NUCLEAR AND RADIATION SAFETY MANAGEMENT AND ITS RELATIONS WITH METAL SCRAP MONITORING

1. NUCLEAR AND RADIATION SAFETY MANAGEMENT AND ITS RELATIONS WITH METAL SCRAP MONITORING GEORGIA Nuclear and Radiation Safety Service Ministry of Environment Protection and Natural Resources of Georgia

2. LOCATION • RUSSIAN FEDERATION • AZERBAIJAN • ARMENIA • TURKEY • BLACK SEA

3. POPULATION estimate 5.5 mil. Annual growth rate 0.81 percent in 1994. Density seventy-nine per square kilometer in 1994 COUNTRY SIZE 69,875 square kilometers. OFFICIAL LANGUAGE Georgian Belongs to the group of Caucasian languages, which is distinguished from Indo-European and Turkish languages. In Georgia is used Georgian script. Oldest example of the writing is of 4th century. RELIGION Christianity Georgian Orthodox 65 percent, Muslim 11 percent, Russian Orthodox 10 percent, and Armenian Apostolic 8 percent. ETHNIC GROUPS In early 1990s, Georgians 70.1 percent, Armenians 8.1 percent, Russians 6.3 percent, Azerbaijanis 5.7 percent, Ossetians 3 percent, and Abkhaz 1.8 percent. CONSTITUTION 1994 president, parliament, constitutional court etc.

4. MAIN TRANSPORTATION CORRIDORS

5. 70 km 75 km

6. LEGAL BASIS • THE LAW ON NUCLEAR AND RADIATION SAFETY • THE LAW ON INTELLIGENCE SERVICE • THE CUSTOMS CODEX • THE LAW ON POLICE • THE NORMS FOR RADIATION SAFETY OF GEORGIA (RSN 2000) – BASED ON BSS (BASIC SAFETY STANDARDS) OF THE IAEA • THE IAEA EARLY NOTIFICATION AND ASSISTANCE CONVENTIONS • THE IAEA– GEORGIA NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY AND ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS (signed in 2001) • LAW ON TRANSPORTATION, IMPORT, EXPORT AND RE-EXPORT OF RECYCLING MATERIALS

7. COMBATING ILLEGAL MOVEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS MINISTRY OF ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION AND NATURAL RESOURCES NUCLEAR AND RADIATION SAFETY SERVICE MINISTRY OF FINANCES CUSTOMS DEPARTMENT INTELLIGENCE SERVICE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR STATE BORDER GUARD

8. MAIN CUSTOMS CHECK POINTS PSOU LARSI ROKI POTI TBILISI AIRPORT SARPI VALE RED BRIDGE SADAKHLO

9. THREAT RELATED TO RADIOACTIVELY CONTAMINATED SCRAP METAL GAPS • INTERNAL MOVEMENT AND RECYCLING • NO OBLIGATIONS ON LICENSING – ABOLISHED AT THE END OF 2004 • NO PROCEDURES, GUIDELINES, INSTRUCTIONS • NO MONITORING EQUIPMENT IN PLACE AS NO OBLIGATIONS TO HAVE IT • NO SURVEILANCE PROCEDURES

10. HISTORY OF RADIOLOGICAL ACCCIDENTS IN GEORGIA 1989– Cs 137 - TBILISI, Co 60 – KUTAISI (no information about victims); 1992 – Ra 226 - AKHALI AFONI (2 overexposed, one dead); 1993–Cs 137 - ZESTAFONI (no information about victims); 1994– Co 60 - KUTAISI(4 overexposed, all are dead); 1997 - Cs137, Co 60, Ra 226 – LILO military base (11 overexposed); 1998 – Sr 90 – village Matkhoji, Sr 90 – villages KHAISHI and LABURTSKHILA (several overexposed among local population); END of 2001 – Early 2002 – Sr 90 – village LIA (3 overexposed, one dead).

11. LAST INCIDENTS RELATED TO RADIOACTIVELY CONTAMINATED SCRAP • FEBRUARY 2004 – Cs137 source in Aluminum scrap • DECEMBER 2004 – Cs137 source with container in Iron scrap • Both discovered at the customs check point Sarp

12. LILO MILITARY BASE - 1997

13. LILO MILITARY BASE - 1997

14. LILO MILITARY BASE - 1997

15. LILO MILITARY BASE - 1997

16. LILO - 1997

17. KHAISHI - 1998

18. RECENT RADIOLOGICAL ACCIDENT PLACE – West Georgia, Region Tsalenjikha, Village Lia DATE – 22.12.01 FACILITY - RITEG PASSPORT DATA: Dose rate 240Sv/H, Activity 35000Ci RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL – Two Sources of the Sr 90 ACTUAL DOSE RATES (distance – 1 meter): I source ~ 0.67 Sv/h; II source ~ 0.58 Sv/h VICTIMS – 3 Individuals

19. LIA – END OF 2001

20. THREAT RELATED TO RADIOACTIVELY CONTAMINATED SCRAP METAL ESSENTIAL POINTS: • Proper legislations – proper monitoring of scrap metal; • Harmonization with international standards – linking with legislations of other countries – interoperability; • Interoperability of national and international (IAEA, UNECE etc.) notification and response centers • Proper training and equipment

21. THREAT RELATED TO RADIOACTIVELY CONTAMINATED SCRAP METAL GEORGIA’S NEEDS: • Improvement of legal basis; • Adoption of guidelines and procedures harmonized with international ones; • Train and equip (partially) relevant personnel; • Improve operability of notification and response infrastructure

22. THREAT RELATED TO RADIOACTIVELY CONTAMINATED SCRAP METAL CONCLUSIONS: • Because of International trading – movement through several countries and between different owners and facilities, • Because of different levels of legislation covering the subject in different countries, • Because of different qualities of equipment used and levels of personnel knowledge and experience, ALL COUNTRIES NEED TO HARMONIZE THEIR LEGISLATIONS AS WELL AS FACILITIES AND PERSONNEL CAPABILLITIES ACCORDING TO ONE COMMON BASIC DOCUMENT & Process of harmonization needs permanent monitoring fulfilled by international organizations (UNECE, IAEA etc.) & Regional Projects covering Black Sea, South Caucasus, Eastern Europe regions more likely to be implemented in order to achieve such harmonization

23. THANK YOU FOR ATTENTION