Nathaneal Greene Liberty Fellowship Montgomery NJ Summer Institute

1. Strategic and Political Dimensions of the 1991 Gulf War, 2003 War in Iraq, and Fighting the Taliban and al-Qacida in AfghanistanEric Davisdavis@polisci.rutgers.eduhttp://fas-polisci.rutgers.edu/davis Nathaneal Greene Liberty Fellowship Montgomery NJ Summer Institute American Institute for History Education June 29, 2010

2. War represented cross-currents of rising Islamic militancy and global need for oil Reflected political ambitions and ego of Saddam Husayn who sought to make Iraq the main military power in Persian Gulf Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990 Iraq claimed that Kuwait was its 19th province that had been separated illegally from Iraq by Great Britain in 1920 (“lines in the sand”) Origins of 1991 (or Second) Gulf War

3. 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War was extremely costly Saudi Arabia and Kuwait lent Iraq funds during the war to prevent an Iranian victory After war ended, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait now feared 1,000,000 man battled tested Iraqi army Saudi Arabia and Kuwait demanded their loans be repaid and increased oil output, driving down prices Saddam had promised Iraqis that prosperity would return after Iran-Iraq War ended, but he was unable to keep his promise 1991 Gulf War and Oil

4. Iraqi Invasion plan for Kuwait, August 1990

5. Iraqi army quickly defeated Kuwaiti forces Kuwaiti royal family and army fled to Saudi Arabia and Gulf states Iraq thought it had “green light” for invasion from US after Saddam Husayn met with Ambassador April Glaspie (http://dvmx.com/glaspie.html) However, US and allies felt Saddam could not be allowed to control Persian Gulf’s oil wealth Iraq in Kuwait: Aug. 1990-Jan. 1991

6. Important to compare the international effort of 1991 in the UN’s confrontation with Iraq, with 2003 war 1991 Gulf War coalition led by the US included important Arab allies, Egypt and Syria War demonstrated that Arab states had differing interests and would not support Iraq Iraq broke the Arab League’s cardinal rule that no Arab League member seize another Arab state Iraq sought to manipulate anti-Israeli sentiment, and bring Israel into war through Scud missile attacks on its cities Saddam added “God is Great” (Allahu Akbar) to the Iraqi flag to manipulate Islamist sentiments against US coalition Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait led to UN coalition

7. Images (and Stereotypes) of the Gulf War

8. Saddam Husayn was still in power because US led coalition refused to overthrow his Bacthist regime US allowed Iraq to use helicopter gun ships to brutally repress a massive popular uprising (Intifada) US forces ordered not to help insurgents, and to blow up ammunitions dump so rebels couldn’t seize them UN sanctions (1991-2003) after war meant to force Iraq to destroy Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Iraq’s national economy and education system collapsed during 1990s under weight of UN sanctions Aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War

9. US feared that only Saddam could keep Iraq from fragmenting after the Gulf War If Iraq split up, Turkey, Syria, Iran and Saudi Arabia might try and seize part of the country Because Iraq major oil producer, and occupies strategic position , US feared foreign takeover of country This was a major strategic blunder because Saddam rebuilt his repressive security apparatus, using oil smuggled out of Iraq Why did US not overthrow Saddam in 1991?

10. Saddam Husayn’s Bacthist regime very weak after 1991 Gulf War bombings and national uprising Many Bacthist officials killed during the Intifada Saddam tried to “Islamicize” and “retribalize” Iraqi society to gain support of traditional forces Economic and educational decline, and Saddam’s policies that promoted traditional forces, led to rise of conservative Islamist movements Collapse of national economy encouraged oil smuggling and transformation of the Iraqi economy into a large criminal enterprise Oil smuggling became main source of wealth Iraq prior to the 2003 War

11. Images from “Shock and Awe”

12. “Shock and Awe” campaign gave US false sense of victory in Iraq Military unaware that massive firepower and bombing not enough to win in Iraq With volunteer army and decline in enlisted personnel, US military thought technology could compensate for reduced force levels Only130,000 troops sent when 400,000 recommended Anticipating rapid US victory, Saddam had insurgency ready, with weapons caches/funds in areas loyal to him “Shock and Awe” vs. Hearts and Minds

13. Donald Rumsfeld said Baghdad April 2003 looting part of “untidy” aspect of freedom and that “stuff happens” Such comments did not build trust among Iraqis regarding US efforts to build democracy in Iraq US military secured Saddam’s Republican Palace (Ministry of Defense) and Ministry of Oil All other ministries were destroyed and Iraq Museum, with priceless artifacts, was looted Baghdad looting undermined Iraqi confidence in US occupation April-May 2003: Losing Hearts and Minds

14. Baghdad looting: April 2003

15. Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) governed Iraq from May, 2003-June 2004 Disbanded 385,000 Iraq army against the advice of US military and Iraqi politicians National police dismissed and 125,000 state factory workers fired Agriculture subsidies eliminated August 2003, forcing many farmers to migrate to urban areas While CPA mandated salary increases helped employed middle classes, their policies hurt poorer Iraqis, the majority of the country CPA policies and hearts and minds

16. Most US officials sent to Iraq had little knowledge of the country and spoke no Arabic US took advice of Iraqi expatriates, many of whom had sectarian agendas in Iraq US wanted complete control over country, and thus focused on eliminating Bacthists from all positions of power US didn’t make distinction between high Bacthist officials and large number of Iraqis who forced to join the party, but really despised Saddam’s regime De-Bacthification led to disastrous consequences Why did US follow bad policies in Iraq?

