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Maintenance Steering Group 3 (MSG-3)

Maintenance Steering Group 3 (MSG-3). Scott Vandersall 730 ACSG Chief Engineer. 9 Nov 2006. Overview. MSG-3 – What is it? Objectives / Methodology Decision Logic Maintenance Philosophy Differences Structural & Systems Inherent Reliability Hierarchical Maintenance

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Maintenance Steering Group 3 (MSG-3)

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  1. Maintenance Steering Group 3(MSG-3) Scott Vandersall 730 ACSG Chief Engineer 9 Nov 2006

  2. Overview • MSG-3 – What is it? • Objectives / Methodology • Decision Logic • Maintenance Philosophy Differences • Structural & Systems Inherent Reliability • Hierarchical Maintenance • Industry Trends /Success • Benefits • Realized Benefits • Work Cards • Implementation • MSG-3 Supply Parts Identification

  3. C-5 MSG-3 • Why: Recommendations from a C-5 General Officer Steering Group to Improve Aircraft Availability • Transition from fly-to-fail philosophy • What: Develop and Catalog Scheduled C-5 Inspection and Maintenance Requirements Along With Scheduled Intervals and Rationale for Each Task. • How: Using Scheduled Maintenance Program Development Approach Described in Air Transportation Association’s MSG-3 Decision Logic Document.

  4. MSG-3 Program • MSG-3 or RCM? • RCM is the philosophy • MSG-3 is the methodology used to execute the philosophy • Improve Reliability and Aircraft Availability • Maximize MC Rates • Minimize NMCS and NMCM Rates • Reduce Maintenance Costs • Eliminate unnecessary maintenance tasks • Extend the interval(s) of maintenance tasks • Improve efficiency of maintenance tasks (standardizes work) • Ensures Operational Safety, Suitability, & Effectiveness • Enabler for Air Force Smart Operations 21 (AFSO21) and Condition Based Maintenance Plus (CBM+) “LEAN” Overall Maintenance Program

  5. eLog21 GoalC-5 Aircraft Availability Percent Available eLog21 Goal 64.1% Aircraft Available

  6. Hierarchical Maintenance Program 8 Yr Tasks 4 Yr Tasks Inspection intensity is typically increased as the task is elevated hierarchically 16 Month Tasks 4 Month Tasks Pre-Flight, Thru-flight, & BPO Tasks All lower level core tasks are accomplished during the next higher level check Intervals based on 1996/97 Inspection Interval Integrity Program (I3P) Study

  7. Change in Maintenance Program Methodology

  8. Benefits • Maximizes aircraft availability • Major Tenet of Aircraft Availability Improvement Plan (AAIP) • Extended inspection intervals frees up assets • Safeguards inherent safety and reliability • Ensures Operational Safety, Suitability, & Effectiveness • Reduces Costs / Cost Avoidance • Creates program credibility and instills confidence by involving all stakeholders • Integrates all levels of maintenance activity • Outcome has logic that is defensible at all levels of scrutiny • Assures that all areas of the aircraft are thoroughly covered and have the proper level of inspection

  9. Realized Benefits • Slat Inspections • Issues During Depot Functional Check Flights • MSG-3 Checklist Developed, Approved and Implemented by Engineering -70-0462 – 39 Slat Discrepancies Prior to Mar 05 PDM Input / Nov 05 Output -87-0040 – 14 Slat Discrepancies Prior to Aug 05 PDM Input / Jan 06 Output • Parts Requirements to Support MSG-3 Checklist Identified • Requirements Provided to CSW for Entering into the File Maintenance Computations • Provide Quick Hits for problem areas for current program until MSG–3 implementation

  10. Commercial Based Workcards Current process with -6 Workcards Process with Commercial Based Workcards

  11. Implementation Overview

  12. MSG-3 Supply Parts Identification Overview • MSG-3 Supply Parts Identification • Stock Listed Parts – Sources of Supply • Stock Listed Parts – By Work Unit Code (WUC) • Not Stock Listed (NSL) Parts – By WUC

  13. MSG-3 Supply Parts Identification • 3,949 Parts Identified • 3,609 Parts Stock Listed • 3,563 Parts with Sources of Supply • 46 Parts Coded Local Manufacture • 340 Parts Not Stock Listed (NSL) • 311 Supply Source to be Determined • 29 NSL Parts Coded Local Manufacture

  14. MSG-3 Supply Parts Identification Stock Listed Parts

  15. STOCK LISTED ITEMS - SOURCES OF SUPPLY

  16. Stock Listed Parts by Work Unit Code (WUC)

  17. Stock Listed Parts by WUC- (Cont.)

  18. Stock Listed Parts by WUC - (Cont.)

  19. Stock Listed Parts by WUC – (Cont.)

  20. Stock Listed Parts by WUC – (Cont.)

  21. Not-Stock Listed Parts (In Work Listing Posted on Requirements Symposium Web Site)

  22. Not Stock Listed Parts by WUC

  23. Not Stock Listed Parts by WUC – (Cont.)

  24. Not Stock Listed Parts by WUC - (Cont.)

  25. Not Stock Listed Parts by WUC – (Cont.)

  26. SUMMARY • Full Air Staff Commitment to MSG-3 • 3,949 Parts Identified • 3,609 Parts Stock Listed • 340 Part Not Stock Listed • 77% of the Parts – DLA Source of Supply • 13% of the Parts – WR-ALC (Robins) • List Provided for the Not Stock Listed Parts

  27. Questions?

  28. Back-up Slides

  29. Maintain Structural Inherent Reliability Structural Inherent Reliability (Design Strength) 1 2 3 4 Upgrade Deterioration Restore Limit Of Acceptable Deterioration SAFETY BOUNDARY • Not necessary to find every defect in a zone at every check. • Program provides multiple opportunities to detect degradation prior to reaching the limit of acceptable deterioration. • Repairs restore structure to original Inherent Reliability. Upgrades are necessary when deterioration rate is excessive.

