which Is Issue-management-oriented and Not Focused on Examining the Whole Environment Ineffective Assessment Processes Uncoordinated Signals Current Information Systems Limit Information Sharing The Nature of National Security Events Is Growing More Complex Simplistic Analyses Disproportionate Sensing Intelligence Isolated from Other Actors

13. Processes Problem 13: Strong departments and agencies often thwart clear, well-coordinated policy. Senior Leader Attention Is often Unavailable Bureaucratic Positions in Interagency Meetings Lead to Paralysis, Diluted Policy or Policies that Are Insufficiently Coordinated Ineffective Policy Processes Slow Development Insufficient Attention to the Full Range of Relevant Organizations Stalemated Debates Reliance on Lead Agency Approach

14. Processes Problem 14: Real “course of action” strategy is infrequent and limited to the informal deliberations of senior officials. An Excessive Focus on Near-term Issues Precludes Mid- and Long-term Strategy The Need to Reconcile Different Department and Agency Objectives Militates against Strategy Formation and In Favor of Lists of Objectives Ineffective Strategy Processes Uncoordinated Efforts “Leak Culture” Militates against “Real Strategy” Being Recorded and Distributed Disconnected Document Insufficient Guidance Lack of Unity of Purpose

15. Processes Problem 15: Interagency planning is irregular, resisted by individual agencies, and too slow and laborious to keep pace with the environment. When Policy/Strategy Are Not Clear, There Is Little Basis for Unified Planning Strategy, to the Extent It Exists, Is Poorly Communicated to Planners Ineffective Planning Processes Departmental Cultures Complicate Cooperation in Planning Bureaucratic Pathologies Departments and Agencies Do Not Sufficiently Value Training and Exercising Plans Strategy Drift Conflicting Departments

16. Processes Problem 16: Implementation is poorly integrated and resourced. Lead Agencies and Individuals Cannot Secure Integrated Effort Resources Are Not Linked to National Security Goals across Department and Agency Lines The EOP Has Insufficient Means to Provide Oversight Ineffective Implementation Processes Reduced Self-efficacy Departments and Agencies Interpret Policy, Strategy, and Plans through their Organizational Perspectives when Conducting Implementation Insufficiently Broad Range of Required Capabilities Planning Drift Interagency Clashes Inadequately Resourced

17. Processes Problem 17: The system militates against rigorous evaluations. The Information Flow Necessary for Basic Organizational Learning Processes Is Impeded by System Attributes Reliable Metrics Are Not Available At the National Level There Is Little Infrastructure for Investigating, Capturing, Disseminating, and Retrieving Knowledge of Value to the National Security System Ineffective Evaluation Processes Inability to Learn from Failures National Level Memory Is Wiped Clean at the End of Each Administration Powerful Incentives to Protect the President from Blame Inhibit Learning Resisted Self-Questioning External Audits Ad Hoc Policy Reviews No Standardized Metrics or Feedback Mechanisms

18. Human Capital Problem 18: The system is unable to generate the required human capital. Inability to Generate the Required Human Capital Limited Flexibility in Current Laws and Regulations Difficulty in Recruiting the Right People A Heavy Reliance on Contractors Growing Number of Excepted Service Positions

19. Human Capital Problem 19: The system is unable to allocate required human capital. Incompatible Personnel Systems Individuals Do Not Have Incentives to Joint Interagency Teams Departments and Agencies Lack Incentives to Share Individuals Inability to Allocate Required Human Capital Departments and Agency Disincentives for Interagency Assignments Failure to Fill Interagency Positions Quickly Tendency to Allocate for Short Rotations Competition for Talented People

20. Problem 20: Dominant department and agency cultures inhibit unified effort. Eroded Overarching Culture (p. 316) System Attributes Militate Against National Security Culture (316) No Interagency Core Tasks (315) WH Issue Management (p. 316) Weak Interagency Education (p. 316) Dominant Department and Agency Cultures Inhibit Unified Effort (313) Weak Structure/Weak Culture (p. 317) Departmental Core Tasks (p. 316) Selection (p. 314) Indoctrination (p. 314) Separate and Unconstrained Department and Agency Cultures (315) Career Progression (p. 314) Embodiment (p. 314) Autonomy-seeking (p. 313) Friction (p. 313) Simultaneous Cultures (p. 316)

21. Human Capital Problem 20: Leaders pay insufficient attention to building institutional capacity No time or incentives for institution building Leaders pay insufficient attention to building institutional capacity Institution building is difficult and progress is hard to measure

