OUTLINE OF SECURITY PROPOSAL

1. OUTLINE OF SECURITY PROPOSAL Malcolm Dando

2. 1. T he Original Design of the EMR • Web of Prevention • Intelligence, Export Controls, Arms Control • The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention • Structure, Weakness, Development, Status • Dual-Use Issues • Bioterror, Scientific Responsibility • Agents of Concern • Bacteria, Viruses, Toxins

3. 2. Final Design of the EMR • History of Offensive Programmes • Illustrated by examples from the following section • Modern Understanding of Biological and Toxin Agents • The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention • Dual-Use • The Web of Prevention • IN SHORT THE EMR WAS TURNED AROUND

4. 3. Lecture 1: Introduction and Overview • Benefits and Risks • H5N1/BTWC, Law Enforcement/CWC • Responsible Conduct of Research • Internal Aspects, External Aspects, Emerging Technologies, Doctrine of Double Effect • Overview of Lectures • Militarization of the Life Sciences • Meselson’s Warning

5. 4. Lecture 2: Chemical Weapons • World War 1 • Incapacitants in Warfare, Lethal Escalation • World War 2 • Why non-use? • The Cold War • MK-ULTRA, Nerve Agents, Iran/Iraq War, Halabja • Counter-Terror/Law Enforcement • Moscow Theatre Siege

6. 5. Lecture 3: Biological and Toxin Weapons • Concepts • Agents, Targets, Purposes • Attacking the Nervous System • SEB, VEE, Behavioural Control? • World War 2 • Fears about Bot Tox on D-Day • Bioregulators and Warfare • Concerns today, Agents Orange in Vietnam

7. 6. Lecture 4: The CBW Non-Proliferation Regime • 1925 Geneva Protocol • Content, Reservations, Status • The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention • Structure, Phases of Development, Current Issues • The Chemical Weapons Convention • Structure, Phases of Development, Current Issues • Holistic Control • Laws of War, Human Rights Law, Drug Control

8. 7. Lecture 5: Novel Neuroweapons • Framing the Question • Bioterror/Dual-Use • Militarization • Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation • Impact of different frameworks for governance • Brain-Computer Interfaces • The data processing problem • Autonomous Weapon Systems

9. 8. Meselson’s Concerns (i) • Warning in 2000 • “…During the century ahead, as our ability to modify fundamental life processes continues its rapid advance, we will be able not only to devise additional ways to destroy life but will also become able to manipulate it – including the processes of cognition, development, reproduction and inheritance…” • “…A world in which these capabilities are widely employed for hostile purposes would be a world in which the very nature of conflict had radically changed. Therein could lie unprecedented opportunities for violence, coercion, repression, or subjugation…”

10. 9. Meselson’s Concern (ii) • Implications • “…Unlike the technologies of conventional or even nuclear weapons, biotechnology has the potential to place mass destructive capabilities in a multitude of hands and, in coming decades, to reach deeply into what we are and how we regard ourselves. It should be evident that any intensive exploitation of biotechnology for hostile purposes could take humanity down a particularly undesirable path.”

11. 10. At Least One Major Question! • I do not think it is possible for a scientists to work out what to do just by discussion of specific cases of dual-use. • So I think there has to be some basic philosophy/ethics here. • But what and where? • And how to bring it in? • Does the Doctrine of Double Effect work best?