  30. Maintain System Inherent Reliability OriginalSystemDesign IR Deteriorated System IR 1 2 3 4 Upgrade ComponentReplacement REV Deterioration Limit Of Acceptable Deterioration SAFETY BOUNDARY • Normally system component replacements will not restore system Inherent Reliability back to original design level • Reliability Enhancement Visit (REV) restores deteriorated system to its original design level • System upgrade increases inherent reliability above original design level

  31. 88 Total Forced Structural Maintenance Plan Items Not Inspected Realized Benefits cont.. Sample

  32. INSPECTION CURRENT INSPECTION INTERVAL PROPOSED POST MSG-3 INSPECTION INTERVAL A/C Pre-Flight Prior to first flight of the day Prior to first flight of the day All Thru-Flight Prior to take-off at intermediate stop Prior to take-off at intermediate stop All Home Station Every 105 days Every 120 days All Minor Isochronal Every 14 months (420 days) Every 16 months (480 days) All Major Isochronal Every 28 months (840 days) Every 48 months (1460 days) All PDM (C-5A) PDM (C-5C) PDM (C-5B) 60 months 60 months 84 months 8 Years (96 months) All ACI Special Inspection In conjunction w/ PDM As specified Specific Specific C-5 Program Status

  33. Is theMLG Wheel a Maintenance Significant Item (MSI) Could failure affect SAFETY (on the ground or in flight), including safety/emergency systems or equipment? Could failure have significant ECONOMIC impact? Could failure have significant OPERATIONAL impact? Could failure be UNDETECTABLE or not likely to be detected by the operating crew during normal duties? One or more “Yes” answers will lead to further analysis All “No” would lead to no further analysis Level 1 Analysis Yes Yes Yes Is the functional failure EVIDENT to the operating crew during the performance of normal duties? Yes No Evident Failure Hidden Failure Does the combination of a hidden functional failure and one additional failure of a system related or backup function have an adverse EFFECT on operating SAFETY? Does the functional failure or secondary damage resulting from the functional failure have a DIRECT adverse EFFECT on operating SAFETY? No No No No No Does the functional failure have DIRECT adverse EFFECT on operating CAPABILITY? Yes Yes No Yes No Level 2 Analysis Evident Safety Maintenance tasks and intervals required to assure safe operation Evident Operational Servicing Task at Pre/Post Flight Restoration task at Major ISO GVI task at ISO Discard at PDM Evident Economic Maintenance tasks and intervals desirable if cost is less than repair cost of failure Hidden Safety Maintenance tasks and intervals required to assure availability necessary to avoid multiple failureseffects Hidden Non-Safety Maintenance tasks and intervals desirable to assure the availability to avoid the economic effects of multiple failures

  34. Current Status of C-5 Program • Enhanced Zonal Analyses & Research • Completed • Approximately 400 Wiring Tasks • Structural Analyses and Task Consolidation • In Review (ECD: Nov 06) • Intervals Predicated on Structural Tasks • Systems Analyses - Completed • Systems Task Consolidation - Completed • Parts Supportability Analysis by System • In Progress (ECD: Aug 07) • Commercial Best Practice Work Cards (ECD: Jun 08) • Providing Quick Hits for problem areas for current program until MSG–3 implementation

  35. Example of Industry Success • Man-hours based on average available 750 man-hours per day • Goal – reduce maintenance costs and maintain Pre MSG-3 reliability • Outcome – reduced maintenance costs and increased reliability • Great reduction in Light Checks due to incorporating enhanced zonal program—proper time to find, proper time to fix

  36. Reliability-Based MSG-3 Program Hours Traditional Program Time • Pay-off – cheaper to maintain a more reliable aircraft • Data Provided by Delta Tiger Team Consultant Industry Inspection Program Trends

  37. Implementation • FY10 Implementation • General Officer Approval Required • AF/A4, AFMC, AMC, ANG, AFRES, AETC • Phased Approach • Obstacles • Culture • Regulations/Policy • Commercial Based Work Cards / Interactive Electronic Technical Manuals (IETMs) • MRRB/Funding • Part Supportability • Technical Manuals • IETMS • Manpower / Rates /Skill Mix

  38. MSG-3 Implementation Risks

  39. Conclusion • Implementation will: • Decrease frequency, not number of Inspections • Create a more detailed inspection • Increase Planned Work Package • Decrease Unplanned Work • Standardize work • Increase Aircraft Availability • Require parts commitment • Need support from Logistics community

  40. MSG-3 Supply Parts Identification Local Manufacture Parts • Stock Listed • Not Stock Listed

  41. Local Manufacture Parts Stock Listed by WUC

  42. Local Manufacture Parts Stock Listed by WUC

  43. Local Manufacture Parts Not Stock Listed by WUC

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