17. Insurgency began summer of 2003 among Sunni Arabs in al-Anbar Province Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army (JAM) existed before 2003, and immediately began to challenge US forces Donald Rumsfeld refused to admit an insurgency existed until fall 2003 Having excluded Iraq experts and Arab politics specialists, and relying on a small military force, US was headed for defeat in Iraq by 2006 Insurgency helped by high unemployment of youth, caused in part by US CPA’s policies Freedom, but not order: the insurgency and the Mahdi Army

18. Muqtada al-Sadr and the Mahdi Army

19. April 2003 looting destroyed many government offices, thereby undermining state’s effectiveness Inadequate US force levels and lack of national police made it impossible to control “sectarian entrepreneurs” Iraqi government’s neglect of agriculture created large rural exodus, and no urban jobs Ethnic cleansing occurred in poorer neighborhoods, but esp. in those with large in-migration of youth from rural areas With lack of security and no state services, Iraqis forced to turn to sectarian organizations US force levels and ethnic cleansing

20. al-Qacida overplayed its hand in Sunni Arab triangle, killing Iraqis and stealing their wealth Rise of “Awakening” movement among Sunni Arab tribes in al-Anbar Province destroyed al-Qacida in less than a year Mahdi Army declared a truce in August 2007 that led to calm in Baghdad and southern Iraq In March 2008, Iraqi army suppressed JAM in Basra, Baghdad and the Shiite south of Iraq Surge helped as well through embedding additional 30,000 US troops in residential neighborhoods What caused situation in Iraq to turn around?

21. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) have not been given enough credit for role in reducing violence PRT role dramatically increased by Gen. David Petreaus (Ph.D, International Relations Princeton University), with new counter-insurgency approach PRTs followed new “bottom up” approach, listening to Iraqis and implementing their goals Iraqis feel respected because they define development goals and projects, while US helps implement them Why role did PRTs play in stabilizing Iraq?

22. Images of Afghanistan

23. US largely ignored Afghanistan after military overthrow of Taliban regime after 9/11 In 2001, US/West promised Afghanistan much development aid, but delivered relatively little Few alternative economic opportunities are available to farmers beyond poppy production Regional warlords continued to exploit peasants after Taliban regime was overthrown How is the US confronting the Taliban and al-Qacida in Afghanistan?

24. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, neighbor states do not want to see political stability and democracy prevail Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Turkey have attempted to undermine Iraq Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have attempted to undermine Afghanistan Saudi Arabia has funded many Taliban “madrasas” which are really not schools, but training camps Military strategy needs to be sensitive to the political environment in fighting wars The role of “neighborhood effects”

25. Pakistan concerned with lack of its ability to control Pashtuns in its remote northwestern provinces 40% Afghanistan is comprised of Pashtuns Inter-Security Services (ISI) – Pakistan’s CIA - has been Taliban’s main supporter since 1990s Pakistan state wants to promote Pashtun interest in Afghanistan so Pakistani Pashtuns do not seek independent state carved out of its NW provinces Pakistan’s “double game”: partially supports US war on terror, while supporting Taliban at same time US and NATO forces cannot defeat Taliban when they enjoy a safe haven in Pakistan Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan

26. The Afghan political leadership Taliban flag Afghani president Hamid Kharzai Taliban leaders, including Mullah Abdul Salaam Zareef (center) Fugitive Taliban leader Mullah Omar (perhaps)

27. Government corruption has alienated many Afghans; undermined their faith in democracy Pres. Hamid Karzai has allowed his relatives to engage in massive corruption al-Qacida has rebuilt its strength along the Afghan border with Pakistan, with many Arab fighters Political instability and fear of India has undermined ability of Pakistan army to fight al-Qacida Many new, younger Taliban leaders have joined the movement since 2001 Why has Taliban gained strength since 2006?

28. Taliban has split into 3 movements 1) Mullah Omar group (older leadership); 2) pro-Pakistan wing; 3) group tied to al-Qacida Split represents tribal, generational and ideological conflicts within Taliban As in Iraq, al-Qacida has alienated many Pakistanis and Afghanis through seizing property and imposing harsh version of Islamic “law” “Pragmatic” wing of Taliban wants to negotiate and end to war, break with al-Qacida, and end quest for supranational “Caliphate,” i.e., Pan-Islamic state Why did Taliban break with al-Qacida?

29. US and NATO forces in Afghanistan

30. US expenditures in Afghanistan and Iraq, 2001-2009

31. Unless local populaces support US and West, military force will not succeed Despite problem of “mission stretch,” US military will need to become more involved in reconstruction efforts in countries like Iraq and Afghanistan International efforts will be needed to provide development aid and fight domestic corruption Unless governments in countries that face threats from radical forces provide social services and act in a civic manner towards their people, the war on terror cannot be won Summary thoughts: fighting wars politically

32. Military force must continue to be core element of US efforts to fight terrorism “Shock and Awe” strategies of limited utility US military units need to be highly mobile and work with local pro-American forces Military efforts alone cannot defeat terrorism US needs new counter-insurgency strategy that goes beyond military force Summary thoughts: fighting wars in the Middle East

33. US does not have the resources and manpower to fight wars on multiple fronts Key to success in fighting radicalism abroad will be extent to which US can internationalize this effort Creating international coalitions will lessen US presence in counter-terrorism and counter insurgency efforts and take pressure off our shrinking resource base Summary thoughts: lessons learned