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Future nuclear weapon policies James M. Acton jacton@ceip

Future nuclear weapon policies James M. Acton jacton@ceip.org. (Some) elements of nuclear posture. Force size and structure Deployed and reserve systems; readiness status Military Organization Troops; training; procedures; operations Enabling systems

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Future nuclear weapon policies James M. Acton jacton@ceip

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  1. Future nuclear weapon policies James M. Acton jacton@ceip.org

  2. (Some) elements of nuclear posture • Force size and structure • Deployed and reserve systems; readiness status • Military Organization • Troops; training; procedures; operations • Enabling systems • Command and control; early warning; ISR; targeting • Infrastructure • Warhead production/maintenance facilities; industrial base; test facilities • Declaratory policy • Statements; training and exercises; domestic discourse • War plans • Treaty obligations

  3. Questions raised by reductions • Can U.S. fulfill “deterrence” requirements? • Will weapons reach target? • Reliability; pre- and post-launch survivability • Will weapons destroy target? • Yield, accuracy and target location error • Can requirements be revised? • How will allies/adversaries view U.S. resolve and capability? • What will the effects on “strategic stability” be? • …

  4. Current U.S. force structure

  5. Future of the triad • Political context crucial; in practice force structure will be determined by politics of the moment as much as nuclear strategy • ICBM replacement will probably be delayed further (beyond 2020); early abandonment very unlikely (jobs!) • Very strong support for SLBMs • Multiple decision points related to heavy bombers and tactical fighters coming up • Air leg most vulnerable

  6. Arguments for heavy bombers and tactical fighters • Unique ability to hold buried targets at risk • But, how much do these targets really matter? • Stealth as alternative to speed for defense penetration • But, how likely is effective BMD? • Recallable • But, how many war plan options include only aircraft? • Forward deployment as tool for assurance • But, are there alternatives? • Signaling as tool for crisis management

  7. A growing role for conventional weapons in strategic war plans? • DoD is directed to conduct deliberate planning for non-nuclear strike options to assess what objectives and effects could be achieved through integrated non-nuclear strike options, and to propose possible means to make these objectives and effects achievable. Although they are not a substitute for nuclear weapons, planning for non-nuclear strike options is a central part of reducing the role of nuclear weapons. • Report on Nuclear Employment Strategy of the United States (2013) • Probably not about large-scale replacement.

  8. Types of target in a “counterforce” attack against North Korea • Fixed, soft targets • ICBM sitting on a launch pad • Fixed, buried targets • Warhead storage facilities; leadership; command and control • Probably tens, potentially hundreds of metres deep • Mobile, soft targets • Road-mobile missiles

  9. Massive ordnance penetrator • Total mass: 13,600 kg • HE mass: 2,400 kg • Can reportedly penetrate to 20 m in reinforced concrete (much less than nuclear weapons)

  10. Physics of conventional penetrators Young Penetration Equation (SI Units) D: Depth S: Penetrability of target N: Nose performance coefficient m: Mass A: Cross sectional area V: Speed • From Nelson (2002)

  11. CPGS technological approaches

  12. Comparison of penetrator effectiveness • Ratio of penetration depths: 1.3-2.1 • CPGS penetrator would only contain about 10% of the HE that MOP does.

  13. Mobile missile hunting • Need to locate and track missiles • If using standoff weapons need to provide inflight target updates (or risk waiting until they’re stationary) • North Korea has hundreds of mobile ballistic missiles • Only a small fraction might contain a nuclear warhead, but very hard to tell which is which • 1991 Gulf War: 1,460 sorties; 0 confirmed kills • 2006 Israel-Hizbollah war: 80-90% of Hizbollah’s medium- and long-range rocket launchers destroyed. But, took time and relied on attacking launchers after missiles has fired.

  14. Nuclear v. conventional options • Lethal radius from flechette weapon: <100 m, possibly much less (my calculation) • TEL can traverse this distance in 10 s • Lethal radius from 100 kT nuclear weapon: 2,900 m (McKinzieet al. 2001) • TEL can traverse this distance in 260 s • Hunting mobile missiles with conventional weapons much harder than nuclear weapons

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