22. Human Capital Problem 21: Leaders pay insufficient attention to interagency missions Leaders pay insufficient attention to interagency missions Senior leader roles are conflicted

23. Human Capital Problem 22: Subordinate leaders are disinclined to take initiative. Bureaucratic control impedes initiative Preference for policymaking over management Subordinate leaders are disinclined to take initiative Poor communication of senior leader goals Inadequate investment in leadership skills

24. Knowledge Management Problem 23: Sharing information across organizational boundaries is difficult. Agency cultures discourage information sharing Poor interoperability on the classified side Sharing information across organizational boundaries is difficult Overclassification The proliferation of the “sensitive but unclassified’ designation

25. Knowledge Management Problem 24: Organizational learning is thwarted The tendency toward consensus decision-making undermines the vigorous debate at the highest levels of the national security system Political and bureaucratic influences impede organizational learning Organizational learning is thwarted The system often abandons institutional memory-particularly in the transition between presidential administrations The worldviews of incoming administrations encourage the discarding of institutional memory

26. Knowledge Management Problem 25: The national security system lacks true global situation awareness Organizational perspectives filter inputs to senior decision-makers, skewing interpretations of the security environment The national security system lacks true global situation awareness The “common operational picture” (COP) demands continuous updating Cognitive biases interfere

27. Knowledge Management Problem 26: Current data systems do not provide or are not employed in a manner that promotes optimal knowledge sharing. Confusion technical connections with collaboration Information systems are missing common data abstraction, protocols, and compatible business logic. Current data systems do not provide or are not employed in a manner that promotes optimal knowledge sharing Inability of systems to understand business limitations and context of data

28. Resources Problem 27: Strategy and policy priorities do not drive resource allocation and tradeoffs. Lack of decision mechanisms and analytic support in OMB or the EOP to link interagency strategy to national security funding decisions Strategy and policy priorities do not drive resource allocation and tradeoffs The current standard procedures reinforce the absence of a clear link between interagency strategy and resources Insufficient regard for the cost of implementing decisions Lack of integrated, broad long-term planning

29. Resources Problem 28: The system is unable to resource the full range of required capabilities for national priority missions The current allocation system actively discourages agencies from budgeting for external or contingent purposes, even for national security. The system is unable to resource the full range of required capabilities for national priority missions No common understanding of the scope of national security Budget assessments operate on the belief that there will be sufficient flexibility and hidden excess to cover any imbalance Resource allocation is not connected to the successful execution of previous budgets

30. Resources Problem 29: It is difficult to provide resources for interagency response to crises OMB belief that appropriated funds are sufficient to cover contingencies or that existing funds should be exhausted before any additional funding is made available It is difficult to provide resources for interagency response to crises Varying limits on reprogramming and transfer authorities available to agencies in response to contingencies Congress has historically resisted providing funding for contingencies Difficulty identifying major emergency resource needs in advance

31. Congress Problem 30: No routine oversight of interagency issues, operations, or requirements. No committee has jurisdiction over the national security system No congressional jurisdiction over national security system management No routine oversight of interagency issues, operations, or requirements Jurisdictional legacies reinforce narrow oversight focus Protection of “turf” and power

32. Congress Problem 31: Congress lacks interest and confidence in the executive branch’s management of foreign affairs Perception of public resistance to aid programs Defense programs have strong domestic constituencies Congress lacks interest and confidence in the executive branch’s management of foreign affairs Congress sees the Defense Department as more capable and efficient than the State Department Inherently controversial national security topics

33. Congress Problem 32: Allocation of resources tends toward inflexibility. Constitutional Prerogative Allocation of resources tends toward inflexibility Legacy of past problems and distrust

34. Congress Problem 33: Slow confirmation process for presidential appointees leads to inaction and bureaucratic drift on many issues Confirmation process increasingly politicized Slow confirmation process for presidential appointees leads to inaction and bureaucratic drift on many issues Paperwork requirements Large number of officials requiring confirmation

35. Congress Problem 34: Failure to pass legislation on time has become endemic. National security legislation is controversial, and foreign affairs committees are weak Failure to pass legislation on time has become endemic Dilution and distribution of power

36. Congress Problem 35: Legislative and executive branches are too confrontational. Reports are multi-purpose tools Legislative and executive branches are too confrontational Executive-legislative tension is inherent to the political process Legacy of past disputes